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I have three main aims in this thesis. The first is simply to interrogate the form and structure 
of the principle texts produced within the English legal system in the late sixteenth century. 
This is obviously a vast and complex undertaking. I have, therefore, limited the scope of the 
thesis to a consideration of that part of English law known as Equity;1 with a particular focus 
on two jurisdictions and the texts produced for them: The Palatinate of Lancaster Court of 
Duchy Chamber, and the High Court of Star Chamber.2 I discuss the instruments of litigation 
- bills of information and complaint, answers, demurrers, rejoinders, interrogatories, 
examinations and depositions - produced for both of these courts, in an attempt to explicate 
their form and structure. Such texts have been used extensively by scholars and a large 
secondary literature has developed, enriching both the associated scholarship and 
historiography more broadly. This has led to important challenges of prevailing orthodoxies 
about early modern legal culture; as well as reflections over, what the scholarship variously 
defines as, the limits of what legal texts such as court records can demonstrate historically. Few 
studies, however, focus on the form and structure of texts in their explanatory hypotheses. This 
thesis, therefore, addresses that lacuna by making form and structure the foundation of its 
analysis. It does so through an examination of the structural framework classical and 
contemporary rhetorical authorities argued was most appropriate for legal disputes: forensic 
rhetoric. This forensic framework, it is argued, is evident in legal texts throughout the English 
legal system; this thesis, however, examines texts specifically from the North Norfolk Manor 
of Gimingham. This allows the thesis to illustrate the significance of this framework in a 
 
1 Whilst reference will be made to English common law and ecclesiastic or civil law, none of these branches 
of law will be of primary concern in this thesis. This is not because I treat Equity as the pre-eminent aspect of 
English law. Rather, as will be addressed later in this introduction, it is motivated by a desire to engage in a 
particular aspect of the scholarship surrounding social history. 





My second aim has been to use the principle texts of the English legal system, that is, texts 
which had juridical significance, to illustrate a more general historical theme.3 This aspiration 
has two distinct but closely connected strands. The first is that I hope to indicate some of the 
means by which English law and English legal culture developed in the late sixteenth-century. 
The distinction here between law and legal culture is fundamental, and forms a cornerstone of 
much of my argument throughout this thesis. Briefly, the term “law” is taken to refer to the 
rules established by custom, precedent and statute, which formed the basis of what legal 
historians commonly refer to as ‘legal doctrine’. Conversely, I take “legal culture” to refer to 
the broad milieu surrounding law.4 I will seek to show that a recognisably classical inheritance 
underpins English law and legal culture to a greater extent than is usually acknowledged. The 
decisive influence was exerted subtly, through an emphasis on the forms of adversarial legal 
argument, which were in turn structured to maximise persuasion through reason. One effect of 
this emphasis was that there began to be a movement away from apodixis in legal proceedings. 
This in turn enabled those without formal legal training to conceptualise the law as something 
more than an abstract set of, often seemingly immutable, rules - as a discourse they could 
participate in, contribute to, and use to their advantage. This leads on to the second strand of 
this aspiration, which is to illustrate that legal problems - the issues people take to law - are 
political problems, they arise out of a particular political context that only gets more complex 
when the number of participants in it increases to include lawyers and judges. I attempt to 
demonstrate this by excavating a much wider, but also much more specific, intellectual context 
for the Gimingham litigation examined throughout this thesis. 
My third concern is to exemplify a particular way of approaching the study and 
 
3 The distinction between juridical and jurisprudential texts is an important one. This thesis is primarily 
concerned with the internal operation of the law within the English legal system. It is not primarily concerned 
with the philosophy of law (jurisprudence) in an extended sense. 




interpretation of historical texts. As my concluding chapters will make clear, I treat law and 
politics in early modern England to be inextricably linked. Attempts to understand law or 
politics in isolation from one another run the risk of over-simplifying the past and the complex 
architecture of dependent institutional and social relationships that made up sixteenth century 
society. This thesis, therefore, sits at the crossroads of social, intellectual, legal and cultural 
history. It will become clear from the outset of Chapter One that I have been deeply influenced 
by the analytical concerns of intellectual history, particularly those of the Cambridge School 
of intellectual historians, but retained an evidentiary base that is almost exclusively a province 
social historians. This is, as far as I am aware, unique in the scholarship, and perhaps the 
historiography; therefore, a considerable portion of this introduction will be spent offering a 
substantive account of the methodological precepts I will attempt to follow throughout this 
thesis. Briefly put, however, just as we consider the classic texts or ‘canon’ in the history of 
political thought, I regard it as essential to consider the intellectual context of all texts in which 
complex legal and political arguments are set forth. I have, therefore, tried to write a history of 
political thought from the ground up, in order to excavate a larger context within which we 
might place individuals within the mass of ordinary people and thereby obtain a greater grasp 
the scope of early modern politics and civil society. This is, perhaps, demonstrated most 
forcefully in the analyses of Chapters Four and Five, wherein I attempt to excavate the 
interconnectivity of Gimingham’s legal and political culture through its litigation. 
Due to the complexity of the methodological precepts considered, the range of scholarship 
drawn upon, and the relationship of both methodology and scholarship to the intricacies of the 
argument developed throughout the thesis, I have chosen to offer a detailed introduction that 
is essentially a substantive chapter. The following introduction (Chapter One) will, therefore, 
be split into three main sections. The first will introduce the locality of Gimingham, around 




of legal culture and approaches in the existing scholarship, before turning in the third section 
to a detailed exposition of the linguistic framework upon which the thesis rests. The final 
section will delineate the more specific aims of each of the four historical chapters: Chapters, 




CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Gimingham 
Twenty two miles north east of Norwich, between the market town of North Walsham and the 
coastal town of Cromer, in the Hundred of North Erpingham, not far from the North Norfolk 
coast, lies the sleepy village of Gimingham. Today, the village is surrounded by farmland and 
has no amenities; indeed, it is little more than a small collection of houses along a single road. 
Appearances can, however, be deceiving. A small parish church, which dates back to the 
fourteenth century, is one of the few indications that there may be more here than meets the 
eye. Whilst it may seem unlikely to someone visiting today, Gimingham was once submerged 
in an ocean of litigation. This thesis is an examination of that litigation and some of the major 
currents which ran through it. In  the texts that make up the legal record of this litigation, we 
see not just a much more substantial and lively locality; we see the winds of thought that blew 
through sixteenth century society manifested in the forensic arguments with which people 
sought to defend their livelihood.5 
In the sixteenth century, Gimingham was an important jurisdictional area. Composed of 
around 9500 acres, it was made up of eight villages - Gimingham, Knapton, Mundesley, North 
Repps, South Repps, Sidestrand, Trimingham, and Trunch - with rights extending into the 
adjoining parishes of Paston, Swafield, North Walsham, and Antingham.6 In the time before 
 
5 The notion that the manifestation of thought is not the expression of an idea, but the exercise of judgement 
through an argument, is drawn from Hannah Arendt. See, for instance, Hannah Arendt, 'Thinking and Moral 
Considerations', Social Research, 38 (3: 1970), pp. 417-46; J Glenn Gray, 'The Winds of Thought', Social 
Research, 44 (1: 1977), pp. 44-62. 
6 The only major study of Gimingham is to be found in Christobel Mary Hood, The History of an East Anglian 
Soke: Studies in Original Documents: including hitherto unpublished material dealing with the Peasants' Rising 
of 1381, and bondage and bond tenure (Bedford: Times Publishing Co., 1918). Whilst it is now over a century 




the Norman Conquest, these eight villages formed an economic jurisdiction known as a Soke. 
This was an area where smaller landowners chose to congregate around a larger landowner 
who then developed certain political rights over the smaller landowners. It was the product of 
a voluntary association of freemen with a lord in his court. Whilst this Anglo-Saxon jurisdiction 
bore many similarities to the manorial jurisdiction that was to be imported into England by the 
Normans, it was quite different: within a manor, political lordship was inseparable from 
landownership and the authority of master over serfs.7 It was only after the Conquest, with the 
importation of feudal tenures and the manorial system, that the old Anglo-Saxon jurisdiction 
of the Soke was gradually superseded by the Manor of Gimingham, which assimilated the 
villages into one administrative jurisdiction. The soke, despite no longer being the jurisdiction 
of record, lingered on in the memory of the people and continued to exert an influence on the 
customs and identity of Gimingham long after it had been superseded.8 This jurisdictional 
overlay of manor and soke gave Gimingham a unique local identity, which, in turn, gave rise 
to a number of legal idiosyncrasies. These idiosyncrasies, for instance, around concealed lands 
and bondmen, or the peculiarities of the foldcourse and attempted enclosures by local 
inhabitants, created the circumstances whereby many ordinary inhabitants felt it necessary to 
use the courts to defend themselves and their livelihoods. It is through their recourse to the law 
courts that this thesis will illustrate how the inhabitants of sixteenth century Gimingham 
understood and engaged with the world around them, and, more broadly, how political, social 
and cultural change in English society played out on a local stage. 
The thesis is based primarily upon readings of records of litigation from the Duchy of 
 
many of the events described in the litigation upon which this thesis is based. 
7 Paul Vinogradoff, The Growth of The Manor (London: Allen and Unwin, 1920), p. 302. 
8 Indeed, Cristobel Hood asserted that the twentieth-century inhabitants of Gimingham still remembered the 




Lancaster Court of Duchy Chamber and the High Court of Star Chamber. Specific cases were 
identified through a series of spreadsheets provided by The National Archives, which catalogue 
the cases before each court.9 These spreadsheets were invaluable in the editorial process of 
selecting the cases upon which this study is based because the archive itself is fragmentary and 
the records which make up the litigation in these courts are kept in different classes within the 
archives.10 Pleadings before the Duchy Chamber, for instance, which make up a significant 
portion of the analytical bedrock upon which the thesis rests, are kept in the archival class 
“DL1”. Depositions before the Duchy Chamber, however, are in the archival class “DL4”. 
There are, then, significant difficulties linking the depositions with the corresponding pleadings 
in each case.11 By examining the workbook which contained the DL4 material, as depositions 
occur after pleadings in the legal process, I was able to identify litigation which would likely 
have more extant material in the archive: if the depositions are extant then it is more likely that 
the pleadings are also extant, but the same cannot be said vice versa because not all litigation 
progressed to depositions after a pleading had been entered. The ability to identify complete 
cases, that is, litigation with extant material from the beginning of the legal process through to 
its conclusion, has been critical because the analysis rests on demonstrating the relationship 
between each stage of litigation. Emphasis has been placed on demonstrating how the 
arguments raised in the pleadings are confirmed by the evidence elucidated in the depositions; 
how, in order to understand what litigants and lawyers were doing in litigating, it is first 
necessary to see how the instruments of litigation necessarily relate to one another. 
Whilst I have preferred to examine individual cases in detail, rather than doing extensive 
 
9 I am particularly grateful to Amanda Bevan at The National Archives for providing me with these internal 
catalogues and for her guidance navigating the archives. 
10 Star Chamber litigation is kept together in more complete bundles than the Duchy Chamber. There is, 
however, a tendency for Star Chamber material to have been misplaced; it is often required to trawl the related 
archival classes in search of additional material. This makes Star Chamber potentially more insightful on one 
hand, but simultaneously infinitely more frustrating on the other. 
11 One of the most outstanding benefits access to these spreadsheets provided was the ability to search and 
filter the archive by geographical location, which is at best cumbersome using the online version available on The 




statistical analysis, even a cursory examination reveals a range of striking statistics that suggest 
the exceptional nature of the litigation which surrounded sixteenth-century Gimingham. Out 
of 292 cases in the Duchy Chamber concerning Duchy holdings in Norfolk during the reign of 
Elizabeth I, for instance, sixty two can be identified as pertaining to Gimingham. That is to say, 
over twenty percent of all Norfolk litigation in the Duchy Chamber during the reign of 
Elizabeth I was related to Gimingham. Given that there is litigation before the Duchy Chamber 
concerning thirty four localities in Norfolk, which suggests that the Duchy had an interest in 
an even greater number, this is a staggering statistic. Gimingham accounts for more litigation 
before the Duchy Chamber than the next two Norfolk localities combined: Wighton and 
Aylesham respectively account for only five and eleven percent of Duchy litigation. 
Gimingham is, therefore, an exceptionally litigious area. As we will see, this litigation is a 
window through which we can glimpse the physical manifestations of social and cultural 
change, as well the ideological winds that carried such change through sixteenth century 
society. 
Whilst there is a rich and diverse body of scholarship on the social and cultural history of 
Norfolk, Gimingham has largely been overlooked. Indeed, the only detailed study of the 
locality was conducted over a century ago and whilst its breadth is impressive, it lacks the 
analytical depth of modern scholarship.12 In the time since this study was published, historians 
have made great strides filling in the details of sixteenth century society. There are now, for 
instance, studies that illustrate large-scale social change by drilling down into specific local 
contexts, such as the agricultural context of Norfolk and its peculiar pattern of sheep-corn 
husbandry, in an attempt to show how plebeian labourers were affected by the economic 
 
12 The only other discussions of the Manor of Gimingham in the secondary literature relatively brief. See: 
Andy Wood, The Memory of the People (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 72-3,183,291,335; 
Nicola Whyte, 'Enclosure, common fields and social relations in early modern Norfolk', in Christopher Dyer and 
Norman Jones, eds., Farmers, Consumers, Innovators: The World of Joan Thirsk (Hatfield: University of 




developments of the sixteenth century.13 There are studies of political institutions and how they 
shaped local culture.14 Social historians, of the late-twentieth and early-twenty-first century in 
particular, have extensively interrogated the structural implications of concepts such as class 
and capitalism on early modern society, in order to illustrate a distinctly plebeian experience 
of agency.15 A younger generation of scholars has continued to emphasise, with increasing 
complexity, the interplay between agency and political economy on the constitution of early 
modern culture.16 This thesis seeks to use litigation surrounding Gimingham to offer a unique 
methodological and historical contribution to this diverse and growing scholarship. 
Litigation from sixteenth-century Gimingham provides a compelling insight into the social 
upheavals wrought by the enclosure of open field arable farmland. Whilst enclosure has been 
well documented to have caused significant unrest wherever it occurred, it was of particular 
complexity in Norfolk due to the idiosyncrasies of the sheep-corn husbandry that predominated 
throughout the county.17 In short, because of the type of soil present throughout much of 
 
13 K. J. Allison, 'The Sheep- Corn Husbandry of Norfolk in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries', The 
Agricultural History Review, 5 (1: 1957), pp. 12-30; A. Hassell Smith, 'Labourers in late sixteenth-century 
England: a case study from north Norfolk [Part I]', Continuity and Change, 4 (01: 1989), pp. 11-52; A. Hassell 
Smith, 'Labourers in late sixteenth-century England: a case study from north Norfolk [Part II]', Continuity and 
Change, 4 (03: 1989), pp. 367-94; R. W. Hoyle, 'Tenure and the Land Market in Early Modern England - or a 
Late Contribution to the Brenner Debate', Economic History Review, 43 (1: 1990), pp. 1-20; Whyte, 'Enclosure, 
common fields and social relations in early modern Norfolk', pp. 63-76. 
14 Diarmaid MacCulloch, 'Bondmen Under the Tudors', in Claire Cross, D. M. Loades and J. J. Scarisbrick, 
eds., Law and Government under the Tudors (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 91-110. 
15 E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (London: Penguin, 1963); Gareth Stedman-
Jones, Languages of Class: Studies in Working Class History, 1832-1982 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983); Keith Wrightson, 'The Encosure of English Social History', in Adrian Wilson, ed., Rethinking Social 
History: English Society 1570-1920, and its Interpretation (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), pp. 
59-77; Jane Whittle, The Development of Agrarian Capitalism: Land and Labour in Norfolk, 1440-1580 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2000); Andy Wood, 'Fear, Hatred and the Hidden Injuries of Class in Early Modern England', 
Journal of Social History, 39 (3: 2006), pp. 803-26; Jane Whittle, 'Peasant Politics and Class Consciousness: The 
Norfolk Rebellions of 1381 and 1549 Compared', Past & Present, 195 (suppl 2: 2007), pp. 233-47. 
16 Alexandra Shepard, Accounting for Oneself: Worth, Status, and the Social Order in Early Modern England 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Hillary Taylor, '"Branded on the Tongue" Rethinking Plebian 
Inarticulacy in Early Modern England', Radical History Review, 121 (2015), pp. 91-105; Elly Robson, 
'Improvement and Epistemologies of Landscape in Seventeenth-Century English Forest Enclosure', The 
Historical Journal, 60 (3: 2016), pp. 597-632; Hillary Taylor, 'The price of the poor's words: social relations and 
the economics of deposing for one's 'betters' in early modern England', Economic History Review, 72 (3: 2018), 
pp. 828-47. 
17 On enclosure see: Maurice Beresford, 'Habitation Versus Improvement: The Debate on Enclosure by 
Agreement ', in R.J. Fisher, ed., Essays in the Economic and Social History of Tudor and Stuart England 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), pp. 40-69; Peter Jerrome, Cloakbag and Common Purse: 




Norfolk, many of the open fields alternated between arable and pasture at different times of the 
year; sheep and cattle were permitted to graze on particular parcels of land at particular times 
of the year, with the sheep manure fertilising the soil ahead of crops being planted. Whilst 
sheep farming was predominantly the concern of the manorial lord or his lessee, flocks ranged 
over the land of the lords tenants. The area upon which a flock could graze was called a 
foldcourse.18 Foldcourses included a mixture of open field and heathland in order to ensure the 
flock had pasture upon which to graze all year round. Whereas the enclosure of land elsewhere 
in England is often depicted in the scholarship as being at the instigation of the lord, who 
perhaps sought to erode the common rights of the local community; in Norfolk there was need 
for co-operation between landlord and tenant to ensure the viability of the foldcourse system. 
If this co-operation broke down, for instance, if the lord attempted to pasture a larger flock than 
was permitted, tenants could respond by enclosing their land with the aim of sowing crops 
year-round and preventing the lord’s flock from grazing. This is the backdrop to which the 
enclosure litigation discussed in Chapters Three and Four is set.19 
This litigation is accentuated by the complexity of Gimingham’s political and jurisdictional 
identity. Indeed, although the overlay of regional identities in early modern England was 
relatively commonplace, the manifest ways in which inhabitants played upon competing 
jurisdictional claims and how these rival jurisdictions competed for the business of inhabitants, 
reveal Gimingham to be a nexus of political and legal contestation.20 Not only did the political 
 
Private Property: Enclosure, Common Right and the Work of Hedges', Rural History, 15 (1: 2007), pp. 1-21; B. 
McDonagh, 'Making and Breaking Property: Negotiating Enclosure and Common Rights in Sixteenth-Century 
England', History Workshop Journal, 76 (2013), pp. 32-56; B. McDonagh, 'Disobedient objects: material readings 
of enclosure protest in sixteenth-century England', Journal of Medieval History, 45 (2018), pp. 254-75. For 
enclosures specifically in Norfolk see: Heather Falvey, 'The Politics of Enclosure in Elizabethan England 
Contesting Neighbourship in Chinley (Derbyshire)', in Jane Whittle, ed., Landlords and Tenants in Britain, 1440-
1660 (Boydell and Brewer, 2013), pp. 67-84; Whyte, 'Enclosure, common fields and social relations in early 
modern Norfolk', pp. 63-76. 
18 The best introduction to the foldcourse is still to be found in Allison, 'The Sheep- Corn Husbandry of 
Norfolk in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries'. 
19 See below, Chapters Three and Four. For the Gimingham context see the discussion in Whyte, 'Enclosure, 
common fields and social relations in early modern Norfolk', pp. 63-76. 




jurisdictions of manor and soke underly the forensic arguments for and against enclosure 
around Gimingham; more broadly, the legal jurisdictions of the manorial, Duchy, equity and 
common law courts underwrote the litigation itself. Thus, whilst social historians have 
extensively mined the archival resources associated with early modern courts, few have 
attempted to use them to illustrate the ideological idiosyncrasies of plebeian politics and 
identity in a local context;21 none have done so through an examination of specifically legal 
jurisdictions.22 What makes this a particularly worthwhile analytical enterprise is that the 
overlay of local identities, through the political institutions of the manor and soke, remains a 
prominent feature of Gimingham litigation across legal jurisdictions. Thus, this thesis argues, 
we can examine the relationship between law and politics in sixteenth-century England through 
a contextualised study of the intellectual content of Gimingham litigation. The manifest ways 
in which lawyers and litigants used forensic rhetoric to construct legal arguments with which 
to legitimate behaviour, illustrates the relationship between ideology and action.  Ciceronian 
and Tacitean threads of humanist political thought, which have been identified more generally 
elsewhere in the scholarship, were specifically deployed in relation to particularly local 
incidences of enclosure and poor relief in sixteenth-century Gimingham.23 This is the context 
in which the litigation between Edward Coke and some of Gimingham’s wealthier inhabitants 
 
Gimingham, it is primarily discussed in relation to the decay of the demense, which lacks an appreciation of the 
intellectual context that accompanied the social and economic developments of the late-sixteenth century. See 
Hood, History of an East Anglian Soke, pp. 255-334. 
21 Andy Wood’s work is a notable exception to this. See, for instance: Andy Wood, The Politics of Social 
Conflict: The Peak Country, 1520-1770 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Andy Wood, The 1549 
Rebellions and the Making of Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 89-
184; Wood, Memory of the People. 
22 Even the seminal work of Chris Brooks, which has been a touchstone for this thesis, is interested in 
explicating more general aspects of early modern “legal culture”. See the following section of this introduction 
for a more precise examination of what is often meant by the term “legal culture”. See, for instance, the discussion 
in C. W. Brooks, Law, Politics and Society in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008). See also the collection of essays in C. W. Brooks, Lawyers, Litigation and English Society Since 1450 
(London: Hambledon, 1998). 
23 Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought  2 vols., vol. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978); Erika Rummel, The Humanist-Scholastic Debate in the Renaissance & Reformation 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1995); Brooks, Law, Politics and Society. For the Gimingham 




is discussed in Chapter Five.  
The inhabitants of Gimingham are perhaps the aspect of Gimingham which have received 
the most attention in the scholarship to date. Their antics animate the archival record, and 
stirred the cultural melting pot of late-sixteenth century Gimingham. The manor itself was, like 
most feudal tenures, ultimately held of the monarch. It was granted to Thomas Boleyn, father 
of Queen Anne Boleyn, in 1530. Boleyn held the lease for twenty years, where upon its expiry 
in 1550 it passed to one Edward Fisher. Little is known of Fisher and he figures only briefly in 
the history of Gimingham as, upon taking possession of the lease, he immediately sublet it in 
its entirety to one Peter Read of Norwich.24 Read figures prominently in the Duchy and Star 
Chamber archives, and is a figure we return to time and again throughout the thesis. The ends 
and the means by which Read exercised his seigneurial power over the manor resulted in 
litigation which, not only ranged across at least four different jurisdictions but also, cut deep 
into the fabric of sixteenth-century English society.25 The spectre of his seigneurialism loomed 
over Gimingham long after his death in 1568, and could still be recalled by inhabitants half a 
century later.26 Other inhabitants of Gimingham, beyond individual lessees, also figure 
prominently in the archives.27 Indeed, a handful of inhabitants, are thrust into historical focus 
by then Attorney General Edward Coke’s prosecution of them in the Star Chamber 1597. This 
litigation in particular throws a unique light onto the complexity of the economic issues 
surrounding agricultural improvement and depopulating enclosures, because the pleadings and 
depositions for both the plaintiff (Coke) and the defendants (Bateman et al) survive in the 
archive.28 Gimingham litigation illustrates, therefore, more than just a particularly specific 
 
24 The genealogy of the Gimingham lessees is discussed at length in Hood, History of an East Anglian Soke, 
pp. 237-46. 
25 See the discussions of Read in ibid. ; Wood, Memory of the People, pp. 72-3,183,291,335; Whyte, 
'Enclosure, common fields and social relations in early modern Norfolk', pp. 63-76. 
26 See below, Chapter Five. See also, TNA, DL4/63/23 
27 The bulk of this work is still drawn from Cristobel Hood’s study which, when used in conjunction with the 
archival material, gives a much clearer impression of the inhabitants of Gimingham. 




instance of endemic enclosure disputes; it also illuminates the ideological apparati both sides 
used to legitimate their positions. 
Crucially, however, what makes Gimingham litigation singularly valuable is the amount of 
interconnected material available in the archive. The amount of litigation from this relatively 
small locality allows us to contextualise individual cases using other pieces of litigation, 
instigated in multiple jurisdictions by people from the same area and at around the same time. 
The ability to not only grasp that three cases in three separate jurisdictions were all interrelated, 
as in the case of Peter Read’s simultaneous litigation in the Duchy Chamber, Star Chamber and 
common pleas, but to also examine the content of those cases to examine how they were 
intended to function legally, is unique in the scholarship. The volume of litigation and the 
content of the cases themselves is such that, when properly contextualised, it allows us to grasp 
the micro and macro historical contexts in equal measure. As a micro history of enclosure, poor 
relief, and petty disputes, Gimingham litigation is, therefore, intimately bound up with macro 
historical questions of law, power, politics and social relations in early modern England. 
 
Historiography of Legal Culture 
Over the course of the proceeding chapters we examine macro historical questions of how legal 
culture is inextricably linked with law, power, politics, and social relations in the micro-
historical context of sixteenth century Gimingham. An interrogation of legal culture in early 
modern England is, therefore, central to the analytical project of this thesis. It is also a central 
contention of this thesis, however, that the existing scholarship suffers from a lack of precision; 
specifically, a lack of clarity over what is meant by what is said, both historically and 
historiographically. That being said, the intention here is not to criticise existing 




intervention into the politics of historiography.29 In what follows, therefore, we will examine 
how historians have approached questions of legal culture historiographically, and some of the 
consequences these historiographical decisions have had on the scholarship. 
Historical analyses have, for a long time, been underpinned by a diverse range of theoretical 
apparati. The  nineteenth-century sociological theories of Marx and Weber set the parameters 
for so much of the scholarship conducted throughout the twentieth century. In the social history 
of the law, Edward Thompson’s work in particular drew upon social theories of marxism to 
create a paradigm within which legal and social historians have worked to explicate a ‘culture 
of the rule of law’ ever since.30 Written in 1973, Thompson’s taxonomy of legal culture 
underpins much of the work that has been, and continues to be, done on the history of English 
law and legal culture. 
The law when considered as institution (the courts, with their class theatre and class 
procedures) or as personell (the judges, the lawyers, the Justices of the Peace) may be 
very easily assimilated to those of the ruling class. But all that is entailed in ‘the law’ 
may not be subsumed into these institutions. The law may also be seen as ideology, or 
as particular rules and sanctions which stand in a definite and active relationship (often 
a field of conflict) to social norms; and finally, it may be seen simply in terms of its 
own logic, rules and procedures - that is, simply as law.31 
Whilst this is not at all to suggest that investigations of legal culture have all been marxist, it 
is to say that the fundamental structure of much of the scholarship that has come after 
Thompson has explicated legal culture in terms of the relationship of law to social control. 
Such an approach has allowed historians to shine a light on some areas of English legal culture 
 
29 I am deeply indebted to the discussions in: Keith Thomas, The Perception of the Past in Early Modern 
England (London: 1983); J. G. A Pocock, 'The Politics of Historiography', Historical Research, 78 (199: 2005), 
pp. 1-14. 
30 E. P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (London: Allen Lane, 1975). The two 
most eminent and productive historians of English legal culture, writing since Thompson, have been John Baker 
and Chris Brooks. See: John H. Baker, The Reports of Sir John Spelman  2 vols., vol. (London: Selden Society, 
1977); C. W. Brooks, Pettyfoggers and Vipers of the Commonwealth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986); John H. Baker, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, 1483-1558 6(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004); Brooks, Law, Politics and Society. 




that had been obscured by the mists of time. One of the points this thesis is concerned to make, 
however, is that this approach, whilst illuminating some areas of English law, has left others in 
darkness. 
Another great stimuli of historical analyses, particularly in social history, has come out of 
twentieth century sociology and anthropology. In the 1960s, Keith Thomas and Peter Laslett 
began to draw attention to the growing scholarship in the social sciences, and encouraged 
historians to begin to work on a different canvas to that which was occupied by the 
historiography influenced by nineteenth-century social theory.32 Since then, the influence of 
late-twentieth century social theory upon historiography has grown exponentially. Here the 
work of Clifford Geertz and James Scott are of particular theoretical importance.33 Their 
comparative approach to legal systems, was designed to show that ‘there is something useful 
to be said across cultures and historical epochs’.34 This has been used to great effect by 
historians such as Andy Wood and Steve Hindle, who have used Scott’s work in particular to 
shine a light into the sixteenth century; in order to illuminate, inter alia, the roots of what would 
become the class conflict imagined by Thompson, in the domination and dependence of those 
people who lived and died under the Tudors and Stuarts.35 As we will see, however, the tradeoff 
of comparative anthropology is a steep price in analytical precision when speaking historically. 
Some of the most stimulating analyses of legal culture in recent years, however, have come 
from investigations into the history of women and gender. Natalie Zemon Davis’ pathfinding 
examination of pardon tales in sixteenth century France illustrated the performative nature of 
 
32 Keith Thomas, 'History and Anthropology', Past & Present, 24 (1: 1963), pp. 3-24; Peter Laslett, The World 
We Have Lost (London: Routledge, 1965). 
33 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973); James C. Scott, Weapons 
of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); James C. Scott, 
Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990). 
34 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, p. x. 
35 Steve Hindle, 'The Shaming of Margaret Knowsley: Gossip, Gender and the Experience of Authority in 
Early Modern England', Continuity and Change, 9 (3: 1994), pp. 391-419; Wood, 'Fear, Hatred and the Hidden 




legal texts.36 This approach, founded upon the identification and examination of the linguistic 
acts performed within and by texts, draws upon the influence of postmodernist discourse in 
late-twentieth century social theory. Davis draws specifically upon Judith Butler’s 
methodological interventions in postmodernist discourse, in order to excavate the agency of 
women through the performativity of their pleas for pardon. More recently, Garthine Walker 
and Laura Gowing have developed Davis’ approach to legal texts in the context of English 
social history.37 They have preferred, however, to cast aside an explicit engagement with the 
social theory which had underpinned Davis’ work. Their work, which retains an essentially 
linguistic hermeneutic, has emphasised the multi-vocality of legal texts. This has allowed them 
to demonstrate the nuances of how women exercised agency in a patriarchal society.38 Whilst 
this thesis will engage with scholarship underpinned by all three of these historiographical 
hermeneutics, it is the approach adopted by gender historians with which this thesis shares the 
closest affinity. It is to a more detailed discussion of these themes in the scholarship on legal 
culture to which we now turn. 
 
One of the things that is evident from even a cursory glance over the scholarship on legal 
culture, particularly early modern legal culture, is that there is no agreed definition of what is 
meant by the term ‘legal culture’. As Clifford Geertz once remarked, studies of legal culture 
are locked in an ‘endless discussion as to whether law consists in institutions or in rules, in 
procedures or in concepts, in decisions or in codes, in processes or in forms’.39 This can readily 
be seen in the work of two of the most authoritative historians of sixteenth century English law, 
 
36 Natalie Zemon Davis, Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and their Tellers in Sixteenth-Century France 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987). 
37 Laura Gowing, Domestic Dangers: Women, Words, and Sex in Early Modern London (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1996); Garthine Walker, Crime, Gender and Social Order in Early Modern England (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003); Laura Gowing, Gender Relations in Early Modern England (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2014). 
38 Above all, see Gowing, Domestic Dangers. 
39 Clifford Geertz, 'Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective', in Clifford Geertz, ed., 




John Baker and Chris Brooks, who have been locked in just such an endless discussion; they 
are indicative of a scholarship that is unable to go beyond Edward Thompson’s taxonomy of 
law in its effort to describe what is meant by ‘legal culture’.40 Indeed, the scholarship generally 
fudges its explanation of legal culture because that ‘culture’ is usually the secondary 
illustration:41 an investigation into another aspect of law - whether it be of an institution (such 
as a particular court), the people around an institution (such as lawyers, attorneys, JPs), or 
whether it be an investigation into the logic of the rules and procedures of the law itself (such 
as, the rules and procedures of Equity, common or criminal law) - is used to illustrate the 
context that surrounds that particular institution, or profession, or ideological development; 
that context is then described as indicative of legal ‘culture’.42 Whilst all of these studies have 
made valuable contributions to the scholarship, they have been written with a number of 
different agendas in mind and have been dispersed in their spatial and temporal coverage. Few 
have been concerned with the role of law in politics and society broadly conceived.43 Studies 
of legal culture have preferred to leave definitions of culture to cultural historians. Thus, Peter 
Burke’s definition of culture as ‘a system of shared meaning, attitudes, and values’,44 which it 
is often forgotten is taken directly from the anthropological literature, is cited more often than 
 
40 Indeed, Brooks’ last great work begins by citing Thompson’s influence: Brooks, Law, Politics and Society, 
p. 1. See also, the much expanded version of Baker’s seminal essay English Law and the Renaissance in Baker, 
Laws,vol. 6, pp. 3-54. 
41 The two major exceptions here are Craig Muldrew and Alex Shepard’s work on credit, but even these two 
important works have a relatively surface-level critical engagement with what they mean by ‘culture’. See: Craig 
Muldrew, The Economy of Obligation: The Culture of Credit and Social Relations in Early Modern England 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998); Shepard, Accounting for Oneself. 
42 For example: Ralph A. Houlbrooke, Church Courts and the People During the English Reformation, 1520-
1570 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979); E. W. Ives, The Common Lawyers of Pre-Reformation England: 
Thomas Kebell, a Case Study (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); J. A. Sharpe, Crime in Early 
Modern England 1550-1750 (London: Routledge, 1984); Cynthia B. Herrup, The Common Peace: Participation 
and the Criminal Law in Seventeenth-Century England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Martin 
Ingram, Church Courts, Sex and Marriage in England, 1570-1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987); Walker, Crime, Gender and Social Order in Early Modern England. 
43 Two notable exceptions are Chris Brooks and Andy Wood Brooks, Law, Politics and Society; Wood, 
Memory of the People. 
44 Quoted in Brooks, Law, Politics and Society, p. 4. See also, Peter Burke, Popular Culture in Early Modern 
Europe (New York: Harper & Row, 1978); A. L. Kroeber and C. Kluckhohn, Culture: A Critical Review of 




not before being cast aside because the scholarship of cultural history has been concerned not 
with legal culture but with notions of ‘popular’ and ‘elite’ culture.45 In other words, there is a 
very real sense in the scholarship that historians have struggled to engage seriously not just 
with the concept of culture in general terms; they have also struggled to delineate what they 
themselves mean by the term. 
Legal historians, almost universally, conceive of English law as a set of rules or doctrines 
that are particular to England.46 The contrast is always made with other systems of law - such 
as Roman law, civil law, and customary law - but the analysis remains, essentially, a 
comparative analysis of systems of rules and doctrines.47 One consequence of this 
conceptualisation is that legal scholars always approach the subject as either rules or doctrines 
being influenced by, or having exerted an influence upon, outside forces: such as, particular 
individuals, identifiable political and cultural movements such as the Renaissance and 
Reformation, or ideological currents like Humanism or Scholasticism.48 There is, in other 
words, an implicit assumption in the legal scholarship that English law exists in a semi-
independent state with its own logic, which could defend itself from alien incursion as well as 
exert an influence external to itself. This view of English law is endemic within the scholarship 
and there is a very real sense in which it can be said that English law did behave in this way.49 
This view of the law, however, could also be said to be somewhat restrictive; it lacks a holistic 
view of how the weave of English law fits into the tapestry of English society because it lacks 
a thorough engagement with the concept of culture. 
 
45 See, for instance, the summary of the relevant scholarship in Brooks, Law, Politics and Society, pp. 1-4. 
46 Houlbrooke, Church Courts and the People; Ives, The Common Lawyers of Pre-Reformation England; 
Sharpe, Crime in Early Modern England 1550-1750; Herrup, The Common Peace; Ingram, Church Courts, Sex 
and Marriage; Baker, Laws,vol. 6. 
47 This is approach underlies, for instance, one of the most celebrated discussions of English Law in our time: 
Baker’s answer to Maitland’s Rede Lecture on English Law and the Renaissance. See Baker, Laws,vol. 6, pp. 3-
54. 
48 Ibid.  
49 I personally would wish to emphasise that the ways in which individuals engaged with and participated in 




The most explicit discussions legal culture are to be found in the anthropological literature. 
Lawrence Rosen has suggested that law itself ‘approaches culture’ and that culture is the 
stitching together across domains of the categories and experience of relationships.50 We 
should not be surprised by the similarities between Rosen’s definition of culture and the 
definition we saw earlier in Peter Burke’s work, as both owe a primary debt to the same 
anthropological school.51 Rosen’s Law as Culture, like James Scott’s Domination and the Arts 
of Resistance, is an exercise in comparative legal anthropology; in his comparison of legal 
systems from around the world, Rosen argues that law is ‘a marvellous entry to the study of 
that most central of human features, culture itself, and hence an open invitation, whatever one’s 
ultimate interests, to think about what and who we are’.52 Anthropology, almost by definition, 
however, is normative: it is the study of human social relations. It is not the study of a particular 
society and its social relations, it is the study of human relations in a particular society.53 This 
leads Rosen to make a compelling case for seeing law and legal culture in the wider context of 
structures of social control. There is, of course, a very real sense in which law structures every 
society; this is what has allowed Andy Wood and Steve Hindle, for instance, to use James 
Scott’s work to great effect and show how legal relationships of domination and dependence 
structured life in sixteenth and seventeenth century England.54  Ultimately, however, the clear 
and present danger of comparative anthropology in historical analyses is its anachronism. 
There is clearly a serious loss of analytic purchase, for instance, in talking about law and legal 
culture ‘when a kinsman mediates a dispute or members of a settlement use gossip or an 
 
50 Lawrence Rosen, Law as Culture: An Invitation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 1-13. 
51 See the discussion in Kroeber and Kluckhohn, Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions. 
Though Rosen arrives at the foundational work of Kroeber and Kluckhohn via Clifford Geertz’s seminal essay on 
law and culture in Geertz, 'Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective', pp. 167-234. 
52 Rosen, Law as Culture, p. 200. 
53 The distinction is that anthropological frameworks are meant to be applied to any society in order to 
examine human relations; the frameworks should not be specific to a particular society. 
54 Hindle, 'The Shaming of Margaret Knowsley: Gossip, Gender and the Experience of Authority in Early 




informal gathering to articulate their vision of society’.55 Whilst law and legal culture may well 
fit into our modern understanding of broader systems of social control, it is hard to imagine 
that sixteenth century lawyers of the English common law would agree that participation in a 
superstructure of social control was a valid description of them or the role of the common law 
in English society.56  
If we take the essence of Rosen’s understanding of culture as the categories and experience 
of relationships in a given context, what we need is a way of historicising it in its legal 
context.57 In this respect I would follow Clifford Geertz and suggest that existing approaches 
to law and legal culture miss the mark: 
The [two] main approaches to comparative law - that which sees its task as one of 
contrasting rule structures one to the next and that which sees it as one of contrasting 
different processes of dispute resolution in different societies - both seem to me rather 
to miss the point: the first through an over autonomous view of law as a separate and 
self-contained "legal system" struggling to defend its analytic integrity in the face of 
the conceptual and moral sloppiness of ordinary life; the second through an 
overpolitical view of it as an undifferentiated, pragmatically ordered collection of social 
devices for advancing interests and managing power conflicts.58 
It is in recognising that legal systems regulate and construe behaviour - and here I diverge from 
Geertz significantly - and that it is this cultural dialectic which provides the resources for 
individuals to create agency.59 It is here, in the method and manner of conceiving individual 
decision situations so that settled rules can be asserted or challenged that the informing choices 
lie.60 That is to say, it is in recognising (rather than contrasting) the choices made by individuals 
and correctly identifying their actions that we illuminate their understanding of legal culture; 
 
55 Rosen, Law as Culture, p. 7; Simon Roberts, 'Review: Law as Culture: An Invitation by Lawrence Rosen', 
The Modern Law Review, 70 (1: 2007), pp. 161-3. 
56 This is, in my view, a critical weakness of comparative anthropology when historians attempt to apply it to 
historical analyses. 
57 Rosen, Law as Culture, pp. 1-13. 
58 Geertz, 'Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective', pp. 167-234. 
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sensibility. Ibid. pp. 214-15. 
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what Geertz would call their legal sensibilities. Some of the most insightful recent scholarship 
in early modern social history has focused on identifying varieties of local custom.61 It has 
demonstrated that lex loci is local knowledge. In order to historicise legal culture, then, we 
need to historicise the locality out of which it arose; this has been the bread and butter of social 
history for decades. What we need, and what this thesis will demonstrate, is a way of turning 
the infinite varieties of law into commentaries upon one another, the one lighting what the other 
darkens. As we will see in the litigation examined throughout this thesis, we need look no 
further than how people used knowledge and used law in their every day lives to create 
relationships of domination and dependence.62 It is clear, therefore, that whilst comparative 
law may be a hermeneutic grande jete; an approach we see in the legal and social 
historiography, akin to 'Englishing Dante or demathmatizing quantum theory for general 
consumption, an imperfect enterprise, approximate and makeshift,’ it is not, pace Geertz, ‘all 
there is’.63  
Within the historiography of early modern legal culture, it is historians of women and 
gender who have struck out on their own and left the paradigm of comparative law behind. A 
particular preoccupation with the textual interpretation of legal records is the hallmark of this 
hermeneutic; its most celebrated practitioners are Natalie Davis, Garthine Walker and Laura 
Gowing.64 Walker has argued that, by focusing on the construction of narratives within texts, 
‘historians are able to do more than reveal information about crime, criminality and the legal 
process. They may open windows into the wider culture and ways of thinking and doing in 
early modern society. Hence, the history of crime becomes a broader cultural history of the 
 
61 Wood, Memory of the People; ibid. ; Andy Wood, '‘Some banglyng about the customes’: Popular Memory 
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62 It is hoped that the approach advocated in this thesis will complement existing scholarship which has made 
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period’.65 Whereas studies that have attempted to explicate early modern culture through 
anthropological frameworks, to paraphrase Kluckhohn, have often been occupied with 
constructing a great mirror in which we can ‘look at [ourselves] in [our] infinite variety’.66 
Gender historians have, by contrast, taken a much more modest approach in their investigations 
of how women have been depicted in legal narratives and constructed such narratives 
themselves. 
 Historians of gender have approached legal texts through their discursive frameworks. In 
doing so, they have demonstrated that ‘it is possible to embark on a linguistic analysis of texts, 
to read them for their semantic content or in the way which they are discursively constructed 
in particular material circumstances’.67 Thus, by excavating the discursive context of how 
women are portrayed and how they construct their own legal narratives, Walker and Gowing 
have shown existing scholarship on early modern culture to be seriously misleading through 
its weakly conceptualised notions of masculinity and femininity68: ‘historians tend to accept 
criminality in general to be a masculine category without conceptualising or contextualising it 
in terms of gender; male criminality is thus normalised while female criminality is seen in 
terms of dysfunction, an aberration of the norms of feminine behaviour’.69 The tools of choice 
for Walker and Gowing in their excavation of the gender dynamics of early modern legal 
culture have been the postmodern linguistic theories of Joan Scott, Mikhail Bhaktin, and 
Michel Foucault, and it is to these theories to which we now briefly turn.70 
The linguistic hermeneutics drawn upon by Gowing and Walker are a product of 
postmodernist developments in late-twentieth century historiography. In particular, Gowing 
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and Walker have both drawn upon a seminal article by Joan Scott in defining the scope of their 
enquiries. The article begins by simply (and provocatively) defining the concept itself, which 
sets the scope for the entire enterprise: ‘Gender. n. a grammatical term only’.71 It is difficult to 
overstate the significance of this definition. Whereas all of the previous historiographical 
approaches to legal culture had construed the object of analysis as something physical that can 
be observed - people, institutions, behaviour, systems of social control - Gowing and Walker, 
in basing their analyses upon the definition of gender offered in this article, construe the object 
of analysis as linguistic. This is the fundamental move that has allowed Gowing and Walker to 
get away from comparative approaches to law and legal culture. An explicit engagement with 
Joan Scott’s concept of gender and the linguistic hermeneutic which underpins it opens up a 
new historiographical vista.  
We need to deal with the individual subject as well as social organisation and to 
articulate the nature of how their interrelationships, for both are crucial to 
understanding how gender works, how change occurs. Finally, we need to replace the 
notion that social power is unified, coherent, and centralised with something like 
Foucault's concept of power as dispersed constellations of unequal relationships, 
discursively constituted in social 'fields of force'. Within these processes and structures, 
there is room for a concept of human agency as the attempt (at least partially rational) 
to construct an identity, a life, a set of relationships, a society with certain limits and 
with language - conceptual language that at once sets boundaries and contains the 
possibility for negation, resistance, reinterpretation, the play of metaphoric invention 
and imagination.72 
Walker succinctly summarised her interpretation of Foucauldian power dynamics and 
Bhaktinian linguistic hermeneutics in the following way. 
Any utterance is dialogic in a dual sense. First, it is produced in a dialogue with sources 
that draw on certain other discourses according to context. In speaking or writing, we 
draw on all sorts of explicit and unacknowledged ideas. Secondly, it is produced in 
dialogue with the listener or reader, in that we assume the responses of those we 
address. Therefore, there are three categories of ‘voice’ in any given discourse: those 
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of source, author and listener.73 
The approach to law and legal culture adopted by Gowing and Walker, which focuses on the 
vocabulary of texts, then, provides the scholarship with a new vocabulary to examine law and 
legal culture historically. Furthermore, a corollary of the linguistic parameters of such an 
approach mean that it does not necessarily detract from earlier scholarship; indeed it can add 
an extra dimension to the the anthropological historiographies of legal culture because it allows 
for an engagement with what Clifford Geertz called the ‘semantics of social action’.74 A 
linguistic understanding of the implications that follow from recognising the fact that ‘man was 
not created governed, and the realisation that he has become so, severally and collectively, by 
enclosing himself in a set of meaningful forms, webs of signification he himself has spun, leads 
us into an approach to adjudication that assimilates it not to a sort of social mechanics, a physics 
of judgement, but to a sort of cultural hermeneutics, a semantics of action”.75 Ultimately, then, 
what this historiography of early modern legal culture gives us is the notion that interpretation 
is largely dialogical. The historiographical aspiration to arrive at a neutral operative definition 
of legal culture is itself unachievable because the law, not to mention the concept of culture 
itself, has a history; any concept that has a history necessarily escapes definition.76 By 
employing the semantics of action we can, however, attempt to contextualise and historicise 
law and the relationships which enveloped it in order to offer an interpretation of a particular 
moment. It is upon this premise that this thesis seeks to offer an original contribution to the 
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In what follows I will lay out the methodological framework upon which the historical analyses 
in this thesis are based. This framework is designed to build upon the historiography discussed 
above. It is argued that existing scholarship, whilst illuminating some aspects of the past, leaves 
others in relative darkness. The hermeneutic discussed here addresses that darkness by setting 
out a way in which historians can approach legal culture with greater clarity and specificity. 
The ways in which gender historians have approached legal texts have already provided a new 
lens through which we can examine historical vistas; what follows is an attempt to bring the 
detail of those vistas into focus by discerning the acts performed within them. Where Walker 
and Gowing have drawn upon the discursive concepts of heteroglossia and multivocality to 
illustrate gender as a concept that was simultaneously, highly normative, contextually specific, 
and shot right through early modern society. I will show that by excavating the linguistic acts 
utterances performed in highly specific legal contexts, we can recover the specificities of how 
people engaged with the law. The aim, then, is to explicate a genuinely historical understanding 
of law and its culture. 
 
Linguistic hermeneutics are not particularly new in the historiography. They do, however, force 
us into a more explicit engagement with complex conceptual debates, such as those around 
politics, law, gender, and how we as historians interpret and represent such conceptual 
discourse. In his 2003 Creighton Lecture, John Pocock described the narratives created by 
people in the past as ‘myths’ which were used to legitimate their behaviour; and how ‘it is very 
hard not to imagine the historiography as either the invention or the subversion and explosion 
of the myths upholding authority.’77 In other words, people in the past used the past to 
legitimate their behaviour in their present; just as much as, in their interpretations of the past, 
 




historians legitimate particular discourses in their present.78 We have already examined how a 
similar thought in the anthropological literature has influenced the historiography of legal 
culture. The representation of history and the construction of narrative is, then, central to 
historiographies which draw upon anthropological and linguistic hermeneutics. 
Pocock’s emphasis of discursive narrative bears a familial resemblance to the approach 
employed in the historiography of gender. It is an analysis of language, which emphasises how 
individuals throughout history, and throughout the historiography, are always doing something 
linguistically in creating and interpreting texts.79 Pocock, however, goes beyond what we find 
in Gowing and Walker; he is much more concerned to isolate the valence of a text within a 
specific context.80 This allows for the isolation of historical meaning by focusing on the 
linguistic force of utterances within texts, while retaining an interest how those forces ripple 
out of the text into a wider context which is always partly, but never wholly, the product of the 
actions performed within it. In other words, if illocution is in the centre of Pocock’s picture, 
perlocution is in the next frame.81 
Texts, Pocock argues, have different levels of abstraction.82 It is perfectly acceptable, for 
instance, in legal culture, to consider texts in the context of the ‘letter of the law’ - that is, in a 
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the performative aspect of environments and objects. Cf. Nicola Whyte, Inhabiting the Landscape: Place, Custom 
and Memory, 1500-1800 (Bollington: Windgather, 2009); Angela McShane, 'Material Culture and 'Political 
Drinking' in Seventeenth-Century England', in Phil Withington and Angela McShane, eds., Cultures of 
Intoxication: Past and Present Special Supplement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Robson, 
'Improvement and Epistemologies of Landscape in Seventeenth-Century English Forest Enclosure'. 
80 Gowing and Walker have been, for the time being, content to illustrate the multivalence of their subject. 
81 The terminology is that of J. L. Austin, but the turn of phrase is quoted from Pocock. Cf. John Langshaw 
Austin, How To Do Things With Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); J. G. A Pocock, 'The history of 
poltical thought: a methodological inquiry', Political Thought and History: Essays on Theory and Method 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 3-19. 
82 Pocock is here working along similar lines to Gowing and Walker when they talk about how there are 





strictly legal sense, what the words on the page say verbatim - and ignore the intentions with 
which the text was created, or even how it has been used since, in order to analyse it on a set 
of purely legal principles. Similarly, it is equally permissible to remove a text from its historical 
context entirely and ascribe to it an entirely different meaning, for instance, when historians 
relate texts to other texts despite them having developed completely independently of one 
another. There are, for instance, legitimate non-historical and perhaps even trans-historical 
approaches to the study of political thought. The point, for Pocock, is to ensure that analyses 
are logically consistent. In short, this means that if the aim is to give an historical account of a 
text, there are two contexts with which we should be concerned: (a) what the author meant by 
what they said and/or (b) how the text was received in a given historical context. For Pocock, 
if we remain on the same level of abstraction throughout our analysis, we might convey an 
impression of something vaguely coherent; whereas, in blending the historical with the non-
historical, we are more like Picasso than Monet.83  
This preoccupation with linguistic meaning raises important questions around how 
historians interpret texts. On the one hand, authors write texts for particular purposes, with 
particular agendas in mind, and it is to those underlying purposes that we need to be sensitive 
if we are to avoid the trappings of anachronism. On the other hand, however, it is perfectly 
evident that texts have been taken to mean things that their authors did not and could not have 
intended them to mean, but which they nevertheless come to represent. This is, essentially, the 
dialectic around which postmodernism revolves, and out of which the ‘linguistic turn’ emerged 
in the historiography.84 This, it will be remembered, is also a central consideration for how 
 
83 This is a vastly simplified account of the argument Pocock advances in Pocock, 'The history of poltical 
thought: a methodological inquiry', pp. 3-19. It is, for instance, possible to weave different levels of abstraction 
together in the same analysis so long as each abstraction forms one thread of the analysis and is clearly identified 
as such. Pocock’s point, as such, is that there are potentially an infinite number of threads one could weave into 
such a picture because the ‘traditions of behaviour,’ that generate those abstractions are themselves contingent. 
84 For insightful, but polarising, discussions of the scholarship surrounding the linguistic turn in history see: 
James Vernon, 'Who's Afraid of the 'Linguistic Turn'? The Politics of Social History and Its Discontents', Social 




gender historians have approached legal texts.85 Nevertheless, it is the linguistic aspect of a 
text that is most often left out of analyses in social history.86 As we have seen, taking into 
account linguistic contexts has the potential to open up other fields of inquiry for social 
historians to excavate. It can afford them a fresh perspective on issues with which they have 
been traditionally concerned - power relations, for instance - and propel them beyond the 
enclosures of professional specialisation that stymie interdisciplinary analyses. Whilst 
linguistics, therefore, in one sense problematises textual interpretation by calling attention to 
whole new sites of meaning, it also, following Thomas Kuhn, supplies the tools with which to 
excavate those meanings.87  
One of the most influential ways to approach historical analyses through language, is the 
method advocated by another member of the Cambridge School of Intellectual Historians, 
Quentin Skinner.88 Briefly, Pocock situates texts in ‘traditions of behaviour,’ by which he 
means the whole complex of ways of behaving, talking, and thinking in politics; which we 
inherit from a social past. In Pocock’s analysis of political thought, political thought forms a 
series of historiographical abstractions from these traditions of behaviour. Skinner, by contrast, 
focuses (in Pocock’s terms) solely on one level of abstraction: what the author of a text meant 
by what they said. He thereby aims to write ‘a history of political thought constructed on 
 
Journal, 42 (3: 1999), pp. 883-902. 
85 Gowing and Walker are, however, take a much more capacious view of culture than Pocock; they are, also, 
interested in explicating a much less technically specific discourse that is nevertheless far more multivalent than 
the political ideologies examined by Pocock. 
86 This is not to say that they are not aware of it. See, for instance, Peter Burke, 'Introduction', in Peter Burke 
and Roy Porter, eds., The Social History of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 1-20. 
Andy Wood notes, however, that social historians have left linguistic analyses to cultural historians and historians 
of ‘elite political thought’. Cf. Wood, 'Fear, Hatred and the Hidden Injuries of Class in Early Modern England'. 
n16. 
87 Following Kuhn’s definition of a paradigm as ‘a mental and linguistic construct that could not only supply 
the answers to questions but also determine what questions should be asked, to the exclusion and occlusion of 
others’. Quoted in J. G. A Pocock, Political Thought and History: Essays on Theory and Method (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. xi. 
88 The ‘Cambridge School of Intellectual Historians’ was originally said to consist of John Pocock (focusing 
on language), John Dunn (focusing on biography), and Quentin Skinner (focusing on authorial intention). Between 
them, they pioneered the use of linguistics in historical analyses from the 1960s through to the 1990s. The 




genuinely historical principles’.89 This approach is not exclusive to intellectual history, but it 
is most widely practiced in the history of political thought. Social history can benefit from 
thinking along similar lines, while retaining its traditional interests in aspects of society such 
as power relations, because to think along these lines is not to change the object of analysis. It 
is only to approach the analytical object from a different perspective. 
As has been demonstrated by historians of gender, the benefit to social history lies in the 
vocabulary employed in interpreting texts along these lines. This is manifest in two distinct 
ways. In the first instance, as I discussed earlier, the vocabulary most appropriate to textual 
interpretation is, in many cases, the vocabulary we use to speak about actions. If we treat texts 
as events, and therefore as actions, we open the gates to a whole new type of explanation in 
social history along the lines of linguistic performance. This is not to detract from existing 
scholarship, it is, rather, to add another dimension to it. By individuating the linguistic actions 
embedded within texts, it is possible to more precisely isolate the historical discourses it 
engaged with. It also makes it possible to validate specific interventions in those discourses by 
recovering the linguistic circumstances in which the intervention was made and, consequently, 
under which it can be legitimated. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it provides a level 
of theoretical clarity, which it has been observed is often lacking in social history.90 This 
theoretical clarity, combined with a focus on linguistic action makes it difficult to avoid an 
awareness of, or even engagement with, our own place in the historiography; therefore, with 
what we are doing in writing history. It is to a more critical interrogation of some of the theory 
employed by social historians to which we now turn. 
 
 
89 Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Volume I: The Renaissance (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978). Preface; Pocock, 'Texts as events: reflections on the history of poltical 
thought', pp. 106-22. 




Whilst Pocock’s essay is a useful way to orientate oneself in historical linguistics, Quentin 
Skinner’s more specific focus on intentionality within linguistic action more broadly is the 
methodological bedrock upon which this thesis rests.91 Skinner’s starting point is that of 
recovering what an author meant by what they said. This entails two things: identifying a range 
of normative vocabulary upon which the speech we are analysing draws, as well as a 
corresponding range of meanings that could be attached to that vocabulary; then using the 
context in which the speech was made to identify which of the meanings the author intended 
to convey in the making of the utterance.92 Although Skinner is clearly indebted to Weber in 
making the jump from linguistic action to legitimate forms of social action. He is careful not 
to leave himself open to criticism along the lines of Gareth Stedman-Jones’s critique of 
historical sociology,93 and grounds his analysis in a close, textural, analysis of language.94 
Skinner argues that there is a body of words in our vocabulary that we use to both describe 
and evaluate actions; we also use these words to also characterise the motives behind actions. 
Skinner calls these ‘evaluative-descriptive’ terms.95 They enable us to perform two types of 
closely connected speech acts: illocutionary actions and perlocutionary actions. In short, 
‘whereas an illocution is defined as an act performed in saying something, a perlocution is 
described as an effect and hence a consequence of saying something’.96 When people attempt 
 
91 Whilst recent historiography of gender has been an important aspect of our discussion so far; we do not 
find a strong engagement with the linguistic theory which underpins that historiography in the scholarship. It has, 
therefore, been necessary to introduce a deeper engagement with linguistics by drawing upon Pocock. 
92 Quentin Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas', History and Theory, 8 (1: 1969), 
pp. 3-53. 
93 See, for instance, Gareth Stedman-Jones, 'From Historical Sociology to Theoretical History', British 
Journal of Sociology, 27 (3: 1976), pp. 295-305. 
94 My analysis derives from Skinner’s original methodological work in intellectual history Quentin Skinner, 
'Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought and Action', Political Theory, 2 (1974), pp. 277-303; Quentin 
Skinner, 'Moral Principles and Social Change', in Quentin Skinner, ed., Regarding Method (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 145-57. This is now a standard tenet of textual interpretation, see the 
discussion in Michael J. Braddick and John Walter, 'Introduction. Grids of power: Order, Hierarchy and 
Subordination in Early Modern Society', in Micheal J. Braddick and John Walter, eds., Negotiating Power in 
Early Modern Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 1-42. 
95 Skinner, 'Moral Principles and Social Change', pp. 145-57. 




to legitimate their behaviour they will attempt actions that fall into both of these categories.97 
Whether people succeed in achieving the perlocutionary effects they generally attempt, such 
as persuading or inciting their listeners or readers to break down an enclosure, for instance, is 
not primarily a linguistic matter. It is simply a matter for historical investigation. The question 
of whether people succeed in achieving the illocutionary effects they attempt - such as evincing, 
expressing or soliciting approval and disapproval, satirising, questioning - on the other hand, 
is primarily a linguistic matter. It is a question of syntax and grammar. This is what gives 
evaluative-descriptive terms ‘their overwhelming ideological significance’.98  
This, for Skinner, is the whole ballgame. The moral dialectic we maintain between 
‘describing and thereby commending certain courses of action as [for example] honest or 
friendly or courageous, while describing and thereby condemning others as treacherous or 
aggressive or cowardly’ is the dialectic around which legitimate social action oscillates.99 It is 
largely ‘by the rhetorical manipulation of these terms that any society succeeds in establishing, 
upholding, questioning, or altering its moral identity’.100 This is why, Skinner argues, rational 
people will always attempt to make their actions appear legitimate to a particular audience.101 
Most people who use language will, therefore, be engaged in this rhetorical exercise in some 
way.102  
Let us take the example of the innovating landlord in sixteenth-century Norfolk, who seeks 
to enclose part of the manorial waste, upon which the poor depend for their livelihood, in order 
to enlarge his own estate. Once he (or she) has accepted the need to legitimate his actions he 
will be committed to showing that some existing favourable terms can somehow be applied as 
 
97 The debt to Weber here is clear. 
98 Skinner, 'Moral Principles and Social Change', pp. 145-57. 
99 Ibid.  
100 Ibid.  
101 This could be as general as a society at large or as private as an individual. Part of the task is to identify 
the intended audience. Obvious exceptions are individuals such as anarchists and other non-rational individuals. 




apt descriptions of his behaviour. Similarly, the poor, as soon as they decide to resist, will be 
committed to showing that some corresponding existing disapproving terms can somehow be 
applied to the lord’s actions.  
To legitimise their conduct, they [both parties] are committed to showing that it can be 
described in such a way that those who currently disapprove of it can be brought to see 
that they ought to withhold their disapproval after all. To achieve this end, they have 
no option but to show that at least some of the terms used by their ideological opponents 
to describe what they admire can be applied to include and thus to legitimise their own 
seemingly questionable behaviour.103 
This leads Skinner to argue that ‘all revolutionaries are to this extent obliged to march 
backwards into battle’.104 The novelty of this hermeneutic, and its immense value, is brought 
out when one contrasts Skinner’s approach with that of historians such as E. P. Thompson, 
who could not conceive that people could exercise legal and political agency in this way. 
Thompson had, at around the same time Skinner was writing, argued that ‘the revolutionary 
can have no interest in the law, unless as a phenomenon of ruling class power and hypocrisy, 
it should be his aim to simply overthrow it’.105 Skinner gives us the means to see how, in the 
hands of revolutionaries, pens could be mightier than swords. By primarily focusing on 
illocutionary effects, Skinner can individuate linguistic acts (illocutions) that authors 
intentionally performed within texts; in so doing, identify multiple discourses that may be at 
play, as well as the specific contributions authors saw themselves as making to those 
discourses. This is how, in Skinner’s terms, he is able to write a genuinely historical history of 
political thought.106 He argues that this approach allows him to write a history of what people 
saw themselves as doing at the time, rather than what they may have been judged to have done 
ex post facto. In Pocock’s terms, Skinner restricts himself to one tradition of behaviour and one 
 
103 Ibid. p. 150. 
104 Ibid. pp. 149-50. 
105 Thompson, Whigs and Hunters. 




level of abstraction per text; or, put another way, Skinner focuses on what was meant by what 
was said. 
Whilst Skinner’s approach has become paradigmatic in the history of political thought, it 
is symptomatic of the enclosure of social history that, while occasionally noting the importance 
of the linguistic turn, social historians have yet to pursue a linguistic analysis along these 
lines.107 As a way to explicate social action, a linguistic analysis on these terms is, for instance, 
ideally placed to facilitate the use of James Scott’s hidden and public transcripts in more 
dynamic ways. That being said, I by no means wish to suggest that this approach is perfect, nor 
that it is necessarily the best approach in every context. Therefore, a critical observation needs 
to be added at this point. Skinner’s history of political thought is, essentially, a history of 
ideologies.108 This is not to be unexpected given Skinner’s inherent interest in political thought, 
but before standing on his shoulders it is worth mentioning what I am trying to reach. The term 
‘ideology’ is commonly employed to intimate some relationship between (a) conceptual and 
verbal structures and (b) social experience and reality viewed in considerable complexity and 
depth. This is, however, not what Skinner’s methodology suggests he is primarily concerned 
with. Skinner restricts himself to: (1) the agent; (2) an action the agent desires to perform; (3) 
the languages available to the agent in which the action may be expressed. Skinner’s history of 
ideologies, therefore, falls short of an engagement with cultural or social history because it 
does not concern itself with the reasons why these languages and not others were available to 
particular agents.109  
 
107 For discussions of Skinner’s work and method see: James Tully, ed., Meaning and Context: Quentin 
Skinner and his Critics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988); Annabel Brett, James Tully and Holly Hamilton-
Bleakley, eds., Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006). 
108 The remainder of this paragraph is is based on the discussion of Skinner’s methodology in J. G. A Pocock, 
'Reconstructing the Traditions: Quentin Skinner’s Historians’ History of Political Thought', Canadian Journal of 
Political and Social Theory, 3 (3: 1979), pp. 95-113. 
109 This is distinct from why agents used these words and not others. Rather, it is about the availability of 




This method, then, when applied to sources in social and cultural history, has enormous 
potential. It has, thus far, been applied only in the relatively narrow context of major texts in 
the history of political thought. This is an existentially small contextual window that, because 
it is contingent on how long ago the text was written, can contract until it is imperceptible.110 
If it is applied to texts with a much richer contextual background, where we can glean a much 
greater understanding of what was going on - for instance, court records, custumals, charters, 
proclamations, probate, pamphlets - we would be able to do so much more than write a history 
of political thought on genuinely historical principles. We may be able to write a historical 
geography of political thought, which could possibly show how political and social ideas 
developed differently in different regions. We could explore the idiosyncratic ideologies of 
regions, institutions, of different social backgrounds, all of which were normative while being 
grounded a specific locus. Applying Skinner’s methodological precepts to social history 
widens the scope of the investigation so that it can account for why particular languages were 
available to particular agents. What I hope to reach, then, is a genuinely historical history of 
law and legal culture. 
This survey of the methodological landscape in social and intellectual history has, 
admittedly, emphasised the benefit of linguistic hermeneutics over those closer to anthropology 
and sociology. This is not because I want to suggest that either should not be used in historical 
analyses. Quite the opposite. I join Keith Wrightson who, echoing Bernard Bailyn, hopes to 
incite a riot for  
a more determined attempt to integrate the ‘latent’ and the ‘manifest’ events of history; 
to examine the active and continuous relationship between the underlying conditions 
that set the boundaries of human existence and the everyday problems with which 
people constantly struggle; to illuminate the landscape surrounding major public events 
and to reassess them accordingly; to establish systems of filiation and derivation among 
phenomena that once were discussed in isolation from each other; to relate the public 
and the private; to put the story together again; now with a complexity and analytical 
 




dimension never envisioned before111  
Social history has been, is, and should remain, an existentially messy collection of tools and 
craftsmen. It is the tavern that sits at the crossroads of different ways of thinking. That does 
not, however, mean that social historians should simply glean theory from those who pass 
through. Paul Cartledge and Richard Evans have argued that ‘we continue to need social history 
… as a history of class, of oppression and exploitation, or - if class, oppression and exploitation 
are found analytically or morally objectionable terms - at all events of poverty’.112 It is through 
a narrative of class, oppression, exploitation, and poverty that this thesis will demonstrate that 
social history is more than the sum of its base. As Marx once argued 
Men make their own history, but not of their own free will; not under circumstances 
they themselves have chosen but under given and inherited circumstances with which 
they are directly confronted. The tradition of dead generations weighs like a nightmare 
on the minds of the living. And, just when they appear to be engaged in in the 
revolutionary transformation of themselves and their material surroundings, in the 
creation of something that does not already exist, precisely in such epochs of 
revolutionary crisis they timidly conure up the spirits of the past to help them; they 
borrow their names, slogans and costumes so as to stage the new world historical scene 
in this venerable disguise and borrowed language.113 
This thesis will investigate how ordinary men and women used language to make their history, 
while also remembering Hobbes’ pithy epigram, ‘of our conceptions of the past, we make a 
future’.114 The whole enterprise of interpretation is dialogical and the name of the game is 
intertextuality. Intertextuality illuminates intentionality, and it is recovering intentionality - that 
is to say, what ordinary people meant by what they said - which is the fundamental 
interpretative exercise of this thesis.  
 
 
111 Wrightson, 'The Encosure of English Social History', pp. 59-77. 
112 Paul Cartledge, 'What is Social History Now?', in David Cannadine, ed., What is History Now? 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 19-35. 
113 Karl Marx, Surveys from Exile, ed., David Fernback, (London: Verso, 2010), p. 146. 





The remainder of this thesis is split into four historical chapters. Chapters Two and Three are 
twinned and form the first major line of argument that runs throughout the thesis; Chapters 
Four and Five are similarly twinned and form the other main line of argument. In short, the 
former is concerned with demonstrating the classical inheritance of equity pleadings and 
depositions, while the latter is concerned to explicate the significance of that inheritance. The 
thesis is not intended to be read as the study of a locality. Whilst it is geographically grounded 
in litigation from a manor in sixteenth-century Norfolk, this is to give the argument a general 
sense of cohesion. The point in grounding the thesis in a locality is rather to demonstrate how 
the broader issues we will discuss can be seen at a local level, in the ways in which ordinary 
litigants understood their experience and talked about it to each other. We will, therefore, be 
introduced to the issues with which the thesis is centrally concerned first. Namely, English law, 
politics and classical notions of rhetoric; we will be introduced to the locality in which the 
thesis is grounded, the North Norfolk Manor of Gimingham more slowly, through each chapter 
as the thesis progresses in order to illustrate how the issues discussed in each chapter can be 
seen at play in Elizabethan Gimingham. Our view of Gimingham and of its inhabitants will, 
therefore, develop in line with our analysis. 
Chapter Two serves two purposes. The first is to act as the main historical introduction to 
the thesis; the second is to begin to question some of the fundamental assumptions we are 
confronted with in the existing scholarship surrounding early modern legal records. We are 
introduced to equity pleadings from the jurisdiction of the Duchy of Lancaster’s Court of 
Duchy Chamber which, in many respects, form the bedrock of this thesis. We are also 
introduced to classical notions of what it meant to be persuasive in a legal context. That is to 
say, we are introduced to the concept of rhetoric. We discuss how, despite making unlikely 




English equity courts actually have a quite a lot in common. It is suggested that the scholarship 
surrounding early modern legal records is, in many ways, misleading because the notion of 
rhetoric is weakly conceptualised in it. That is to say, rhetoric in the scholarship is often simply 
used as a synonym for persuasive speech. Throughout this chapter we begin to see that 
persuasion, whist it may be the intended effect, is not the sum of rhetoric; which, when properly 
grasped, is much more concerned with what makes speech persuasive. Once this is held in mind 
we can begin to see how, contrary to the prevailing orthodoxy in the scholarship, English law 
was not nearly as insular as it may at first glance appear. 
Chapter Three begins to discuss the process of equity litigation in more detail. We retain 
our focus on records from the Duchy Chamber’s jurisdiction, but we begin to expand the scope 
of the inquiry. We are introduced to the structure of the archive and the different classes of 
document contained within it. In this chapter we begin to think of the whole process of equity 
litigation in rhetorical terms. We consider the stages of litigation side by side with how classical 
and vernacular rhetorical authorities argue one should structure an argument before a court of 
law. When we consider the instruments of litigation in context, that is to say when we consider 
the complaint alongside the related answer, rejoinder, demurrer, interrogatories and 
depositions, we can appreciate the legal and juridical context of litigation. This chapter 
demonstrates how, by examining all of the instruments of a piece of litigation alongside one 
another and situating them within the broader context of humanist legal discourse, we can 
excavate a vibrant legal tradition that owes much more to classical modes of thinking than the 
scholarship generally allows for. The form and structure of legal texts are shown to be 
inherently classical; this, it is argued, has broad significance for our understanding of English 
law and legal culture in Renaissance England. 
In Chapter Four we move from demonstrating the classical provenance of English legal 




of forensic forms and structures had upon the development of English law. In this chapter we 
delve deeply into the legal scholarship surrounding Equity and the influence of humanism and 
the Renaissance on English law more broadly. The notion, put forward by Maitland and so 
pivotal to much of the existing legal scholarship, that ‘English law is not where we look for 
humanism or the spirit of the Renaissance’, is challenged.115 The intellectual contexts of 
pleadings are excavated and illustrate how humanist discourse inflected more than just the 
forensic structure of the arguments advanced; humanism is also to be found in their substantive 
content. Lawyers and litigants are shown to have deployed the vocabularies of Cicero and 
Tacitus, as well as the more legalistic common law vocabularies associated with ancient 
constitutionalism. Throughout this chapter we begin to see how people used these vocabularies 
to make sense of the world around them, to engage with their surroundings and, most 
importantly, to try and effect change within their world. It is argued that the development of 
English law mirrored the development of English society in important respects. By being 
sensitive to these developments in English law, specifically to how people used language to 
evaluate and describe their behaviour in a legal context, and thus legitimate their actions, we 
can recover the character of early modern society. By examining the ideas and ideologies 
deployed in defence of everyday life we begin to get a sense of how the law operated on the 
ground for ordinary people; this illuminates how the early modern state functioned and how 
ordinary people’s relationship with the State was mediated through the law. Crucially, this 
chapter demonstrates how key political concepts, which we most often associate with academic 
political theory, such as the concept of the State or commonwealth, were contested through 
litigation.  
The final chapter, Chapter Five, develops this key insight into early modern politics. The 
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focus shifts from a legal context, wherein we examined the effects of forensic rhetoric on early 
modern English law, to a social context. We interrogate the concepts of power and authority in 
early modern politics and examine what they meant to the ordinary people of Gimingham. We 
examine how people other than the plaintiffs and their lawyers involved themselves in litigation 
by giving evidence in examinations and depositions. We see how ordinary people had a vested 
interest in the litigation taking place around them and used the opportunity to give evidence to 
construct their own narratives. We see how litigation was shaped by more than the ends 
litigants attempted through recourse to the law. It was also deeply shaped by the strategies and 
wagers involved in engaging with the epistemic discourses on politics; what Sophie Smith has 
recently described as ’the politics of political theory’.116 We examine the discourse of popular 
memory as a means through with ordinary people were able to challenge dominant ruling ideas 
of contemporary political discourse by deploying alternative narratives. We see how notions 
of power, freedom and authority were written into the landscape of early modern England; how 
ordinary people, who perhaps lacked the technical vocabulary to debate politics in an academic 
sense, nevertheless understood politics in their own terms and could engage with complex 
notions of power and authority for their own ends through litigation. 
 
History, we were told in 1989, is at an end.117 Human civilisation, in terms of its political 
development, has reached a terminal point in the form of Western liberal democracy. In making 
this provocative declaration, Francis Fukuyama intended to stir the political community to 
action, to reinvigorate and instil in people once again the ‘willingness to risk one's life for a 
purely abstract goal,’ to re-create a ‘worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, 
courage, imagination, and idealism’.118 One cannot help but feel bewildered that such a beacon 
 
116 Sophie Smith, Okin, Rawls, and the Politics of Political Theory. Paper delivered to the Foundations of 
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117 Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History?', Centre for the National Interest, 16 (1989), pp. 3-18. 




of postmodernist theory should be so existentially ironic; whether or not we agree with 
Fukuyama’s assessment, his notion of history is indeed dead. We no longer think of history as 
the history of past politics.119 Historians have done battle with the spectre of modernism in 
Marxist historiography and a resurrected empiricist political historiography. History is 
increasingly seen in contemporary discourse, to borrow an analogy from Clifford Geertz, as a 
representation of the past; the questions with which historians now concern themselves centre 
around how those representations are to be represented.120 Most social historians, however, 
remain reluctant to critically engage with their sources along explicitly linguistic lines.121 This 
thesis is, therefore, situated along that methodological rubicon social historians seem so 
reluctant to cross. It is an attempt to develop a productive framework with which to approach 
the language used within legal texts, through an illustration of how ordinary people in early 
modern England risked their lives and livelihoods in daring displays of courage, imagination 
and idealism on a daily basis. If it is successful, perhaps it might suggest that neither history, 
nor its historiography, could ever be at an end. 
 
119 Patrick Collinson, 'De Republica Anglorum: Or, History with the Politics Put Back', in Patrick Collinson, 
ed., Elizabethan Essays (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), pp. 1-30. 
120 Geertz, 'Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective', pp. 167-234. 
121 The main exceptions to this are Laura Gowing and Garthine Walker, in their work explicating the concept 
of gender  through a close analysis of early modern legal records. See: Gowing, Domestic Dangers; Walker, 
Crime, Gender and Social Order in Early Modern England; Gowing, Gender Relations. Andy Wood has also 
attempted to engage with texts linguistically. See: Andy Wood, ''Poore men woll speke one daye': Plebeian 
Languages of Deference and Defiance in England, c. 1520-1640', in Tim Harris, ed., The Politics of the Excluded, 
c. 1500-1850 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 67-98; Wood, The 1549 Rebellions. All of these works are 




CHAPTER TWO: PLEADINGS 
 
This chapter is concerned with the unexceptionally exceptional. It is concerned with everyday 
legal records produced by the English equity courts. Classical rhetoric may not be the first thing 
that we think of when it comes to the law and legal history, yet we shall see that rhetoric 
occupied a significant place in Renaissance culture. There is a growing appreciation of how 
the rhetorical and juristic culture of the sixteenth century shaped the political developments of 
early modern England, but there is as yet no study of how the multitude of people engaged with 
this culture and began to use it to reshape the world in which they lived. This chapter will, 
consequently, begin to examine this question in relation to legal records created by the equity 
court of Duchy Chamber under the reign of Elizabeth I. I have three main aims in this chapter; 
the first is simply to demonstrate that, legal records are not as sterile or insular as the 
scholarship surrounding the law might suggest. Properly contextualised, they can make ‘the 
law’ a worthwhile and rewarding subject of investigation for historians. They do not wholly 
consist of formulaic legal jargon created by court bureaucracy; the ‘platitudinous repetition of 
technical legal argument merged with more general observations on the nature of the rule of 
law’ served a very specific purpose within these texts.122 My second aim has been to 
demonstrate that when we examine these records with classical theories of rhetoric in mind we 
expose a number of tensions within the texts. These records may be centuries old, but they 
provide windows into a culture we only partially understand; it was constantly changing and 
evolving, just like our own. My third concern follows from the second in that I have sought to 
show that, once we begin to remember the rhetorical and humanistic ambience of late-Tudor 
 








Classical rhetoric is rarely the first thing one thinks of when asked about the law, the legal 
profession, or the courts in sixteenth century England. Yet, it had a profound impact on the law 
and legal culture in sixteenth century England. Its influence rippled throughout society, and 
realigned a broad spectrum of English culture into a philological sphere; wherein eloquence 
became the preferred instrument with which to remake society. Scholars have, however, been 
slow to grasp the importance of rhetoric in sixteenth century society. Despite the presence of a 
large scholarship on the Renaissance and its influence on English society, outside of intellectual 
history, there is relatively little work on classical rhetoric. This is, perhaps, unsurprising; whilst 
the place of rhetoric in the humanist curriculum is well established, English law is ‘not where 
we look for humanism and the spirit of the Renaissance’.123 This thesis argues, however, that 
if we re-examine the classical and sixteenth century rhetorical literature alongside early modern 
legal records, we will find Ciceronian rhetorical precepts were deployed throughout the English 
conciliar courts. This should precipitate a re-examination of English law and legal culture in 
the scholarship. 
Within the historiographical paradigms examined in Chapter One, the scholarship of 
sixteenth-century England has, over the course of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, 
emphasised innovations in English government, politics, and law under the Tudors.124 Geoffrey 
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Elton posited a ‘Tudor revolution in government’ under the administration of Thomas 
Cromwell.125 Elton and his apologists argued that the rise of bureaucracy under the Tudors 
formed the genus of a recognisably modern form of government - a theme picked up and 
debated throughout the course of the later-twentieth century. John Guy has similarly written 
on the political innovations of the Tudor monarchs, finding in the political expedients 
employed by Henry VIII and Elizabeth I a Machiavellian finesse which, when no longer 
present under the inelegant and ‘fumbling’ Stuarts, created the conditions for revolution.126 In 
emphasising the transformation of English law during the sixteenth century, John Baker has 
spoken of a ‘yawning gap’ in the historiography of English law during the sixteenth century, 
resulting in ‘generations of lawyers [being] prevented from seeing that most of their law took 
the shape in which they knew it in the sixteenth century.’127 In the social and cultural 
historiography of sixteenth-century England, Phil Withington has examined the vocabulary of 
early modern England in an attempt to demonstrate how ’a better appreciation of the early 
meanings and chronologies’ of words such as “society” and “modern” ‘illuminates the nature 
and antecedents of modernity … [and] enables us to demarcate the sixteenth … century as a 
distinctive era of social and cultural change.’128 In a more narrative vein of analysis, Mike 
Braddick has argued that our modern conception of the state began to take a recognisable form 
in the sixteenth-century.129 Steve Hindle has similarly connected the formation of the state to 
specific pressures in sixteenth-century society, particularly pressures that precipitated a 
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recourse to the law.130 Law and politics in sixteenth century England, it is clear, were 
irrevocably intertwined. 
Delving further into the legal historiography of early modern England there have been 
studies made of crime,131 on the ecclesiastical courts,132 on the legal professions,133 on civil 
litigation, and on the place of common-law thinking in early modern political thought.134 
However, while all of these have been valuable contributions to the scholarship, they are all 
written with a number of different agendas in mind. They have been dispersed in their 
chronological coverage, and few have been specifically concerned with the role of law in 
politics and society broadly conceived. Those working on the lawyers have concentrated on 
internal professional developments and the social origins and social mobility of practitioners. 
Studies of crime usually draw their conclusions with little reference to the ideologies and 
attitudes that were associated with law enforcement. Those studies that have used quarter 
sessions and assize records to study crime, or ecclesiastical court depositions to examine sex 
and marriage, have on the whole been more concerned with the nature and incidence of crime 
and criminals, or the character of sexual and marital relations, than with legal thought and 
practice. Whilst some studies have addressed questions about the relationship between law and 
agency, they have for the most part been interested primarily in the value of legal records as 
sources for social and cultural history rather than in the social history of the law itself.135 Andy 
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Wood’s recent study of custom in early modern society, and Chris Brooks’ seminal work Law, 
Politics and Society stand out as beacons in an otherwise dim historiographical landscape.136 
 In the scholarship surrounding the intellectual developments that took place in early 
modern society there have been studies of humanism and scholasticism,137 on the development 
of political thought,138 on rhetoric and poetics in literary texts,139 on ideas of citizenship and 
republicanism,140 and on the relationship between language and law in early modern 
discourse.141 Once again, however, these studies are written with a number of different agendas 
in mind. Whilst some of these studies have concerned themselves with the role of law in politics 
and society, they are generally restricted to a particular social class or geographical area: the 
gentry, the aristocracy, London or a specific county or urban centre. Those working on 
intellectual movements such as humanism concentrate on individual exchanges between the 
protagonists or the wider pamphlet wars in which they take place. Studies of political thought 
often fall into the trap of teleology, but a teleology that takes as its milestones only the texts 
that were written by scholars, or those already involved in government. There is little 
consideration of texts created for, or by the actions of, those who were not active in government 
or politics: the smallholders, copyholders, tenants at will, neifs and villeins, those who worked 
the land and lived and died in the same place in which they were born. Those studies that have 
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used literary texts to study the intellectual culture of a broader swath of society have on the 
whole been concerned with poetic or dramatic texts, plays performed in urban theatres and 
poems written for the few rather than the many. Studies of language and discourse have often 
been underpinned by Foucauldian philosophy and stressed both the normative power and 
constraints of language, while focusing on a particular thread of discourse wherein recurrent 
links can be demonstrated between words within texts and actions outside of them. 
The scarcity of interdisciplinarity and intertextuality in the scholarship surrounding the law 
has not gone unnoticed. In the opening pages of Law, Politics, and Society in Early Modern 
England, Chris Brooks argues that while scholars regularly make use of legal records, ‘many 
British historians would probably maintain that … ‘the law’ itself is not a very worthwhile or 
rewarding subject of investigation’.142 Brooks attributes this reluctance to investigate ‘the law’ 
to the ‘insularity and sterility’ of the existing scholarship, which in turn has its roots in ‘the 
heart of western social thought’.143 The predominant influence of Marxist social theory in the 
twentieth century drove scholars away from the study of law and legal history because such 
theory did not regard legal thought or institutions as keys to the understanding of any society. 
Instead, it regarded them as epiphenomenal to the means of production.144 Brooks’ study is a 
delicate weave of social, cultural, and legal history; drawing on threads from the Ciceronian 
and Aristotelian inheritance of law and politics, it shows how classical learning informed 
sixteenth and seventeenth century English culture through a rhetorical understanding of civil 
society.145 What Brooks does not do, however, is offer an account of what constitutes rhetoric; 
 
142 Brooks, Law, Politics and Society, p. 2. 
143 Ibid. pp. 2-3. 
144 Ibid.  




of how rhetoric may have been employed in the contexts he examines. He quotes Thomas 
Wilson’s definition of the art, which was essentially Ciceronian, emphasising the need to speak 
fully and eloquently about all things which by law and mans ordinance are enacted and 
appointed for the use and profit of man, but he does not give an account of what Wilson may 
have meant.146 Rhetoric, in Brooks’ analysis, has no visible content; if it does have content it 
is indistinguishable from the rest of the studia humanitatis.  
Whilst some more recent studies in intellectual history have addressed questions about the 
relationships between politics, law, language, and agency, they have for the most part been 
interested in examining only literary texts.147 Indeed, there is a growing literature on the 
political edge of Shakespeare’s dramatic works and the rhetorical devices used within.148 This 
preoccupation with literary texts, however, while allowing for a self-contained analytical 
demonstration of theory and its subsequent practice within a text, is the Humanities equivalent 
to conducting a scientific experiment in a lab. The scenarios being analysed are fiction. They 
are inherently removed from the way in which the majority of people experienced and engaged 
with the world around them. Shakespeare’s use of classical rhetoric in Hamlet and The 
Merchant of Venice or A Midsummer Night’s Dream may be unquestionable, as is the fact that 
those plays were enjoyed by hundreds of thousands of men and women in sixteenth-century 
England, but it would be misleading to suppose that these examples indicate widespread use 
(or understanding of) of Roman rhetorical precepts throughout early modern society. Only in 
the more general scholarship on Humanism and the Renaissance do we find discussions of 
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classical rhetoric in the broader context of early modern culture. This scholarship has, by and 
large, focused on the humanist educational curriculum and its influence on sixteenth century 
society; although it is not specific to the local study of this thesis, the examination of the 
humanist educational curriculum is deeply relevant to the broader themes examined throughout 
the thesis and it is, therefore, necessary to discuss it in some detail.  
 
Legal Education 
Any discussion of education, legal or otherwise, in the sixteenth century cannot be conducted 
as if the Renaissance, Reformation and Counter Reformation were incidental to its 
development. Moreover, Paul Kristeller’s widely accepted definition of humanism as as a 
phase in the rhetorical tradition of Western culture is based on the sound observation that 
humanist thinkers were, as a group, fascinated by the power of speech.149 In the intellectual 
scholarship, then, discussions of education in the sixteenth century tend to revolve around how 
different humanists, and different categories of humanists, conceived of the humanist project 
and practiced what they preached at various points in time: humanism, christian humanism, or 
civic humanism.150 Scholarship which focuses on the place of rhetoric in the sixteenth century 
curriculum is centered on a debate over whether classical rhetoric in its Ciceronian form 
predominates over the tradition practiced by, among others, Peter Ramus, or vice versa.151 The 
debate over the ascendancy of Ciceronian or Ramist rhetoric is the framework within which a 
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debate over the humanist project more broadly is conducted. The essence of which is that 
Ramus and his follows are characterised as emptying classical rhetoric of its moral content, 
reducing it to the ‘endlessly bifurcating dichotomies’ of forensic arguments.152 Ciceronian 
rhetoric, epitomised in the sixteenth century by Thomas Wilson and his Arte of Rhetorique 
(1553), by contrast maintained an essential connection between eloquence and moral virtue. 
This intricacies of this debate are, for instance, the subject of Anthony Grafton and Lisa 
Jardine’s influential discussion of sixteenth century humanism.153 
This debate in the intellectual scholarship underpins the most important recent discussion 
of humanism and humanist education in the context of English law and legal culture.154 That 
is to say, John Baker’s much enlarged and revised 2004 English Law and the Renaissance. The 
evolution of Baker’s essay, which has been revised every decade since the 1970s, illustrates 
how our understanding of legal education in the sixteenth century has changed over the course 
of the last half century.155 At first, in the 1970s, legal historians were dismissive of the idea 
that Renaissance Humanism may have influenced the development of English law. Indeed, 
Baker even quipped that ‘English law is not where we look for humanism and the spirit of the 
Renaissance’.156 In his 2004 version of the same essay, however, Baker articulated a much 
more nuanced argument: humanism exerted no substantive influence on the content of English 
law, but the broad philological principles inherent in Renaissance humanism did, naturally, 
exert their influence on all kinds of law; ‘English law sailed with the jurisprudential tide’.157 
The English common law mind, impervious to direct influence, was ‘indeed susceptible to new 
ways of thinking about the legal process and to development by the courts’.158 The way in 
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which our understanding of the ways in which humanism influenced English law has developed 
over the course of the last half century is indicative of how our understanding of legal education 
needs to develop if we are to grasp the influence of classical rhetoric on English society broadly 
conceived. 
Discussions of specifically legal education in sixteenth century England have managed to 
elide the Renaissance context by and large.159 Studies have, instead, focused largely on the 
education of lawyers once they reached University or the Inns of Court. This scholarship has, 
for instance, emphasised the formal and informal experience gained through apprenticeship of 
attorneys in the Inns of Chancery.160 It has examined the formal training of barristers undertake 
at the Inns of Court.161 These studies have been enormously influential in the scholarship, but 
their influence is such that, generally speaking, few historians of sixteenth century law 
challenge their basic tenets. Chris Brooks’ studies of the lower branch of the legal profession, 
for instance, are incredible and indispensable to the scholarship. That being said, however, 
Pettyfoggers and Vipers of the Commonwealth, just as much as his Law, Politics and Society, 
struggles to conceptualise the concept of rhetoric and, therefore, misunderstands the formative 
influence a grammar school education could and did exert on the legal profession. Rhetoric, 
for Brooks, has no content; it is simply taken to mean any form of persuasive speech. This is, 
however, a deeply modern understanding of what it means to be persuasive. Rhetoric in the 
sixteenth century was understood in its classical and humanistic sense; as an art that taught one 
how to structure and ornament speech through a set of formal rules. Rhetoric and rhetorical 
speech in sixteenth century England entailed a deep and felicitous engagement with and 
understanding of latin grammar and the rhetorical literature taught in the grammar schools: 
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above all, with Cicero’s De inventione.162 This thesis seeks to demonstrate that, in order to 
grasp the influence of classical rhetoric on sixteenth century English society, we first must 
grasp the role of educational context lawyers and litigants gained at grammar school. It is this 
formative experience, wherein students were steeped in the humanist curriculum of latin 
grammar and rhetorical literature before they began their University studies or a formal 
apprenticeship at an Inn, which had the most significant effects on sixteenth century legal 
culture.  
 
Equity and Rhetoric 
Early modern English law was made up of a set of competing jurisdictions. Broadly speaking, 
these jurisdictions fell into distinct categories: the common law, Equity, and ecclesiastical 
law.163 Whilst we will primarily be concerned with the aspects of English law and legal culture 
associated with Equity, for clarity, it is necessary to briefly delineate the main jurisdictions. 
The first of which was the common law, the primary legal jurisdiction throughout the realm. 
The fundamental characteristic of the common law was that it was (and still is) based on 
precedent. Sir John Davies, a late-sixteenth century lawyer and Attorney-General for Ireland, 
summarised the common law as 
The Common Law of England is nothing else but the Common Custome of the Realm; 
and a Custome which hath obtained the force of a Law is always said to be Jus non 
scriptum: for it cannot be made or created either b Charter or by Parliament, which are 
Acts reduced to writing, and are always a matter of Record; but being onely matter of 
fact, and consisting in use and practice, it can be recorded and registered no-where but 
in the memory of the people.164 
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This fundamental principle, that custom constituted law, ran through English legal culture. It 
informed the common law as it was enforced in the central courts of Kings Bench and Common 
Pleas just as much as it did borough and manorial jurisdictions throughout the realm.165 An 
analysis of the part of early modern English law known as Equity will form the basis of this 
thesis. This aspect of English law developed from the late-fourteenth century out of the need 
to mediate the common law, which was theoretically seen to be a universal good and not open 
to contextual interpretation or modification.166 Common law, consequently, could not take into 
account the context surrounding individual legal cases; judges were required to determine the 
outcome of a case on the pleadings before them.167 In other words, the letter of the law prevailed 
over the spirit in every case.  
Equity, by contrast, was based on the medieval notion that a Prince stood above the law 
and could intervene upon, although not alter, the common law.168 Its authority rested on royal 
prerogative, although in practice the prerogative was exercised by the Lord Chancellor who, 
acting in the name of the Prince, answered petitions from litigants whom the common law 
could offer no satisfactory remedy. The key point to take away is that Equity was not a body 
of rules or customs in the way that the common law was held to be. It originated and developed 
much more haphazardly through the idiosyncratic and oftentimes quixotic interests of the 
Chancellor and individual ministers in particular petitions and cases. Only towards the end of 
the sixteenth century did it become a more recognisable set of principles espoused in the 
prerogative courts.169 The central courts of Chancery, Exchequer, Requests, and Star Chamber, 
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along with the Duchy of Lancaster Court of Duchy Chamber, were all prerogative courts that 
applied the principles of Equity in their orders and decrees. Of these jurisdictions, this thesis is 
centrally concerned with how people approached and pleaded before the latter two.170  
The final major division of English law is ecclesiastical law. This encompasses the 
jurisdiction of the Church Courts and dealt with matters held to be of spiritual significance. 
Ecclesiastical law followed neither the common law nor the principles of equity. It was made 
up of civil law. Civil law is the other great legal tradition of Western Europe wherein the core 
principles of a society or institution are codified and referred to in the interpretation of the law 
in each context. This is to be contrasted with the common law tradition, wherein precedent not 
principle is the highest authority. The civil tradition is the classical inheritance of Roman law, 
specifically the Codex of Justinian. The emphasis in civil law is for arguments are provided on 
both sides of a case and it is the decision of the judge to decide which side has merit. The 
contrast with common law is that, in common law proceedings, judges are to a certain extent 
required to determine a case by the pleading entered into the court, rather than deciding on the 
merits of either side. We will not encounter ecclesiastical law in this thesis but, as we will see, 
Equity, by its nature, was bound to account for context and issue decrees on the merits of a 
case. The influence of the tradition of civil law upon Equity and common law is, therefore, an 
issue around which this thesis turns; the extent to which it, that is an essentially classical 
understanding of law, underpinned English society, is a question which runs through the thesis. 
 
The legal records examined in this chapter come from the equitable jurisdiction of the 
Duchy of Lancaster’s court of Duchy Chamber. The central premise of the chapter is, therefore, 
that many of these records are constructed according to a set of rhetorical precepts advocated 
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by humanist writings during the sixteenth century. The decision to examine legal records 
relating exclusively to courts of equity was taken in order that complimentary analyses could 
be conducted as the thesis progresses and the argument develops. It would be misleading to 
generalise and suggest that humanist rhetoric influenced the entirety of English law in the same 
way.171 
The corpus of English law in the sixteenth century consisted of a number of different parts, 
including: common law, ecclesiastical law, and Equity; all of which can be divided into further 
subdivisions. Each division was distinct and possessed its own telos; consequently, they 
developed in different ways and at different rates. Not only did legal procedure and form vary 
between the different branches of law, jurisdictions and courts, so too did the type of case. 
Litigants were careful to choose under which jurisdiction and court they would litigate, the 
success or failure of an action often hung on that decision. The line of argument adopted 
throughout this thesis will become clearer as we progress through each chapter and each 
analysis builds upon the preceding one. The focus on two courts is meant to demonstrate that 
the conclusions drawn cannot be explained away as a local or court-specific peculiarity: the 
influence of humanist rhetoric extended into multiple jurisdictions. 
Equity is the first branch of English law wherein we can discern the influence of humanist 
rhetoric. Originally developed and administered in Chancery and under the jurisdiction of the 
Lord Chancellor, it was intended to provide redress for litigants who could not secure justice 
due to the strict procedures of the common law. Unlike the common law, in the sixteenth 
century the legal procedures and content of Equity as a body of law were not fixed; they could 
vary according to the inclinations of the individual occupying the office of Lord Chancellor. 
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The courts which operated under its jurisdiction were, therefore, much quicker to adapt to the 
evolving culture and circumstances of English society. One consequence of this versatility was 
that the equity courts were often seen as a courts of appeal: litigants who were unhappy with a 
decision rendered in the Courts of King’s Bench or Common Pleas could bring a case under an 
equity jurisdiction such as Chancery, Star Chamber, or Duchy Chamber, and if successful they 
could have the original common law verdict overturned.172 Often criticised by contemporaries 
for its ever-increasing authority at the discretion of the Lord Chancellor, the seventeenth-
century jurist John Selden described equity as: 
a roguish thing: for law we have a measure, know what to trust to; equity is according 
to the conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is 
equity. 'Tis all one as if they should make the standard for the measure we call a foot, 
a Chancellor's foot; what an uncertain measure would this be? One Chancellor has a 
long foot, another a short foot, a third an indifferent foot: 'tis the same thing in a 
Chancellor's conscience.173 
It is for precisely this reason that equity was the first branch of English law to exhibit rhetorical 
forms of argument in its procedures.  
We begin to discern the effects of the increasingly rhetorical basis of legal learning in a 
number of legal treatises before we see it in the texts produced by the courts themselves. In the 
1540s, Sir William Stanford composed a treatise entitled An Exposicion of the Kinges 
Perogative.174 In the preface to what is essentially a series of explanatory essays, Stanford 
extolls the singular virtue of English law, but laments that ‘the knowledge of the said laws is 
placed so far of, the journey thereunto so exceding long and painfull, & the ways and paths so 
rugged and unpleasant’.175 Shortly afterward in the 1550s, Edmund Plowden began to compose 
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his Commentaries; although originally written in law French and not published in print until 
1571, they are indicative of the way in which attitudes towards legal arguments were changing 
with the times. The Commentaries were designed to be a tool to help law students and are 
essentially records of the different arguments used in court. In the preface, Plowden states that 
one of his aims in writing the Commentaries was to ‘give diligent attention to, the debates and 
questions of law’.176 Similarly, the reports of Sir James Dyer, the former Chief Justice of the 
Court of Common Pleas, were published posthumously in 1586. Dyer’s Reports were his notes 
on over 1000 legal cases taken from his personal notebooks.177 They provide a remarkable 
insight into the thought process of one of the most senior and learned legal minds of the time, 
as well as a glimpse of how legal knowledge was applied in both the ordinary and extraordinary 
workings of the law. All of the works mentioned above were widely available and known in 
late-Elizabethan England and demonstrate what John Baker has described as an evolution of 
older forms of legal learning, specifically regarding legal proofs, to a more jurisprudential 
understanding of the law: ‘a shift in emphasis from doctrine (or common learning) to 
jurisprudence (or judge-made law)’.178 As Chris Brooks pithily summarises, ‘litigants 
evidently wanted decisions and they wanted to know the reasons for those decisions’.179 
 It is now incumbent to establish more specifically how this curriculum began to have an 
impact upon how people understood and engaged with the law and how they came to influence 
not only the legal profession, but also the courts and even the law itself. The classical and 
Renaissance handbooks on the art of rhetoric are almost entirely devoted to offering advice on 
how to understand and engage with the law through the use of forensic rhetoric; the extent to 
which their advice was followed only increased as the sixteenth century wore on. This is the 
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claim that -  beginning with an examination of the opening stages of litigation in the Duchy 
Chamber - this chapter will attempt to illustrate, and the attempt to do so will occupy us for the 
rest of this thesis. 
 
Form and Structure 
When we examine complaints to the Duchy Chamber under Elizabeth I we can see they possess 
a definite structure and form. This structure and form often closely follows the precepts 
advocated by the humanist proponents of the Roman rhetorical tradition. That we can discern 
this at all brings into question the assertion that English law was insular and sterile.180 Indeed, 
the presence of rhetorical forms of argument in the workaday texts of busy jurisdictions is 
symptomatic of a wider ideological conflict which took place throughout sixteenth-century 
Europe and Renaissance England between the proponents of humanism and the defenders of 
medieval scholasticism. It is, therefore, somewhat misleading to characterise English law as 
insular or sterile: such law would not be susceptible to influence from external pressures such 
as humanism, and we would not be able to see rhetorical forms of argument replacing outdated 
forms of legal proof.181 They did, however, and we can. In decrying the ’dark and farr off’ 
nature of English law, contemporaries were not, primarily, commenting on how it developed 
independently of any external influences such as Civil law or Canon law, although there is 
some truth to this view.182 They were lambasting how difficult it was to understand and engage 
with the law: they were commenting on the difficulties faced in pursuing a legal education.183 
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There seems to me to be some confusion, or perhaps more accurately some imprecision which 
has engendered confusion, in the scholarship surrounding the history of English law. 
John Baker’s famous characterisation of the sixteenth century as ‘The Dark Age of Legal 
History’ is perhaps one of the most easily identified causes of this confusion.184 Although 
Baker made the remark when characterising the state of modern scholarship on English law, 
the characterisation has its rings true to sixteenth-century characterisations of English law.185 
Baker’s argument is, just like many of the writers in Tudor England, focused on the state of the 
scholarship surrounding the law; not on the law itself. Indeed, there is a tension in much of 
Baker’s work between his desire to investigate the intellectual influence of the Renaissance on 
English law and the abject state of many of the sources and surrounding scholarship which 
prevent the historian from looking backwards with any degree of clarity.186 The historical 
prejudice of the term “Dark Ages” hangs like an albatross around the neck of the historian of 
Renaissance England. English law did experience a renaissance  during the sixteenth century 
and Baker, following Maitland, has sought to illustrate this in his contributions to the 
scholarship while also encouraging us to pay more attention to this neglected aspect of History. 
The humanist advocacy of teaching rhetoric, specifically forensic rhetoric, as the basis for 
understanding law - rather than the medieval scholastic method of dialectical disputation - led 
to an emphasis on the persuasive power of rhetorical argument as being key to successful 
litigation; although he eschews a detailed exposition and analysis of such forms, their presence 
is implicit in much of Baker’s work, as well as in the related work of Christopher Brooks.187 
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Whereas Baker largely ‘laid aside the question of the extent to which law was influenced by 
the Renaissance’, this is one of the fundamental questions this thesis attempts to (partially) 
address.188  
The precepts of forensic rhetoric were designed to make judicial speech more persuasive 
in a formal legal context, as such they apply a general theory of rhetoric to a legal context and 
offer specific advice about how to conduct a speech in court with maximum effect. Cicero and 
the author of the Ad Herennium argued that the ars rhetorica was comprised of five main 
elements or skills that an orator should master: inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, and 
pronuncitatio; with inventio being by far the most important. It was further argued that a 
rhetorically complete speech would be divisible into six distinct parts, each with its own 
purpose: 
The Exordium is the beginning of our speech, by means of which our audience’s mind 
is made ready to hear our case. The Narratio is the factual account of what happened 
or might have happened. The Divisio is where we indicate what is agreed and what is 
in dispute, and where we explain what points we plan to take up. The Confirmatio is 
the stage at which we offer an exposition of our own arguments with full seriousness. 
The Confutatio is when we demolish the arguments of our opponents. And the 
Conclusio is when we bring our speech to a resounding close.189 
 
The specific rhetorical devices - the figures and tropes of speech - appropriate to each of these 
sections then varied even further according to what type of speech was being given. The 
rhetoricians offer three categories of rhetorical speech: epideictic (to speak in praise or blame 
of a particular person), deliberative (wherein we seek to persuade or dissuade people from a 
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particular course of action), and finally judicial or forensic speech (the type of speech most 
appropriate to courts of law wherein there will be a prosecution and a defence of a particular 
controversy). 
The complaints examined in this chapter, when examined side by side with the rhetorical 
handbooks, show that they can be read as if they form the exordium of a legal case: the 
beginning of a legal action, wherein we prepare the judge to hear our case. The later stages of 
litigation - answers, demurrers, examinations, depositions and judgements - then, form 
subsequent partes of the case; taken together they form a rhetorically complete legal argument. 
Each text is composed of a set number of parts; when all of the parts are taken together they 
form a rhetorically complete judicial text. That is, however, only part of the story. That text is 
just one document, one record in a series that document the life of the case. In order to 
appreciate the full force of the rhetorical arguments deployed we need to situate each of these 
documents in the rhetorical and juristic context in which they were created. We need, that is, 
to ask what exactly it is these lawyers and litigants are doing in these texts: they are not all 
doing the same thing. Just as each part of a speech has its own telos, so does each document, 
which is why the rhetoricians emphasise that a mastery of inventio is of paramount importance: 
one must be able know which arguments are appropriate to different sections of a speech and 
at different points within the life of the case. This is not to say that these texts can only be 
understood when we examine the other records associated with the same claim. It is only to 
suggest that we should be mindful of the wider rhetorical context of a case if our objective is 






Legal Complaints and the Jurisdictions of Gimingham 
Complaints to the Duchy Chamber under the reign of Elizabeth I are held in the National 
Archives in London and make up the bulk of material in the class of DL1 in that archive. The 
Duchy Chamber had jurisdiction over all lands and properties ultimately held or claimed by 
the Duchy of Lancaster; the Duchy held vast possessions in counties across England, however 
an analysis which touches all of these possessions is obviously beyond the scope of this thesis. 
I have, therefore, chosen to concentrate on the Duchy’s holdings in Norfolk, and more 
specifically on Gimingham and the surrounding area in north Norfolk.  
Not far from the North Norfolk coast, in the Hundred of Erpingham, is situated the Manor 
and Soke of Gimingham: composed of around 9500 acres, the Soke was once an important 
jurisdictional area that bound a number of local villages - Gimingham, Knapton, Mundesley, 
North Repps, South Repps, Sidestrand, Trimingham, Trunch - together economically and 
administratively.190 In the time before the Norman Conquest, the Soke of Gimingham referred 
to these eight villages in terms of an economic jurisdiction: smaller landowners chose to 
congregate around a larger landowner who then developed certain political rights over the 
smaller landowners. The Soke was the product of protection, not of tenure. After the Conquest, 
with the growth of feudalism and the manorial system it employed, the old Anglo-Saxon 
jurisdiction of the Soke was gradually replaced by that of the Manor of Gimingham, which 
assimilated the villages into one administrative jurisdiction. The Manor of Gimingham was, 
however, unlike the Soke of Gimingham, based on feudal tenure. Whereas the Soke was 
characterised by the relationship between a lord and the free suitors of his court, in the Manor 
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‘lordship is indissolubly blended with landownership, and the authority of a master over serfs’. 
In short, a Soke is ‘a jurisdictional district attached to an estate’, while a Manor is ‘an estate 
acquiring some rights of jurisdiction’.191  
Whilst the legal jurisdiction of the Soke was overwritten by that of the Manor, the memory 
of an earlier, slightly different, time lived on and we find tenants invoking ’the Soke of 
Gimingham’ well into the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; even, or perhaps especially, as 
the yoke of feudalism and its manorial braces gave way to that new economic imperative: 
capitalism. Whilst I do not wish to suggest that sixteenth and seventeenth century litigants 
invoked the concept of the Soke in a way that would have made sense to those inhabiting it in 
the tenth century, I would follow Andy Wood in suggesting that invoking the memory of the 
past was a way in which people attempted to make their actions appear legitimate.192 An appeal 
to authority at once piercingly specific and frustratingly vague, it could be used to cover all 
manner of sins. What is often easily overlooked, however, is that an appeal to memory and 
custom in this way is also to deploy a rhetorical device; indeed, every classical authority since 
Aristotle has argued it is one of the strongest forms of argument in a legal case: demonstrating 
that there are conflicting laws or jurisdictions.193  
That being said, the lingering memory of the former jurisdiction of the Soke is indicative 
of more than simply institutional memory or skilled legal acumen. Law in sixteenth century 
England underwent rapid change in a relatively short period of time. Manorial courts, which 
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had replaced the old courts held in the sokes, were themselves fast becoming obsolete as 
litigants turned towards the more impartial and often faster justice on offer in the central courts. 
Indeed, Maitland argued that after the Statute of Gloucester was passed in 1294, the manorial 
court was ‘condemned in the course of time to become a petty court’.194 In an attempt to stem 
the tide of litigation to the royal courts, the statute had set a minimum value of 40 shillings on 
any case brought before the royal courts. This was, however, interpreted by the judges as a 
limit on the value of litigation which could be brought in manorial courts.195 Whilst this did not 
immediately have an overwhelming impact on the courts as 40 shillings was not an 
inconsiderable sum in the thirteenth century, by the sixteenth-century inflation had greatly 
reduced the value attributable to 40 shillings and the statute had not been altered to provide 
redress for this change in the economic reality facing the courts.196 Furthermore, while 
manorial courts continued to hold jurisdiction within their manors, the central courts held sway 
over the entire country and could overturn manorial decisions. It was, therefore, often in the 
interest of the litigant to simply skip the local jurisdiction entirely and plead before the 
Common Law, or in Chancery or the Star Chamber. Although the Duchy Chamber sat at 
Westminster its jurisdiction did not extend across the whole of England but rather only to the 
Duchy holdings, wherever they may be. It was still, however, a higher court than the manorial 
court at Gimingham and could overrule its decisions. Often with less business than the central 
courts, the Duchy Chamber was often more convenient than litigating in Chancery or Star 
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Chamber, and more expedient than King’s Bench or Common Pleas. These competing 
jurisdictions were not just an intricate web that one was liable to get tangled up in, they were 
part of a dark, elaborate, labyrinth that one needed to navigate in order to reach a successful 
judgement. The old half forgotten jurisdiction of the soke was but one potential road a litigant 
could take; numerous turns onto connected roads were required if one was to find a path all the 
way through.  
 The amount of litigation in Gimingham and its immediate vicinity is what makes it 
particularly interesting to a historian using legal records as the basis for their investigation. Out 
of some 290 cases concerning Duchy of Lancaster possessions in Norfolk during the reign of 
Elizabeth, sixty-two pertain to Gimingham and its inhabitants. Given the size and population 
of Norfolk in relation to the other counties in England at the time, and the relatively small size 
of Gimingham, this is significant as it means that suits concerning Gimingham made up nearly 
one fifth of all suits from Norfolk which were brought before the Duchy Chamber. This gives 
us a large, but also compact, set of evidence which we can use to build up an understanding 
multiple aspects of early modern culture. 
 
Beginning a Judicial Speech 
Robert Bateman brought a suit before the Duchy Chamber in 1586 when, after the death of his 
uncle, his father seized a piece of land willed to Robert by the now deceased uncle. In seizing 
the land, his father had, according to Robert, violated the custom of Gavelkind and deprived 
Robert of his rightful inheritance under the custom of the manor.197 Robert’s complaint to the 
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Duchy Chamber, written on one large side of parchment and kept in a large storage box filled 
with similar complaints in the National Archives, forms a single document: only this complaint 
features on that piece of parchment; unlike the plea rolls for King’s Bench or Common Pleas 
which are extremely long flowing pieces of parchment containing the details of case after case. 
It is, therefore, possible to analyse it in isolation from the cases being conducted around it, as 
well as in light of the other documents associated with the case.198 This is a feature common to 
every complaint to the Duchy and so, unless stated otherwise, it should be kept in mind that all 
of the documents considered throughout this thesis take this form. Shared physical attributes 
are only the beginning however; it is the intellectual content these documents share which is 
of interest to us moving forward. 
Robert Bateman’s complaint in 1586 begins, unsurprisingly to anyone familiar with early 
modern legal complaints, by addressing the judge presiding over the case - in this instance, as 
the Duchy Chamber is a court of equity, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster - and 
informing him (and the reader) why the complaint is addressed to him.  
 
To the right honourable Sir Francis Walsingham, knight. Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster and principal secretary to her majesty199 
The etiquette governing speeches in court is important here on two fronts. In the first instance 
it is important to remember that, even in our own time, barristers and attorneys begin addressing 
the court by addressing the judge, as it is the judge who dispenses royal justice. As this is a 
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written document, however, the duality of audience is of subtle importance here. The formal 
address not only opens the text but it serves as a clear indicator of what the text pertains to: a 
civil suit in the Duchy Chamber.200 Without an effective contemporary system of storing and 
cataloguing the records within the archive, it is as much a clerical necessity as it is anything 
else. 
The complaint continues in earnest: 
 
In most humble manner complaining showeth unto your honor your duly Orator 
Robert Baytman of South Reppes in the county of Norfolk, yeoman201 
By addressing the judge as a supplicant, Bateman not only introduces himself in an 
appropriately formal manner as required by the conventions of legal speech, but he also 
emphasises that he is requesting that the law be administered, that he is appealing to the 
Chancellor for justice. Equitable justice at this elementary level is ‘the good will, between those 
who are roughly equal, to come to terms with each other, to ‘come to an understanding,’ again 
by means of a settlement - and, in connection with those who are less powerful, to force them 
to reach a settlement’.202 A glance through some of the dictionaries and thesauri of Elizabethan 
England highlights this. Thomas Cooper’s Thesaurus Linguae Romanae et Britannicae, first 
published in 1565, for instance lists the following synonyms for ‘humble’: ‘Base: low: simple: 
poor: abject: vile: of low condition’. Similarly, Thomas Thomas’ Dictionarium Lingue Latinae 
et Anglicanae, first published in 1587, defines humble as ‘Base, low, simple. poor, abject, vile, 
of low condition, faint, feeble, small, of small cost’.203 In highlighting his faint and feeble status 
 
200 The distinction between criminal and civil litigation will be addressed in Chapter Four. 
201 TNA DL1/141/B23 
202 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morality, p. 46. 
203 Thomas Cooper, Thesaurus Linguæ Romanæ & Britannicæ (London: 1565); Thomas Thomas, 




the complainant draws the judge’s attention to the fact that he is unable to remedy the situation 
on his own and is in need of assistance which, as Chancellor of the Duchy, it was within 
Walsingham’s prerogative to provide.  
 Indeed, as we can see, immediately after explicitly stating his base status and his inability 
to redress the situation himself, Bateman addresses the judge directly as ‘your honor’. This is 
standard practice when addressing the judge in court and so the view that this is simply a legal 
form evidently holds water. It is worth briefly returning to the dictionaries however, as if we 
look under ‘honour’ we find it listed beside ‘dignity: Reverence: honesty: Beauty’ in Thomas 
Cooper’s Thesaurus.204 Thomas Thomas is characteristically more thorough in his definition, 
demarcating honour as relating to ‘dignity, glory, promotion, office, estimation, reputation, 
reverence, honesty, beauty’. He also lists it as part of the latin honestus, which he defines as 
‘honest, good, kind, noble, honourable, of good behaviour, well mannered, honestly and well 
conditioned, commendable, of good reputation, worshipfull, comely, fair, beautiful, and well-
favoured’.205 An appeal to honour, regardless of whether or not it can be deemed a legal form, 
carries with it a number of explicit connotations that would not have been lost on the attorney 
or the judge educated to university level, either at Oxford or Cambridge, or in one of the Inns 
of Court, and steeped in the humanist learning that accompanied the English Renaissance.206  
  Whilst the Bateman case may be said to be a typical example of how complaints to the 
Duchy Chamber begin, it can also be said that this is simply the standard way in which legal 
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complaints begin and that the formulaic repetition of these openings is indicative of little more 
than a clerical template which attorneys could use for any case: a sort of fill in the blanks top 
sheet wherein the case-specific data is simply fitted around the necessary preexisting legal 
jargon. Clearly this argument has some purchase, but its basic premise - that these ways of 
opening cases, which are repeated with almost pedantic regularity, are simply technicalities, 
administrative or legal in origin - seems to obscure a whole type of inquiry. That is to say, it 
prevents us from asking why these forms used in the first place? One answer, I would suggest, 
can be found by examining the classical and vernacular rhetorical handbooks available during 
the sixteenth century. 
The rhetoricians argued that, if one is to maximise their chances of success in persuading a 
judge of the validity of a particular case, the beginning of any legal argument should begin by 
developing a successful exordium.207 A successful exordium will aim to establish our ethos or 
character in such a way as to render the judge attentive (attentus), responsive (docilis), and, 
above all, well-disposed (benevolus) to our side of the case.208 There are said to be two types 
of exordium: a principium and an insinuatio. The two are distinct in that ‘a principium is an 
address that which in plain language makes the audience well-disposed, receptive, and 
attentive;’ while ‘an insinuatio is an address by which dissimulation and indirection 
unobtrusively steals into the mind of the audience’.209 In order to discriminate which type of 
opening is appropriate we need to discriminate two features of our case. We first need to 
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distinguish whether the issue around which our case revolves is honest (causa honesta), foul 
(causa turpis), or strange (causa admirabilis). We then need to consider whether the constitutio 
of the case is legal, conjectural, or juridical. That is to say, whether the point of controversy 
stems from a text, a series of facts or events, or whether some action was justly or unjustly 
performed. We need to identify these two points because the question of whether to use a 
principium or an insinuatio essentially rests on the moral standing of our argument: if our cause 
is honest we should always open it with a straightforward principium; if it is foul or strange it 
will generally be necessary to use a more subtle approach, an insinuatio.210 
 If we keep this advice in mind as we examine another complaint before the Duchy 
Chamber it is possible to discern that the way in which the rhetoricians advise us to open an 
honest speech, a principium, is not dissimilar to the way in which attorneys typically open the 
initial complaints in the Duchy Chamber. As with the Bateman case, the cases initiated by Sir 
Henry Lee between 1574-1580 begin with a formal address to the Chancellor of the Duchy: 
‘To the right honorable Sir Ralph Sadler, Knight, Chancellor of the queens majesty’s courte of 
her Duchy of Lancaster’.211 If we now, instead of simply assuming that this is a legal 
commonplace, ask why Lee opens his case in this way, if we ask what is he doing in opening 
it in this way it becomes possible to see that he may in-fact be following some rhetorical advice 
about how to conduct a legal argument. Indeed, immediately following this opening line Lee 
continues, just as Bateman did, in seeking to ‘humble show and on the behalf of our sovereign 
Lady the queens majesty inform your honour’.212 The rhetorical dimension to these opening 
lines now becomes apparent. The formulaic structure, the choice of words, even the syntax - 
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the dispositio - takes on new meaning and significance when examined in this light.  
  That it is possible draw a line between classical rhetorical theory and sixteenth century 
legal complaints, however, is only one aspect of this analysis. It is also possible to draw this 
conclusion without necessarily diminishing the argument that the opening lines of these 
complaints are legal commonplaces. Indeed, illustrating that they possess a rhetorical 
dimension does not change the fact that they are legal forms, commonplaces typical to every 
complaint. The opening lines are exercises in throat-clearing, a necessary preamble that every 
attorney and plaintiff was (and is) required to begin with because this was (and still is) the 
prevailing convention in a court of law. This is evident in that of the 292 cases from Norfolk 
initiated in the Duchy Chamber during the reign of Elizabeth I, each and every one of them 
begins with a subtle variation of the opening examined in this chapter. That being said, if we 
put this point the other was round we can elucidate its significance for the present analysis: the 
prevailing convention in courts of law required attorneys to begin a case in this way. That is to 
say, these documents are, de jure, written examples of judicial orations in court. They are the 
formal legal beginning of a case, they are meant to be able to be read as if the reader is 
physically in court watching and listening to the case being heard.  
 To argue that the opening lines of these documents are an exercise in throat-clearing, a 
simple preamble before the substantive matters are dealt with should be axiomatic. If our aim 
is to perceive their significance we need to begin asking why. The attorneys, judges, perhaps 
even the litigants, will all have had experience with litigation; they will have been involved in 
other cases and watched them progress through the courts.213 They will therefore have a degree 
of familiarity with the proceedings and perhaps even with the people involved. That familiarity, 
 




however, did not diminish the need, or indeed requirement, for formal procedure in each 
individual case. On the contrary, the volume of litigation and the level of familiarity that it 
engendered in the court is arguably one of the main reasons why such stringent formality was 
(and still is) observed in legal proceedings. The foundations of common law, of equity, of the 
concept of justice itself rest on the bedrock that is the impartiality of the law - in theory, if not 
always in practice.214  
 A further point to be emphasised here is that these documents were not created simply 
for internal court business. If they were, they would more closely resemble the plea rolls of the 
King’s Bench and Common Pleas. The plea rolls, unlike the documents presently examined, 
are not records of what was said in court, but rather a summary of the proceedings without the 
same level of rhetorical formality inherent in equity pleadings.215 The complaints to the Duchy 
Chamber and their connected documents are not simply records, they constitute the case both 
in terms of the speech they represent, and also in that they are the written record of that case, 
without which there would be no documentary evidence of its existence. The fundamental point 
to grasp here is that once we ask why these texts are constructed in the way they are, and what 
their authors may have been doing in constructing them in this way we can come to appreciate 
that these texts are not simply legal records. That is to say, we can begin to discern the 
character of the texts in front of us. They are written examples of judicial speech; and as we 
shall see, judicial speech in sixteenth century England was governed by the principles of 
forensic rhetoric. 
 
214 Studies detailing the fraudulent exploitation of the law by those inside and outside the legal profession are 
endemic in the scholarship. 
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Developing a Judicial Speech 
If we examine the pleadings in more detail we soon see that they follow the rhetorical advice 
in more than just their opening lines. Their whole structure follows the rhetorical precepts laid 
out by Cicero and the Ad Herennium. In what follows we will examine the rhetorical advice 
side by side with the archival evidence. We will do so primarily through an examination of the 
litigation initiated by Sir Henry Lee in relation to bondmen around the manor of Gimingham. 
Lee was a courtier granted a commission to manumit bondmen on the Queen’s estates in 
Norfolk, a profitable enterprise as anyone found to be of villein status could be compelled to 
pay a fee upon their manumission.216 Lee’s suits, therefore, are an attempt to demonstrate that 
certain parcels of land, ultimately held by the Duchy, were hereditary feudal tenures and that 
those inhabitants resident on those lands owe services in return for being allowed to cultivate 
it. Lee initiated five such suits in the Duchy Chamber between 1574-1580. In what follows we 
will examine one of the suits in detail and demonstrate, through the examination of several 
quotations of the initial pleading, how the classical precepts of forensic rhetoric were applied 
to pleadings before the Duchy Chamber.  
After developing a successful exordium in which we prepare the audience to favourably 
hear our argument, the rhetoricians argue that it is necessary to develop a narratio in which we 
briefly and completely set out a plausible account of what we intend to argue.217 The defining 
characteristics of a successful narratio are said to be that it is brief, clear, and plausible. A 
narrative will be brief if we confine ourselves to what is immediately relevant to the issue hand, 
 
216 See the valuable discussion of sixteenth century Bondmen in MacCulloch, 'Bondmen Under the Tudors', 
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taking pains to neither start in the mist of history nor continue too far into the future. This may 
seem rather obvious but, Cicero cautions against rashness at this point as, many are deceived 
here by an appearance of brevity so that they are prolix when they think they are brief.218 
Orators must be careful not to try and say many things in a short compass; they should instead 
confine themselves to saying few things, or not more than is necessary. A narrative will clear 
if it proceeds chronologically, being careful not to omit anything pertinent to the case. Again, 
a word of warning here in that clarity goes hand in hand with brevity: for often a case is 
misunderstood more from excessive length of the narrative than from obscurity.219 Finally, a 
narratio will be plausible if it appears to embody the characteristics which are accustomed to 
appear in real life, if it possesses verisimilitude.220  
Typically, after the opening preamble the complaints move on to give a narrative account 
of the controversy around which they see the case revolving. In this case, from 1575, Lee’s 
narratio begins by clearly and concisely sketching the context of the suit.   
Where the queens majesty and her progenitors is and has long time been seized in the 
right of her and their Dukedom of Lancaster amongst other manors of and in the manors 
of Gimingham in the county of Norfolk and Knapton likewise in the county of Norfolk. 
The said manors are part and parcel of the possessions of her highness Dukedom of 
Lancaster unto the which manors time out of memory of man there have been and yet 
are divers and sundry villeins and neifs regardant of whom the Queen’s majesty and 
her most noble progenitors have been seised…221 
By recounting the Queen’s rights to the manors and their historical association with the Duchy 
of Lancaster, Lee does a number of things: he establishes the Crown’s interest and the 
jurisdiction of the Duchy Chamber in the suit. There was a long history of bondmen in Norfolk 
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and Suffolk; the inhabitants of Gimingham would have been acutely aware of this. There was, 
then, no need for Lee to define the scope of villenage or the implication of particular types of 
tenure: the manor court rolls would explain all of that in detail if the defendants demur on a 
point of law; Lee’s assertion that there will have been bondmen on the manor is, therefore, not 
a legally controversial statement. This is not to say, however, that the issue of bondage was 
uncontroversial. Quite the opposite: claims of bondage cut to the bone of social relations in 
sixteenth century England, partly because they were something of a feudal anachronism.222 For 
this reason the number of manumission cases from Gimingham is particularly illuminating of 
the jurisdictional decay in Elizabethan Gimingham.223 It will be noted, then, that Lee’s simple 
precis of the historical context avoids prolixity and serves to keep his narrative brief.  
The narrative continues with the assertion that the manors of Gimingham and Knapton are 
part of that ancient estate. The pleading justifies Lee’s involvement by demonstrating his 
commission to survey and manumit any such bondmen that remain on the estates, before finally 
indicating that his case is supported by readily available evidence. This is almost exactly in 
line with the precepts governing the construction of a judicial speech. 
… as of her [the Queen] and their [her progenitors] villeins and neifs and regardant to 
her said manors of Gimingam and Knapton by being parcels of her highness said Duchy 
of Lancaster time out of memory of man and whereas also by virtue of the Queen’s 
majesties commission sealed with the seal of her gracious court of the Duchy of 
Lancaster her majesty hath appointed [Sir Henry Lee] to make a survey of such and 
enquire of all and singular of her majesties bondmen and neifs in bond regardant unto 
any of her majesties said manors and of all bondmen and neifs engrossed to her 
belonging and of their goods chattels and lands…224 
 
222 Bondmen under the Tudors was last discussed seriously in a classic article by Diarmaid MacCulloch, 
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the Tudors', pp. 91-110. 
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The narratives Lee develops in all of his suits before the Duchy follow this advice with 
remarkable exactitude. No extraneous details are given. There are no discussions of how the 
manors came to be Duchy possessions: they simply have been since ’time out of memorie of 
man’. There is no discussion of what villeins or bondmen are as it assumed that these terms 
will be understood by everyone.225 The evidence upon which the claims rest is said to be ‘court 
rolls and also evidences and writings as also by the examination of witnesses’: all of which the 
rhetoricians describe as non-artificial proofs in the demonstration of judicial claims. 
… it doth appear as well by the court rolls of the said several manors of Giminham and 
Knapton and as well by divers and sundry other ways and means that Richard Coggill 
of Norwich in the county of Norfolk, John Coggill of Gimingham lately in the county 
of Norfolk and all their ancestors time out of memory of man have been villeins and 
neifs regardant to the said manor of Gimingham and that John Knowell of Knapton in 
the county of Norfolk and all his ancestors time out of memory of man have been 
villeins and neifs regardant to the queens majesties said manor of Knapton226 
Here we see Lee begin to move from the narration to the confirmation of facts. Cicero, it will 
be remembered, tells us that ‘confirmation or proof is the part of the oration which by 
marshalling arguments lends credit, authority, and support to our case’.227 The rhetorical advice 
offer a range of advice on how to create a successful confirmation, but for our purposes it is 
enough to divide them into two categories: artificial and non-artificial proofs. Artificial proofs 
are syllogistic arguments and inductive reasoning; non-artificial proofs are non-rhetorical 
proofs, such as witness testimony and written records. As we can see, Lee deploys simple 
induction by arguing that ‘it doth appear’ from the textual evidence that the defendants are in 
fact in unfree tenants of the manor and have been for time immemorial.  
The final substantive part of a judicial oration is the confutation. This comes after the facts 
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have been confirmed and its aim is to combine artificial and non-artificial proofs in order drive 
stir the emotions of the audience and forcefully tie the evidence to the argument laid out 
throughout the oration. Lee does this by casting the defendants and their actions in morally 
dubious terms. 
… may it please your honour that the said Richard Coggill John Coggill have departed 
from the said manor of Gimingham and also that the said John Knowell hath departed 
from the manor of Knapton and that they the said [defendants] have sought by all secret 
ways and means to conceal and hide their said bondage and not withstanding that it 
doth plainly appear by the court rolls of the aforesaid several manors that they and all 
their ancestors time out of memory of man have been bondmen and neifs regardant to 
the aforesaid manors in indentures as aforesaid yet they and every one of them have 
and do refuse to acknowledge their said bondage to Queen’s majesty and do such 
service unto [her] as they ought and are bound to do to their utter disinheritance of the 
Queen’s majesty.228 
This is exactly what Cicero advises in De inventione when it he discusses how to forcefully 
confirm an argument.229  Lee marshalls artificial proofs by syllogism and induction to suggest 
that the defendants have intentionally attempted to conceal their status and manifestly stolen 
from the Crown in the process; their malicious intentions are clear because they have done this 
‘notwithstanding that it doth plainly appear by the court rolls’ that they are bound to the Queen. 
All that is left to do now is to bring the oration to a swift and decisive close, which Lee does 
simply by calling for the Duchy to bind the defendants to appear before it and answer the 
charge. This is, then, an example of how a pleading before the Duchy Chamber is constructed 
according to the precepts of classical forensic rhetoric. Furthermore, whilst I have chosen to 
illustrate the use of forensic rhetoric before the Duchy Chamber through the examination of 
one pleading, all of these precepts are also evident in the five other manumission cases initiated 
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by Lee throughout the 1570s.230 My choice to illustrate this with quotations from one case, 
rather than several, was to accentuate how the different parts of a judicial speech fit together; 
which would have been lost if quotations were taken from multiple cases. 
It is possible to argue, however, that this is simply coincidence, or another self-evident legal 
commonplace; that in seeing the similarities between classical theories of forensic rhetoric and 
the way in which these texts are constructed I am inventing an ex post facto explanation. To 
advance this argument in the face of the educational currents of Renaissance Humanism, 
however, is to deliberately ignore the intellectual context in which these texts were created.231 
This analysis does not detract from the argument that this may be a legal commonplace, a 
necessary exercise, it compliments it and explicates a reason why this may be a legal form. 
That is to say, it is a legal form because forensic rhetoric told lawyers it was; that way of 
thinking has proved to be incredibly influential even down to our own time, so much so that it 
is still familiar to modern lawyers. It is this ‘yawning gap’ in the historiography, its failure to 
ask why this may be a legal form, that has resulted in ‘generations of lawyers [being] prevented 
from seeing that most of their law took the shape in which they knew it in the sixteenth 
century.’232 The vocabulary of legal argument is the vocabulary of classical theories of forensic 
rhetoric. Once we begin to accept this premise we can start to build up a more holistic 
understanding of these texts and the culture in which they were created. 
 
Variation in Pleadings 
I now wish to advance a related but distinct line of argument to that which was pursued above 
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in that I wish to address the second potential criticism that could be mounted against 
approaching these texts as examples of judicial rhetoric. Namely, the claim that the 
idiosyncrasies inherent in these texts prohibit any characterisation of them as being constructed 
according to the precepts of forensic rhetoric. It is certainly true that there is a great deal of 
variation inherent in the complaints to the Duchy Chamber: they do not all always follow the 
advice offered by the rhetorical handbooks. That they all possess certain features such as the 
opening preamble may be conceded; similarly it may also be taken for granted that they narrate 
the facts of their case as they see them. But this is where the wheels may seem to come off the 
wagon. Where the rhetoricians argue for brevity, clarity, and plausibility in a narrative, some 
complaints exhibit narratives so long and complex that they have no hope of ever appearing 
plausible.  
There seem to be at least three potential explanations for this. First, the attorney writing the 
complaint may not have been aware of the rhetorical advice offered on how to develop a 
persuasive narrative. This explanation, however, seems to be rather unlikely. The ubiquity of 
the humanist curriculum, and specifically of rhetoric in grammar schools, as well as throughout 
the Universities and the Inns of Court during the sixteenth century meant that students would 
have obtained at least a rudimentary understanding of forensic rhetoric. For them to have no 
knowledge of it at all seems to be implausible.233 The second explanation follows from the first 
in that instead of being completely unaware of how to construct a rhetorically persuasive 
narrative, the attorney may simply have lacked the necessary ability. That is to say, they may 
not have properly mastered the necessary skills of inventio and dispositio and so may have 
been unable to avoid the pitfalls facing those seeking to argue persuasively. For instance, they 
 




may have begun their narrative too far back in time from the relevant events, or they may not 
observed a chronological order when narrating the events - both of which, as we have seen, 
were specifically given as examples of potential traps the orator may fall into. The third 
potential explanation, however, rather than assigning ignorance or inability on the part of the 
attorney, is conversely that they may have knowingly jettisoned the rhetorical advice and 
intentionally constructed a different kind of narrative. 
The second and third explanations seem to have more purchase than the first. Indeed, the 
vernacular rhetorical literature is littered with condemnation of the state of eloquence in Tudor 
England. Thomas Wilson, throughout The Arte of Rhetorique, extolls the civilising nature of 
rhetoric and repeatedly reminds the reader of the need for eloquence.234 Philip Sidney in his 
Defence of Poesie similarly laments the state of eloquence throughout the realm.235 It is, 
therefore, entirely possible that some attorneys may simply have lacked the rhetorical skill 
necessary to construct a rhetorically persuasive narrative. Conversely, it is equally possible that 
some attorneys made conscious decisions to ignore the rhetorical handbooks. An explanation 
of why they may have done this is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis as it would require 
a detailed knowledge of the life and times of each attorney at the time they wrote each 
complaint; such contextual knowledge may even be for the most part impossible to recover. 
What this thesis is concerned with in relation to these two premises, however, is that it does 
not follow from either of these lines of explanation that these texts cannot be constructed 
according to the precepts of forensic rhetoric. Indeed, to advance that argument would seem to 
be a non sequitur for it commits us to endorsing the basic assumption that the rules of forensic 
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rhetoric governed properly constructed judicial arguments. The result is to make it seem 
obvious that forensic rhetoric did influence the way in which these texts were constructed.  
Robert Bateman’s complaint of 1586 is a good example. Bateman began his complaint with 
a flawless exordium, but as it moves into the narratio his complaint seems to fall into some of 
the pitfalls the rhetoricians warn us to take care to avoid. For instance, Bateman begins his 
narrative by claiming that his grandfather settled his land upon the eldest of his three sons and 
his heirs. The narratives continues by telling us that there was a will and that it was certified 
by the parish authorities. Already this would seem to be erring towards offering extraneous 
detail as if the land was settled on the eldest son there would have had to be a will and it would 
ipso facto have had to be certified and accepted; otherwise the land would remain, by definition, 
unsettled.236 We must, as the Ad Herennium observes, ‘avoid stating the obvious’.237 The eldest 
son we are then told, however, died intestate and without any heirs, so the lands passed to the 
two remaining brothers ‘according to the custom of gavelkind’.238 This is the first indication 
that primogeniture was not the custom of the manor and that we are in fact dealing with an area 
of partible inheritance.239 It would seem, then, that the complaint has either failed tell 
everything in a chronological order or failed  to mention everything pertinent to the case, both 
of which it will be remembered are key to developing a rhetorically lucid narrative.240 The final 
nail in the coffin is that the narrative goes on to give a step by step account of the means by 
which Bateman’s father deprived him of his inheritance.241 The rhetoricians, it will be 
 
236 For a recent study on probate see Clive Burgess, The Right Ordering of Souls: The Parish of All Saints’ 
Bristol on the Eve of the Reformation (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2018). 
237 Ad Herennium, pp. 26: ‘si dicam me ex provincia redisse, profectum quoque in provinciam intellegatur’. 
238 TNA DL1/141/B23 
239 On Gavelkind see Hasted, 'General History: Socage and Gavelkind Tenures', pp. 311-21. On partible 
inheritance see Thompson, 'The Grid of Inheritance', pp. 328-60. 
240 Ad Herennium, p. 26; Cicero, De inventione, pp. 59-61. 




remembered, had warned this was not appropriate in a narratio, for in constructing a judicial 
narrative ‘it will frequently be sufficient to offer a summary, without going into the specific 
elements of the story, for often it is enough to say what happened without recounting how and 
why it happened’.242 That level of detail belongs, according to the rhetoricians, in the later parts 
of the speech - the confirmatio and confutatio - where we prove our argument in detail and 
refute our opponents arguments. What this indicates, then, is a lack of understanding of - or 
flagrant disregard for - the rules of inventio and dispositio: the discovery of appropriate 
arguments and the most effective distribution of them within an oration. 
The result is a confusingly long and complex narrative which, to quote Thomas Wilson, 
’tumbles one tale in anothers necke leaving it rawe, hacking and hemming, as though our wittes 
and our senses were a woll gathering’.243 This does not, however, negate the rhetorical 
dimension of Bateman’s complaint. It does still hit the major notes of developing a formal 
opening and it does attempt to narrative a version of events. The argument  advanced here is 
that this Bateman’s complaint can be read as being necessarily weaker and less persuasive than 
other complaints which do follow the rhetorical precepts more exactly - such as those initiated 
by Sir Henry Lee - and thus they may have been more likely to fail at judgement. Furthermore, 
it is to suggest the relative strength of these complaints would have been evident to anyone in 
the legal profession in sixteenth-century England. Robert Bateman’s complaint could, 
therefore, be held up as an example of how not to construct a convincing judicial narrative. 
This is not to say that the rhetorical dimension of legal complaints is only evident in some 
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complaints and not others; it is only to suggest that some complaints possess more rhetorically 
sound arguments than others and those complaints are inherently more persuasive.  
To argue in this way is not to suggest that success is guaranteed if every rhetorical precept 
is followed with absolute precision. Indeed, Quintilian concedes that there are limits to the 
power of rhetoric and that even if we follow every rule we may still not succeed in persuading 
our audience to accept our argument. The argument they make is not that we will be successful, 
but rather that we are more likely to be successful in persuading our audience. It is a mistake, 
Quintilian argues, ‘to subject the orator to the sway of fortune to such an extent that, if he fails 
to persuade, he cannot retain the name of an orator’.244 That is to say, we should not measure 
rhetoric by its capacity to successfully persuade, but rather that in using it orators are attempting 
to enhance the persuasiveness of their arguments. In other words, the key to understanding the 
significance of rhetoric in these texts is not to examine their perlocutionary effects, but rather 
the illocutionary actions embedded within them. 
 
Conclusion 
I began this chapter with three general aims. In the first instance I have sought to show that the 
law in sixteenth century England was not as sterile and insular as has been suggested in the 
existing scholarship.245 I have attempted to demonstrate this by showing that complaints to the 
equity court of the Duchy of Lancaster, the Duchy Chamber, were influenced by an essentially 
Roman rhetorical theory of how to argue persuasively in a court of law. My second concern 
has been to illustrate that, once we accept this premise, we can begin to discern a number of 
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tensions within the complaints which mirror some broader tensions within early modern legal 
culture. My third general concern has been to suggest that historians have perhaps been asking 
too narrow a set of questions when examining sources of this nature. If, instead of exclusively 
concerning ourselves with the effects of these texts, we ask what their authors may have been 
doing in them we can begin to excavate a dimension of them that we have since lost sight of. I 
now want to begin to draw some general conclusions from these lines of inquiry and sketch the 
way in which I seek to develop these conclusions in subsequent chapters.  
The insularity and sterility of the scholarship surrounding English legal history, I would 
suggest, is not simply a historiographical construct. Its roots are actually to found in the theory 
and practice of the law in sixteenth century England. What has not been explicitly brought out 
in the existing scholarship is that while this view may have died very hard, it is in fact the 
product of a conscious attempt on the part of the common law judges to resist the ever 
expanding jurisdiction of equity.246 This conscious attempt on the part of the common law 
judges is itself the result of some latent assumptions in the common-law mind, which were 
themselves the result of a practice and experience of a purely insular form of law.247 To expand 
upon an example that John Pocock has examined and which I will work through in detail as 
this thesis develops, the deployment of arguments based upon english historical ideas, of 
concepts such as custom and memory, is also causally linked to those latent assumptions. They 
are the product of English history itself; and contingently limited the way in which lawyers 
thought.  
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The deployment of custom and memory, of legal concepts such as ‘time out of memorie of 
mane’, as legal justification does not fit well with the legal developments taking place in 
sixteenth century legal theory and practice. As John Baker has shown, the modes of proof used 
to prove a case were becoming philological rather than dialectical.248 That is to say, there was 
a shift away from an inquisitorial legal system towards the adversarial system we have today 
where arguments are heard in umtranque partem, on both sides. Whereas common law and 
customary law were never fully compatible, the issue was rarely pressed. With the growth of 
the equity jurisdictions during the sixteenth century, however, the incompatibility of custom 
and common law was highlighted as litigants turned to equity as a means remedying the failures 
of common law. This was itself possible because there was no straightforward separation 
between the different types of law and the different jurisdictions actually competed for legal 
business. This also serves to highlight a further tension within these texts, and within legal 
theory more broadly in that ‘time out of memorie of mane’ as a legal concept continued to be 
deployed throughout the sixteenth century. But it was deployed more as a rhetorical device; as 
a form of rhetorical proof, a way of legitimating actions and behaviour. 
As Andy Wood has observed, with every judgement issued by a central court concerning a 
local custom ‘the legitimacy of the ruling instruments of the early modern state was deepened. 
The story of dispute of custom is, therefore, in some part, a story about the contradictions of 
state formation in early modern England’249. The point I would wish to emphasise here, which 
does not detract at all from Wood’s argument, is that “the state” and its instruments in this 
context are not necessarily the product of an intelligent design on the part of those with political 
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power. Rather, they are more often than not the byproduct of attempts by those excluded from 
politics to exercise some form of agency. The aspect of these complaints that I therefore want 
to suggest we have lost sight of somewhat is the political dimension of legal argument; within 
that, specifically the way in which these texts are indicative of an engagement with political 
science on the part of litigants and lawyers. It is this engagement with political science and 




CHAPTER THREE: INSTRUMENTS OF LITIGATION 
 
The legal records examined in this chapter pertain to various cases initiated in the equity court 
of the Duchy of Lancaster, the Duchy Chamber. The bulk of the material examined in the 
present chapter is made up of documents created in the later stages of litigation, after the initial 
complaint has been made. That is to say, answers, replications, demurrers, rejoinders, 
examinations and depositions. As with the complaints examined in Chapter Two, the texts 
themselves are held at the National Archives in Kew. The answers, replications, demurrers, 
and rejoinders are held in the class of DL1, along with the complaints; whilst the examinations 
and depositions are held in DL4. The significance of this, which may seem obvious but which 
is nevertheless important to grasp, is that examinations and depositions are the last stage in the 
legal process before a judgement is rendered. Therefore, if the examinations and depositions 
are extant in the archive there will generally be evidence of the earlier stages of litigation to be 
found in DL1. It was suggested in Chapter Two that if we examine these texts alongside the 
rhetorical literature of the period - both the classical texts and the neo-classical vernacular texts 
they engendered - we can begin to explicate why attorneys structured these texts in the way in 
which they did; and why a certain vocabulary was employed which, from our standpoint, may 
seem dry and formulaic. This chapter develops that argument and extends the analysis beyond 
the opening lines of the initial complaints and in an attempt to illustrate that each part of the 
case, each text, each document, is governed according to the precepts of forensic rhetoric. 
 
Partes of an Oration and Parts of Litigation 
An essentially Roman understanding of rhetoric predominated the sixteenth century humanist 
curriculum throughout the grammar schools and universities. The two great textbooks used in 




anonymous Rhetorica ad Herennium. These authorities argued that any oration would be 
divisible into roughly six parts, each with its own telos but also constitutive of the greater 
whole; in mastering the five elements of the ars rhetorica - inventio, dispositio, elocutio, 
memoria, and pronuncitatio - an orator would be able to weave these parts together so 
eloquently that they would be able to deliver a speech with the maximum amount of persuasive 
force. In these elementary textbooks, the rhetoricians discuss each part of a speech in turn and 
offer some general advice in relation to each part; before, in later books, offering guidance on 
the specific figures and tropes of speech with which to amplify one’s argument.250  
This preference for offering broad advice before moving into specific techniques is 
reflected in the vernacular rhetorical literature such as Thomas Wilson’s Arte of Rhetorique 
(1553).251 The previous chapter demonstrated that the opening lines of these texts can be said 
to follow the basic advice offered by the rhetoricians concerning how to begin a judicial 
oration. In modern scholarship surrounding rhetoric, however, there is a tendency to reverse 
this emphasis and concentrate on the more specific rhetorical figures and tropes at the expense 
of the more general advice advocated at the beginning of the rhetorical textbooks.252 In what 
follows we will see that if we place too much emphasis on specific rhetorical devices, we are 
liable to misunderstand the influence of Roman rhetoric on Renaissance culture. 
This tendency in the modern scholarship surrounding rhetoric to emphasise the specific 
figures and tropes of rhetorical speech over the more general advice has created some confusion 
within the scholarship concerning what it means to speak about rhetoric. Indeed, to do so is to 
put the cart before the horse. But this stems less from a misunderstanding of rhetoric than it 
does from misidentifying the specific contexts surrounding the vernacular rhetorical works 
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produced throughout the sixteenth century. In the Roman rhetorical tradition, as Quintilian 
argues in his Institutio Oratoria, the salient point to grasp about rhetoric is that it requires not 
just ‘a care for words, but a deep concern for the subject’.253 That is to say, the specific words, 
the syntax, the figures and tropes of speech - dispositio and elecutio - are not as important as 
understanding which arguments are appropriate for that particular moment. If we search for 
words without first thinking about subject matter, ‘we shall merely do violence to what we 
have found out’, rather than enhancing our speech.254 What the Roman rhetoricians want to 
emphasise is that inventio is the key skill upon which all others depend; and what they mean 
when they speak of inventio is the act of discovering and applying whichever lines of reasoning 
and argument are most appropriate to the case in hand. This understanding of inventio as being 
the key element of rhetorical argument was, however, challenged in a number of the vernacular 
rhetorical treatises of the sixteenth century.  
If we examine the volume of rhetorical literature produced in sixteenth-century England, 
such as the works of Richard Sherry (1506-55), the headmaster of Magdalen College School, 
who wrote his Treatise of Schemes and Tropes in 1550; Henry Peacham, whose Garden of 
Eloquence was first published in 1577 and reprinted in 1593; George Puttenham’s The Arte of 
English Posie (1589); as well as Angel Day’s The English Secretorie (1586), it is tempting to 
conclude that the Roman rhetorical tradition I have explicated above was overtaken by another 
tradition that took its cues not from Cicero, but from Lorenzo Valla (1407-57), Rudolph 
Agricola (1443-85), and Peter Ramus (1515-72).255 In what was essentially an educational 
debate surrounding humanism and scholasticism these writers, in arguing that the ars rhetorica 
was distinct from the ars dialectica, claimed that inventio and dispositio were properly parts 
of dialectic, with rhetoric being comprised of elecutio, memoria, and pronuncitatio.256 Indeed, 
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this line of thinking is precisely the one taken up by Thomas Elyot in his The Book Named the 
Governor (1531) when he discusses the education appropriate for gentlemen.257  
On the other side we have the Ciceronian tradition, its chief advocates being Leonard Cox 
(1495-1550) with his The Art of crafte of Rhetoryke, first published in 1532; Richard Rainolde 
(1530-1606) with his The Foundacion of Rhetorike (1563); and most importantly Thomas 
Wilson (1524-1581) with his The Arte of Rhetorique, first published in 1553.258 On the face of 
it, quantitively, it may appear that the Ramists have taken the field. But, it is in taking this 
analysis at face value, in drawing a qualitative conclusion from a quantitive analysis, that the 
confusion arises and in which we stray into imprecision and error.  
Much of the modern scholarship on rhetoric, in focusing on dispositio and elecutio, not 
only comes perilously close to anachronism but also seems to misidentify the contexts in which 
these vernacular texts were produced and utilised by contemporaries. There is, in fact, little 
evidence to suggest that a Ramist understanding of rhetoric ever had a significant impact on 
the teaching of rhetoric in sixteenth-century England because there is little evidence of them 
on any educational curriculum. The Ad Herennium and Cicero’s De inventione remained the 
most widely used manuals throughout the century, and Thomas Wilson’s Arte of Rhetorique 
was by far the most popular vernacular rhetorical treatise of the second half of the sixteenth 
century, being reprinted no fewer than seven times before the end of the century. The humanist 
curriculum throughout the grammar schools, universities, and Inns of Chancery and Inns of 
Court was Ciceronian, not Ramist. To focus on the figures and tropes of speech when 
examining the influence of rhetoric on English law is, therefore, to attribute to the vernacular 
texts a broad educational context which, with the exception of Wilson’s Arte of Rhetorique, 
they simply did not possess.259 It is this Roman, this Ciceronian, understanding of forensic 
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rhetoric that had a profound impact on the theory and practice of English law, and my attempt 
to illustrate this will occupy me for the remainder of this chapter. 
The texts examined in this chapter, it will be argued, are generally structured according to 
the precepts of forensic rhetoric, both internally and externally. That is to say that each text, 
whether it be a complaint, answer, replication, demurrer, or rejoinder, can generally be said to 
follow a set structure that consists of a number of parts; it will be shown that these parts 
generally correlate with the advice offered in the rhetorical literature. When all of these partes 
are taken together they form a rhetorically complete judicial speech. This is, according to the 
rhetoricians, the ideal outcome which will give a speech the best chance at persuading its 
intended audience. Furthermore, what they also want you to see is that each speech is just one 
part of the story, one part of the larger judicial argument that spans the life of the case.  
In order to appreciate the full force of the rhetorical arguments deployed we need to situate 
each of these documents in the rhetorical and juristic context in which they were created. We 
need, that is, to ask what exactly it is these lawyers and litigants are doing in these texts. They 
are not all doing the same thing. Just as each part of a speech has its own telos, so does each 
speech, which is why the rhetoricians emphasise that a mastery of inventio is of paramount 
importance: one must be able know which arguments are appropriate to different sections of a 
speech as well as which speeches are appropriate to the different stages within the legal process. 
Complaints are not meant to do the same things or have the same effects as replications or 
demurrers, answers are not meant to do the same things as rejoinders. Whilst each individual 
text is made up of a number of constituent parts that each have a function within the text which 
when taken together form the overall force of the text, the text itself is but one constituent part 
of the larger judicial argument. It is in taking these larger constituent parts together - that is to 
say, taking the complaint, together with the answer, together with (if they are extant) the 




intended to be understood, and which, in rhetorical and legal theory, form a complete judicial 
argument. This is not to say that these texts can only be understood when we examine the other 
records associated with the same claim. It is only to suggest that we should be mindful of the 
wider rhetorical context of a case if our objective is to work towards a more holistic 
understanding of them and it.  
 
We can imagine, and we should imagine, the aspiring lawyers of Elizabethan England sitting 
in grammar school learning rhetoric by reading Cicero’s De inventione and the Ad Herennium; 
we need to picture them emerging from grammar school with a humanist education and perhaps 
going to university, or being apprenticed in one of the Inns of Chancery where they would have 
studied it in much greater depth. We need to grasp that the people within legal profession were 
absolutely saturated in humanist rhetorical theory by the time they began working as attorneys. 
This is the context that we must keep at the forefront of our mind as we move through this 
thesis and examine the texts with which it is concerned.260 The fundamental question that will 
concern us for the remainder of this chapter is how far this rhetorical culture can be said to 
have influenced the construction of these texts; I argue that this culture was so pervasive that 
these texts should not, and indeed cannot fully, be explicated without recourse to this culture.261 
There seem to be at least two obvious potential objections that could be raised against the 
argument advanced in this chapter; and in what follows I will address them both in turn. The 
first relates to method: it could be argued that in approaching these texts in this way we are 
applying an a priori framework to them and, therefore, reading a rhetorical structure into them 
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ex post facto. That is to say, it could be argued that these texts may have been influenced by 
the theories we have discussed but to find in these texts a sustained fidelity to those theories is 
a misreading. This line of criticism however, whilst it is perhaps the most instinctive, seems to 
miss the mark slightly as to advance this argument in the face of the educational curriculum 
widely demonstrated  in the scholarship is to misunderstand - or ignore - the intellectual context 
in which these texts were created.  
A second line of criticism that could potentially be mounted may be along the following 
lines. If it is conceded that complaints, answers, replications, demurrers and rejoinders are 
generally structured according to the rhetorical precepts I have suggested, surely this cannot 
also be said for the examinations and depositions because they are simply questions and 
answers. Interrogatories asked to deponents whose answers were then recorded by a clerk of 
the court. Whilst it is certainly the case that examinations and depositions cannot be said to be 
written examples of judicial speeches in the same manner that the other stages of litigation can 
be. It would be erroneous to suppose that this means that they are devoid of any structure or 
rhetorical influence. For instance, who do we suppose crafted the interrogatories? The answer 
is the attorneys; if the attorneys created the questions, why did they ask these questions and not 
others? What were they trying to elicit from the deponents in asking these specific questions; 
why did they try to draw out these specific details and not others? Once we start to ask these 
questions we can begin to get a sense of what attorneys were doing in asking these questions; 
indeed, understanding what the questions were designed to elucidate can also help us make 
sense of how deponents answered them. What might a deponent be trying to do in answering 
an interrogatory in what appears to be a rather indirect way? Once we ask these questions we 
are driven back to how the interrogatories were constructed and for what reasons, which in turn 
demonstrates that they are part and parcel of the same rhetorical exercise as the other texts. 




understanding their intellectual context.  
In the analysis that follows we pursue two distinct but closely connected lines of inquiry. 
The first explores the extent to which later stage pleadings - answers, replications, demurrers 
and rejoinders - from the Duchy Chamber can be said to follow the precepts of forensic rhetoric 
in their structure and forms of argument; do these texts really demonstrate a fundamental and 
explicit engagement with forensic rhetoric along the lines suggested? The second line of 
inquiry interrogates the interrogatories and examinations specifically, with a view to 
illustrating precisely how they fit into the structures of argument advanced earlier in a case 
before sketching some implications of what this suggests about the changing nature of evidence 
in English law. 
 
Later Stage Pleadings 
Litigation in the Duchy Chamber was initiated by a bill of complaint - as opposed to the 
purchase of a writ from Chancery as in the common law courts of King’s Bench and Common 
Pleas. Unlike the common law courts, pleading was done in written form rather than orally: 
complainants would submit their bill of complaint to the Duchy Chamber and then defendants 
would have to submit an answer in response.262 Sometimes this was the end of the story as a 
case would be withdrawn when the plaintiffs claims were met with an answer. If the litigation 
was to progress, however, the plaintiff would then submit a replication - a formal restatement 
of their claims in light of the defendants answer. If this then covered the extent of the 
controversy the attorneys for each side would draw up witness lists and craft a series of 
interrogatories to be asked of all the deponents. Although the Duchy Chamber sat in 
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explored in greater detail in Chapter Five. It should be noted, however, that written procedure being the norm 
rather than oral proceedings in equity jurisdictions does not invalidate the premise that these texts should be 
thought of as written examples of judicial speech; if anything it enhances that aspect. This will be more fully 




Westminster, examinations and depositions took place in the localities and were recorded by 
clerks at the sessions there before being sent to Westminster for consideration and judgement.  
Interrogatories were constructed ahead of the examination of witnesses but were not meant 
to be shared with the opposing side until the date of the depositions.263 If, however, defendants 
had further objections to the restatement of the plaintiffs claims in the replication they could 
submit a rejoinder, or if they had a purely legal objection to the case they could submit a 
demurrer. Demurrers are particularly rare as they are an answer to a particular kind of legal 
argument concerned with the technicalities of law rather than with the substantive issues of a 
case. In forensic terms, they are only appropriate to juridical arguments.264 The salient point to 
grasp here is that all of these stages of litigation, all of these texts, are constructed ex parte; 
wherein each party set our their case at length and in the most favourable light. This highlights 
their rhetorical dimension. 
The texts examined in this chapter, as in Chapter Two, pertain to the soke and manor of 
Gimingham and its inhabitants. Gimingham is located near the North Norfolk coast, in the 
Hundred of Erpingham, and is composed of around 9500 acres.265 For our present purposes the 
salient details are that it was once an important jurisdictional area that bound a number of local 
villages - Gimingham, Knapton, Mundesley, North Repps, South Repps, Sidestrand, 
Trimingham, Trunch - together economically and administratively.266 In total, over 292 cases 
have been examined from the court of Duchy Chamber and as with the complaints in the 
previous chapter, the answers, replications, demurrers and rejoinders deployed in this chapter 
are taken from eighty-six cases initiated during the reign of Elizabeth I (1558-1603). The 
depositional evidence collected from DL4 is much more sparse and whereas out of the 292 
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cases examined, while eighty-six were initiated relating to Gimingham, there are only extant 
examinations and depositions for fourteen of those eighty-six.267 This may seem like a 
substantial drop, and it is, but it does not necessarily point towards some kind of archival 
disaster that has left a large whole in the extant evidence. Rather, it is indicative of how people 
engaged with the law in sixteenth century England. Litigation could be expensive; a protracted 
legal proceeding could end up being rather costly and time consuming for both parties - 
especially given that legal proceedings in equity jurisdiction were primarily written rather oral 
exercises - each text had to be drawn up by an attorney who charged per document, as well as 
for examining witnesses and clerks transcribing their testimony. Initiating a suit and delivering 
a forceful argument in the first instance was often enough to compel parties to reach a 
settlement out of court and avoid the time and expense of taking the case to a judgement that 
was far from certain to be desirable. 
 
As we have seen, the rhetoricians argued that, if one is to maximise their chances of success 
in persuading a judge of the validity of a particular case they should try to ensure that their 
speech is structured in such a way as to take advantage of every possible opportunity to 
persuade. That is to say, we should ensure that our speech is made up of - as far as it can be - 
of six parts. Quentin Skinner, in a recent study of classical rhetoric in Shakespeare, succinctly 
summarises the advice as follows. 
The [exordium] must aim to establish our ethos or character, and in such a way as to 
render the judge attentive (attentus), responsive (docilis), and above all well-disposed 
(benevolus) to our side of the case. The narratio should then furnish the judge with the 
salient facts, while persuading him at the same time to accept our version of events. 
The confirmatio and confutatio should call on ‘non-artificial’ proofs such as written 
documents and the testimony of witnesses in addition to the most appropriate ‘artificial’ 
or rhetorical forms of argument. Finally, the conclusio should not only summarise our 
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case but make use of ‘amplifications’, especially in the form of loci communes, to excite 
the emotions of the judge. Sometimes the rhetoricians suggest that suitably resonant 
commonplaces can be inserted at any stage where they seem likely to have a powerful 
emotional impact, but they always add that the [conclusio] is the moment at which they 
must chiefly and indispensably be used. The figure of the perfect orator whom these 
writers take themselves to be fashioning is accordingly said to be endowed with two 
closely related abilities: knowing how to invent or find out suitable arguments, and 
knowing how to amplify and ornament them with maximum emotional force. As Cicero 
summarises at the start of De inventione —in a phrase that proved to have exceptional 
resonance—the ideal orator will therefore be a man who combines in the highest degree 
the power of ratio or reasoning with that of oratio or eloquent speech.268 
In order to successfully discover which arguments are appropriate to each part of our oration, 
however, we first need to ensure that we correctly discriminate two features of the case. We 
need to distinguish whether the issue around which our case revolves is honest (causa honesta), 
foul (causa turpis), or strange (causa admirabilis). We need to identify this because the type 
of causa will determine whether or not we can be upfront and direct in our speech and claim 
that our case is absolutely right, or whether it will be necessary to dissemble and steal into the 
mind of our audience to win them over covertly. Once we have identified the causa we then 
need to identify what the rhetoricians stress as much the most important thing about a case: its 
constitutio, the issues around which the controversy chiefly turn. Without correctly identifying 
the constitutio we cannot discover what arguments are appropriate to our cause, and if we 
cannot discover the appropriate arguments we have no hope of persuading anyone of the 
validity of our claim.  
 
Robert Browning’s answer to the complaint of William Tatsell in 1588, begins by simply 
stating what the text is - ‘the answer of Robert Browning, defendant to the Bill of Complaint 
of William Tatsell, complainant’ - before moving straight into a direct repudiation of the 
plaintiff’s complaint: ‘the said defendant say that the said bill of complaint as this defendant is 
 




informed by his counsel is very untrue and insufficient in the law.’269 If we were to imagine 
this being read out in a courtroom this would happen immediately after the initial complaint 
had been read. There is no need for an exordium along the same lines as the complaints we 
examined in Chapter Two, the case has already been introduced and all parties present know 
what the issue at hand concerns. This is a standard way of beginning an answer to a complaint 
before the Duchy Chamber and it should be treated as an example of a legal form, a necessity 
that needs to be got out of the way at the beginning of the answer.270 As we saw in Chapter 
Two, however, this does not mean that it is not also a rhetorical opening along the lines we 
have seen in the rhetorical literature. The question is, once again, why is this sort of opening a 
legal commonplace? If we continue reading we can see that it continues by eloquently 
embellishing the rejection of the complaint: ‘… to be answered unto for many very great and 
manifest imprecisions and insufficiencies therein apparent’.271 The answer is, as before, that 
this is a written example of judicial speech and therefore needs to be read as such. For our 
present purposes, however, it is once we move into the defendant’s narrative of events that 
things begin become much more interesting as we get to the substantive issues of the case. 
The narratio of William Tatsel’s complaint gives us a brief summary of his case, which is 
essentially that Robert Browning, his brother in law, had unlawfully taken a piece of land that 
had been willed to him by his father in law according to the custom of gavelkind.272 In his 
answer, however, Robert Browning claimed, inter alia, that there was no such custom in force 
in Gimingham and the suit should be heard by the manorial court at Gimingham, not the Duchy 
Chamber. Note the competing jurisdictional claim: it is likely that Tatsel knew he would be 
unlikely to receive a favourable verdict at the manorial court and so deliberately chose a 
 
269 TNA, DL1/143/T4a 
270 This is also the same formulation used at the outset of rejoinders and demurrers. 
271 TNA, DL1/143/T4a 




favourable jurisdiction.273 The case then, it seems, revolves around whether the manor of 
Gimingham was an area of partible inheritance. In another complaint of 1588, Nicholas 
Thompson claimed that Stephen Powle and others were not only denying him right of way to 
market, but that they were doing it on lands that were not even their own and which they had 
concealed from the crown.274 Stephen Powle and his fellow conspirators answered by claiming 
that they held the lands in question by virtue of a lease that they had, apparently, paid for some 
years before.275 This case then, it seems, turns on who holds the title of the lands in question.276 
The truth or falsity of these claims has little bearing on the present argument as, for the moment 
we are only concerned with these claims being an advanced as a form of argument; the key to 
arguing persuasively and effectively lies in correctly identifying the issues around which it 
chiefly turns: its constitutio.  
The constitutio of the case can take one of three forms: legal, conjectural, or juridical.277 
That is to say, the point of controversy will stem from a text, a series of facts or events, or 
whether some action was justly or unjustly performed; the right way to discover which type 
you are dealing with is simply ‘to put together the charge levelled by the accuser with the basic 
plea of the defence’.278 Returning to William Tatsel and Robert Browning, then, we can see 
that the constitutio appears to be legal, because the matter around which the case will turn will 
be whether the custom of gavelkind can be found within a text - the custumals of the manor. 
Similarly, if we turn look again at the case between Nicholas Thompson and Stephen Powle, 
we can see that the case in that instance appears to have turned around the whether or not Powle 
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and his acquaintances did actually purchase the lease when they claimed; the constitutio of that 
case therefore appears to be conjectural. The significance of this is that in correctly identifying 
the constitutio of a case we will be able to determine the most effective line of argument, and 
the most appropriate forms of proof with which to validate our case.  
Failing to correctly identify the constitutio can result in offering inappropriate proofs in 
support of a claim and therefore advancing a less persuasive argument. For instance, if Tatsel 
identified the constitutio as conjectural and then went on to offer an argument based, not around 
the custumals but, rather around past events and the testimony of deponents, and then Browning 
was able to produce the custumal of the manor in refutation, the case would likely go in 
Browning’s favour. As a general rule, written forms of evidence held up better than oral 
testimony; it is in missing this and focusing on the weaker form of oral proof instead of refuting 
the validity of the textual evidence that would lead to a fundamentally weaker argument.279 
This is not to suggest that textual evidence and oral testimony cannot be offered in support of 
the same claim, it is just to note that failing to address the textual evidence at all leaves us open 
to a direct refutation along the lines the rhetoricians described. It is to these forms of proof in 
support of a claim, offered after we have identified the constitutio of a case, in the confirmatio 
and confutatio of a speech, that form the most important parts of a legal argument and to which 
we now turn. 
 
In 1571 Anne Reade, widow of Peter Reade and farmer on the manor of Gimingham, 
initiated a claim before the Duchy Chamber against a number of other tenants of the manor 
alleging that the tenants were unlawfully claiming rights of foldcourse, demense and pasture 
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on land for which, she claimed, she held the lease.280 The complaint begins with the standard 
formulation we examined in Chapter Two, before giving a brief narration of the facts which 
describes how, her husband Peter Reade leased the land from one Edward Fisher during the 
reign of Edward VI; now that her husband is deceased she, as ‘widow administrix’ of her 
husbands estate, lawfully holds the lease of the lands in question.281 The tenants, in their answer 
to her complaint, reply by claiming that Read was breaching the customs of the manor, which 
afforded them the right to demense and foldcourse, in order to unjustly levy charges and fines 
upon the tenants.282 Both of these texts - the complaint and the answer - develop a flawless 
exordium along the lines explicated above, before delivering a brief narratio in which they set 
out the salient facts of their case; after which, both texts then move seamlessly into a 
confirmatio and confutatio in which they gesture to physical evidence (non-artificial proofs), 
while also amplifying their arguments with specific rhetorical tropes (artificial proofs), before 
bringing their orations to a close with a brief conclusio designed to arouse the emotions of the 
judge and drive their case home. That is to say, the texts that make up this case can be said to 
construct an argument that bears a remarkable similarity to how the Roman rhetorical tradition 
advocated one argue in a court of law; this is, I argue, not a coincidence, but rather the product 
of an inescapably rhetorical understanding of legal argumentation endemic throughout 
sixteenth-century England. 
Every rhetorical authority since Aristotle has argued that the most important methods of 
non-artificial confirmation are by means of legal documents - especially laws and contracts - 
and the testimony of trustworthy witnesses.283 Anne Reade’s complaint initially identifies the 
constitutio of the case as legal and, therefore, advances an argument that emphasises the textual 
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evidence in the form of written leases that prove she has the title to the lands she claims. Her 
confrimatio and confutatio correspondingly gesture towards these texts in attempting to 
substantiate the claim: ‘a certain indenture sealed with the seal of the said Duchy being dated 
to the xith day of August…’.284 Even precise dates are offered to substantiate the validity of the 
evidence, directly contrasting with the often more imprecise memory of oral testimony. The 
tenants’ answer, by contrast, while also having identified the constitutio as legal, offers non-
artificial proofs in the form of ‘the manifest customs of the manor of Gimingham’ by 
referencing the court rolls as evidence of customary providence.285 One form of textual 
evidence thereby refuting another and in so doing illustrating that the question to be adjudicated 
is in fact not whether Reade holds the title to the lands, but whether the rights she claims the 
tenants are infringing actually come with that title. The replication Reade submitted in answer 
to the tenants’ answer of her complaint then reflects this by refuting the defendants use of court 
rolls in arguing that ‘the same court rolls doth show’ that the tenants are abusing the customs 
of the manor to claim these rights to the ‘manifest disinheritance of your said orator’.286 As we 
saw above, this is exactly how the rhetorical literature argues that a legal argument should 
develop and progress.  
If we turn to the artificial forms of proof advanced in the complaint, answer, and replication 
of this case, we find artificial proofs peppered throughout; with a focus immediately after non-
artificial proofs have been offered. Again, just as the rhetoricians advice in order to amplify 
the persuasive effect of the documentary evidence. Anne Reade’s initial complaint attempts to 
stir the judge into action by citing the potential damage to the Crown and to the commonwealth 
if the ‘manifest disinheritance of the Queens majesty and the impeachment of her highness 
liberties … [and] great weakening of your said orator’ is allowed to go unchecked.287 Similarly, 
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the tenants’ answer deploys similar language but reverses the impetus in an attempt to evoke 
sympathy and emotion in the judge, using loci communes - commonplaces - such as threats to 
the commonwealth and the liberty of subjects.288 The use of these amplifications and 
commonplaces throughout these texts accentuates the fact that these texts were not simply 
created for internal use, to furnish the court with the salient facts of a case as in the plea rolls 
of King’s Bench and Common Pleas. These texts were written for a wider audience and for a 
completely different purpose. They were written to persuade an audience; in the absence or 
oral pleading in a courtroom setting, they constitute the legal record of a case as well as the 
pleas themselves. The attorneys who wrote these texts thought about them in depth. They 
invented the arguments used within and structured them in such a way as to make them 
persuasive. They were designed and the arguments advanced, as well as the proofs offered in 
support of those arguments were carefully selected so that they did in fact confirm, rather than 
undermine, the arguments attorneys were concerned to advance on behalf of the litigants. This 
is, almost by definition, the classical theory of invention: from the Latin invenire, to discover, 
to find out the arguments most appropriate to a given context; given the educational 
background of the legal profession it would be misleading to suggest ignorance of this on the 
part of the attorneys when they were constructing these texts. 
 
Interrogatories and Depositions 
It is important to examine how the material kept in the archival class of DL4 - that is, 
interrogatories and depositions - fits into the judicial narratives constructed in the pleadings. In 
this section I have been guided by the work of Laura Gowing and Garthine walker in particular 
who have drawn upon legal records of similar jurisdictions to examine the role women played 
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in early modern legal culture. Specifically, their emphasis on the narrative construction of legal 
texts and the multi-vocality of depositional evidence is illuminating. Whilst plenty of historians 
have used depositional evidence as a means by which to get at the experience of ordinary 
people in early modern England, few explicitly engage with what this entails 
historiographically. That is to say, it is often assumed that depositional evidence offers us 
relatively unfettered access to the words of people from relatively humble backgrounds when 
they were deposed before the courts.289 In what follows it will be demonstrated that 
interrogatories, which have received far less attention in the scholarship, can be used to 
illuminate just as much, if not more, than the depositions given in answer to them; indeed, it 
will be argued that the depositions themselves cannot be fully understood without being 
examined in the context of their related interrogatories.290 I am concerned to illustrate the value 
interrogatories have as evidence, as opposed to the artificial proofs we find in the pleadings; to 
examine which voices are recorded in interrogatories and what constraints may be placed upon 
them. We will also consider how to interpret interrogatories like this more generally; as we 
discussed in Chapter One, there are complex hermeneutics and questions of interpretation to 
consider when approaching legal records. 
Let us return to a set of cases we examined in Chapter Two: the manumission litigation 
initiated by Sir Henry Lee in the 1570s.291 The underlying premise of this litigation, it will be 
remembered, was that Sir Henry had been granted a commission to go and trawl through 
properties held by the Duchy of Lancaster in order to find whether or not there existed any 
people still bound by the terms of their tenure to provide service to their lord. If Sir Henry 
could identify such inhabitants, he could charge them a fee for their manumission - that is, to 
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be released from their feudal obligations - or, similarly, force them to undertake their 
obligations. In practice, however, anyone who could be proved to be still bound by a feudal 
tenure would simply pay for their manumission rather than be obliged to undertake feudal 
dues.292 Lee’s pleadings before the Duchy Chamber, as we saw in Chapter Two, therefore, 
attempted to establish that certain inhabitants of Gimingham were bound to the Crown. Whilst 
we can identify the pleadings for five instances of manumission litigation in Gimingham 
initiated by Lee in the Duchy Chamber, the interrogatories and depositions only survive for 
one case; moreover, we only have the interrogatories and corresponding deposition of one 
witness for the defendants.293 Our examination will, then, illustrate the opposite argument to 
that which we examined in Chapter Two: we will see how these interrogatories were designed 
to elicit testimony that would repudiate Lee’s narrative of how the inhabitants of Gimingham 
wilfully concealed their status out of greed and low cunning.294 
Perhaps the most obvious point to note when we turn to the interrogatories and their related 
depositions is that it is clear they are not structured like a judicial speech. They are quite simply 
lists of questions to be posed to witnesses and then the corresponding answers of those 
witnesses. They are not made up of distinct technical parts, as is the case with the pleadings. 
That being said, these interrogatories were crafted by attorneys for a specific reason, in order 
to elucidate specific details from witnesses that would support the arguments advanced in the 
pleadings. Similarly, the deponents themselves knew that they were being deposed for a 
specific reason and would have had at least a vague - but probably intimate - understanding of 
the details of the case. These questions and answers were not launched into a cultural or social 
void. The participants were aware of the stakes and both the interrogatories and the answers 
reflect this. These texts, then, despite not being structured in the same way to their related 
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pleadings, are nevertheless complex heteroglossic legal instruments that need to be set in their 
rhetorical context if we are to grasp what it is they were designed to do.295 
The following are the first five interrogatories (out of a set of fourteen) pertaining to a 
manumission case initiated by Sir Henry Lee in the manor of Gimingham in 1574. Out of the 
five manumission cases we have pleadings for in the archives, only this set of interrogatories 
survive; these were drawn up by the defendants’ attorney in an attempt to rebut the arguments 
advanced by Lee (which we examined in Chapter Two). The strategy employed in these 
interrogatories centres around establishing whether the Sir Henry Lee’s commissioners (John 
Green and Francis Legate) entered into various lands around the manor as part of the 
commission, presumably to challenge the findings of the commissioners. 
 
1. Whether do you know John Grene and Francis Legate 
2. Whether did you see or know that any commission was sent or directed to the said 
John and Francis or either of them out of the court of the Duchy whereof the one or 
either of them were commanded to take a survey of regardant bondmen 
3. Whether the said John or Francis or either of them by virtue of the same commission 
were commanded to enter upon any mans house to execute the said commission 
4. Whether you or either of you were required by the said Legate to go with him to the 
house of Thomas Grene 
5. Whether do you know that the said Francis Legate by virtue of the same commission 
come to the house of the said Thomas Grene at Knapton and there required that he 
might come into the said Grene’s house and searched there with any evidence that 
concerned the said manor of Gimingham296 
Whilst these interrogatories clearly are not made up of multiple formal parts prescribed in the 
rhetorical literature, this does not mean that they are without rhetorical structure. They are 
clearly designed to establish the facts of the case in favour of the defendant: did the deponent 
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know the men who acted as commissioners and was the witness aware of whether the 
commission (if it existed) granted them the authority to enter upon private property in their 
execution of the commission. Once these foundational facts could be established, questions 
four and five begin to establish more specific circumstances of events. We need not examine 
each interrogatory individually to see that they relate directly to the arguments advanced in the 
DL1 material and serve to elucidate non-artificial proofs in support of the claim. The key point 
to emphasise here is that it is precisely this relationship between argument and evidence that 
illustrates the rhetorical dimension of these texts. That is to say, it is in examining the 
intertextual relationship between the complaints, answers, replications, interrogatories and 
their corresponding depositions which allows us to perceive how attorneys sought to prove a 
case at equity before the Duchy Chamber. Whilst I am not concerned here to illustrate the 
forensic links between pleadings and interrogatories in this particular piece of litigation, it 
should be noted that this is what the rhetorical advice suggests in terms of establishing non-
artificial proof in support of the artificial rhetorical arguments.297 
Aristotle had argued that the most important methods of non-artificial confirmation are by 
means of legal documents - especially laws and contracts - and the testimony of trustworthy 
witnesses. Quintilian agrees but stresses importance of witnesses.298 This reflection is 
strengthened when we recall that, while forensic arguments may be more or less ingenuous, 
witnesses will usually be giving their testimony under oath; the importance of written 
documents is stressed throughout the rhetorical literature, not just in the classical and neo-
classical Ciceronian tradition but also in the Ramist tradition. The fundamental point, however, 
is that these non-artificial proofs are to be advanced in conjunction with artificial rhetorical 
devices. With loci communes, with figures and tropes of speech designed to move the audience 
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to our side of the case. If we put this point the other way round we bring out its significance: 
written documents and sworn testimony are not in and of themselves sufficient to prove a case 
at law, they are materials to be interpreted and the fundamental task of anyone going to law is 
to make their interpretation appear legitimate. This is the absolutely elemental move that is 
made in sixteenth-century jurisprudence and it is in equity that we first see this shift being 
made. What John Baker has characterised as an evolution of older forms of legal learning, 
specifically regarding legal proofs, into a more jurisprudential understanding of the law: ‘a 
shift in emphasis from doctrine (or common learning) to jurisprudence (or judge-made law)’299  
The questions with which we are presently concerned in this section are 
historiographical.300 The interrogatories posed to John Bacon in Anne Read’s enclosure 
litigation of 1571 can be used alongside those of Lee’s litigation to illustrate the value of 
examining interrogatories as evidence.  
 
1. Do you know Anne Reade widow farmer unto the manor and soken of Gimingham? 
2. Whether do  you know a Stephen Powle of Southreppes  within this year now last past 
did ever trap or kill coneys or hares within the soken of Gimingham? 
3. Whether do you know or hath heard that any tenant of the soken might enclose any 
ground within the soken without licence?301 
Discussions of the jurisdictional overlay in Gimingham in the scholarship have drawn upon 
depositional evidence to illustrate that the memory of the old Anglo-Saxon jurisdiction 
remained in the popular consciousness. The implication, in particular in Wood, is that the 
memory of the Soke is used by inhabitants to legitimate their somewhat subversive attitudes in 
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the face of assertions of seigneurial authority by lessees like Peter Read.302 These questions 
illustrate, however, that the jurisdiction of Soke was recognised even by attorneys working in 
other jurisdictions. This insight has serious implications for how we understand and interpret  
competing jurisdictional claims: it suggests an awareness and active encouragement of 
competing identities by institutions, as well as individuals. What is more, however, is that this 
insight could not be gained through the depositional evidence; one must examine the 
interrogatories in order to grasp this context. 
Both of these sets of interrogatories illustrate the wider value to be gained from an explicit 
engagement with interrogatories as well as other instruments of litigation. For legal historians 
they throw into sharp relief numerous aspects of the legal context which cannot necessarily be 
gleaned from an examination of the pleadings or the depositions. For instance, they give an 
insight into the process by which manumission commissions may have gone about their 
investigations; the first two questions in Lee’s litigation in particular highlight the importance 
litigants placed on due process in law: the emphasis on the commission being lawfully sent; 
that this is not taken as self evident is indicative of the suspicion with which local inhabitants 
received interference in their affairs.303  
If we set interrogatories alongside their related depositions we gain an even greater insight. 
Bacon’s deposition, for instance, has been used in the two other discussions of Gimingham in 
the scholarship. Nicola Whyte recently to used Bacon’s testimony to illustrate how enclosure 
litigation was negotiated in sixteenth century Norfolk; Andy Wood demonstrated how memory 
could be deployed to assert or challenge local customs.304 Neither Wood nor Whyte make any 
mention of the interrogatory Bacon answered in giving his deposition, however. Whilst this is 
indicative of the wider neglect of interrogatories within the scholarship as a valuable source of 
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evidence, it also illustrates the limitations of examinations which rely on depositional evidence 
alone. 
He hath heard that the tenants of the Soke could not enclose any grounds without 
licence, for he says at a certain time about five years since Peter Reade going a hawking 
having in his company Mr George Duke Mr Peter Beverley, this examinant and diverse 
others went down to a covert called Bradfield Carres, and as they went they did see 
Richard Wortes inclosing a certain piece of ground lying on the East side of 
Sowthwood, with whom the said Peter found great fault and asked him who gave him 
licence, to whom the said Wortes said none, and desired him to be content and that he 
should sustain no loss thereby, to whom the said Peter said that by means of that 
Inclosure he could not have his foldcourse in shack time upon the said ground, and then 
the said Wortes answered that all shack time the said ground should be open, with which 
answer the said Peter Reade was pacified and went his way.305 
This deposition it has been rightly noted, for instance, is a narrative account of John Bacon’s 
memory concerning enclosure in sixteenth century Gimingham.306 There is, however, 
something absolutely critical missing from this characterisation if it is not also recognised that 
Bacon, in giving this deposition, was responding to a particular question. Whilst no one in the 
scholarship would assume that this deposition was given in a cultural void - Bacon is rightly 
seen as making an intervention into contemporary debate and discourse on enclosure and 
seigneurialism - it must also be recognised that nor was it given in a legal void. An attorney 
for Anne Read had asked Bacon ‘whether do you know or hath heard that any tenant of the 
soken might enclose any ground within the soken without licence’.307 This was a question 
specifically designed to elicit the testimony Bacon then gave, in order to offer a piece of non-
artificial proof which would confirm the forensic argument Read had advanced in her pleading. 
In other words, what is lost by not considering the interrogatory alongside the deposition in 
this case is the fact that Bacon was doing a number of things - some of which were, for instance, 
supporting Anne Read’s seigneurial claims over the manor, repudiating the testimony of 
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witnesses for the defendants, offering an interpretation of local custom which privileged the 
manorial jurisdiction and the political authority of the lessee over that of the old jurisdiction of 
the soke, which privileged the rights of individual inhabitants over their lands - in giving this 
deposition.  
To assume that uneducated tenants and labourers were aware of Roman rhetorical theory 
is surely erroneous. But, as Tom Johnson has shown, deponents were capable of manipulating 
legal discourse to tell the stories they wanted to tell, while also telling the court what they 
thought it wanted to hear, whether that be in corroboration or contradiction of a particular 
claim.308 This point has recently been explored by Hilary Taylor, in two particularly insightful 
studies she has demonstrated that plebeian deponents were often forced to testify either through 
intimidation or economic imperative - this is certainly evident in the testimony of tenants in 
cases concerning Peter and Anne Read.309 A more detailed contextualisation of legal records, 
particularly of litigation across jurisdictions - such as Peter Read’s litigation across the Duchy 
Chamber, Star Chamber, and Common Pleas - will allow historians to grasp the 
interdependency of the categories and relationships which constitute legal culture at any given 
moment. The salient point for the present argument is that the attorneys asked these specific 
questions and not others because they wanted specific answers. The implications of the 
deponents’ answers and what they can tell us about society and politics in early modern 
England will be addressed in Chapters Four and Five. For the present argument, the point is 
not how the questions were answered but rather that these questions were the questions that 
were asked in the first place. Why were these the questions posed? What were they designed 
to elucidate from the deponents? It is in asking these questions, in asking what attorneys - not 
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litigants - may have been doing in these texts, that we can excavate an aspect of these texts that 
tells us something about law, the legal profession, and legal culture in sixteenth-century 
England. 
That these interrogatories correlate with the arguments advanced earlier in the case and 
they were constructed by attorneys in order to substantiate specific claims is, I hope, self 
evident once we situate them in  their broader context. That attorneys crafted the interrogatories 
carefully and with a specific purpose is clearly brought out in Heather Falvey’s illuminating 
work on enclosure litigation in sixteenth-century Derbyshire.310 What is interesting, however, 
is that in the existing scholarship historians have tended not to examine the interrogatories and 
depositions alongside the related material held in DL1. They have, for the most part, been 
interested not in what these texts can tell us about the law, the legal profession, or forms of 
legal argument; but rather with what depositions can tell us about society, or culture more 
broadly. Indeed, social and cultural historians have generally eschewed the use of complaints 
and answers, preferring instead to concentrate on depositions which allow them to hear what 
ordinary people had to say about a subject. Unfiltered, so far as transcribed testimony can be 
said to be unfiltered. Even legal historians, somewhat paradoxically, maintain that legal records 
are of little value to the study of the law; often claiming that complaints, answers, replications, 
even depositions contain little analytical value relating to the substantive content of English 
law.311 Indeed, much of the same scholarship denigrates the insularity and sterility of English 
law in the sixteenth century while it, rather ironically, simultaneously excludes texts produced 
within the legal system and by the legal profession from legal historiography. That legal 
records are utilised at all in the wider scholarship owes more to the social and cultural 
historiography of the past twenty years than it does to the legal scholarship of the past century. 
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I hope that this chapter has demonstrated that a critical engagement with interrogatories along 
the lines undertaken in this chapter is mutually beneficial to historians of English law and legal 
culture as it is to historians of English society and culture broadly speaking. 
 
I began this chapter with three general aims. In the first instance we have sought to banish the 
notion, endemic within the scholarship, that English law in the sixteenth century was insular 
or sterile, through illustrating the prodigious influence that an essentially Roman theory of 
rhetorical argument wielded over the construction of legal records created by the equity court 
of Duchy Chamber. My second concern has been to contend that the influence of this rhetorical 
understanding of legal argumentation was so pervasive that in order to explicate these records 
to a satisfactory degree we need to do so with reference to humanist rhetorical theory and 
culture. My third main concern has been to suggest that historians have struggled to situate 
these texts in their appropriate contexts. Historians of all different creeds have thereby are 
asked too narrow a set of questions of them; it is this flawed hermeneutic, in the legal 
historiography especially, which has perpetuated the misleading characterisation of these texts 
as being of little analytical value to the study of law. These texts, properly contextualised, 
illuminate the vibrancy of English law and the legal profession in the sixteenth century. Social 
and cultural historians have shown us that through depositional evidence we can hear the voices 
of ordinary people and how they organised their experience and talked about it to each other. 
If we are prepared to listen, however, we may find that as well as telling us what the participants 
of a case may have thought or believed, we can also hear what the people who actually created 
these texts may have been saying. The silent partners who shaped the texts and guided the cases 
through the courts on behalf of the litigants. 
In the existing scholarship surrounding legal records of this nature there is a tendency to 




themselves did not write these texts, and that what is written in the depositions probably does 
not reflect what a witness may have said verbatim. But this is chalked up to being as close as 
we can get to what ordinary people were saying. We may get the information second or third 
hand, but it is still better than not getting it at all. There is, therefore, a tension in much of the 
historiography between a somewhat misguided desire to make these texts fit within a 
Foucaldian or Derridian philosophy of authorship, and a desire to acknowledge that these texts 




CHAPTER FOUR: LAW AND EQUITY IN THE ELIZABETHAN STAR CHAMBER 
 
This chapter will demonstrate that, rather than being a set of abstract institutional rules and 
principles, the ways in which people interpreted the law had a fundamental impact on its 
substantive content. The central contention of this chapter will be that explicating how people 
interpreted the law and why they engaged with it are two distinct, but closely related, analytical 
exercises; they were both critical to substantive legal development. This chapter will, therefore, 
investigate the relationship between the substantive content of the law and how people 
attempted to engage with the law. This represents an epistemological shift from prevailing 
approaches in the scholarship. In what follows it will be shown that legal engagement, whilst 
having a variety of social and political dimensions, was also an intellectual exercise. 
By focusing on the intellectual content of texts created within courts of Equity, this chapter 
exposes the sterility of doctrinal legal history and the limitations of social history. It is no longer 
a sufficient condition of a satisfactory analysis of the law merely to clarify the institutional 
structure and procedural habit of jurisdictions.312 Nor is a restricted account of the social 
motivations for litigation any more satisfactory if we aim to understand the nature of the 
relationship between law and social practice.313 Rather, these two analytical enterprises are 
each one side of the same coin. Legal historians have largely ignored the social, political and 
cultural contexts out of which litigation arose. They have preferred to try to ‘tell the story of 
each aspect of the law as it developed under the stimulus of legal decision’.314 Social historians 
have, by contrast, not considered the law itself to be a ‘worthwhile or rewarding’ subject of 
investigation.315 Consequently, social historians have made mined the texts created by equity 
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jurisdictions for the wealth of contextual information contained within the pleadings and 
depositions. Whilst legal historians have largely ignored them because, where they have not 
been lost, the decisions reached in Equity did not share the common law’s reliance on precedent 
and, therefore, did not build up a codified body of law upon which future judicial decisions 
were rendered.316  This chapter argues that the legal decisions made by judges are of secondary 
importance when investigating legal development. A much more promising field of enquiry is 
to be opened up by illuminating the intellectual tools with which lawyers and litigants 
attempted to shape the law; in excavating different interpretations of the law and the utility of 
those interpretations.  
The intellectual contexts of court records have been little explored in the scholarship. 
Intellectual historians, like legal historians, have largely ignored texts produced by courts 
because they are not seen as intellectually rewarding. They are considered to be indicative of 
legal process and not of intellectual or legal debate.317 This is a mistake. The texts examined 
throughout this thesis performed multiple functions. They were administrative records of 
litigation: they were the primary way in which litigation before equity courts was recorded. 
They constituted the case itself in that they performed specific legal functions: the bills of 
complaint initiated the legal process and were certified by counsel in order that defendants 
would then be subpoenaed and bound over to make answer before the court; the defendants 
answer or demurrer, again certified by counsel, initiated the next stage in the legal process and 
so on until the case reached its conclusion.318 They were also intellectual interventions in a 
wide range of debates and discourses: they arose out of specific social and cultural contexts 
and were intended to contribute to those contexts in identifiable ways.319 The reputation of 
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court records, and of pleadings in particular, as being so functionally formulaic that they are 
emptied of their intellectual content is misleading.320 Their intellectual value is to be found by 
excavating the space around the actions they were intended to perform. 
 
Law and Legal Development 
Star Chamber was a court of justice predicated upon the royal prerogative. It was presided over 
by the Lord Chancellor alongside privy counsellors and common law judges, including Sir 
Edward Coke when he became Lord Chief Justice under James I. As Attorney General of 
England and Wales in 1597, however, Coke was the primary prosecutor on behalf of the 
Crown. Thus, in what follows, we will see Coke litigating on behalf of the Crown. Unlike the 
Duchy Chamber, which was limited to civil suits in which it had an interest, Star Chamber 
possessed a superior criminal jurisdiction that was, theoretically, limited only by itself; with 
the notable exception that it could not alter the common law and so had no jurisdiction over 
life or limb.321 Like the Duchy Chamber, Star Chamber administered the body of rules that 
came to be known as Equity. Historians have struggled to precisely describe the substantive 
content of Equity. Whereas legal historians have been able to describe the content of common 
law relatively precisely through precedents established and recorded on the plea rolls of the 
Courts of King’s Bench and Common Pleas, we have no such resource for much of Equity’s 
history. In any event, prior to the mid-sixteenth century the ecclesiastical chancellors, of which 
Wolsey was the last, who presided over the great equitable jurisdictions of Chancery and Star 
Chamber were less bound by precedent than the common law judges. They ’decided cases 
without much reference to [legal precedent], making use of some analogy drawn from the 
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common law and of some great maxim of jurisprudence which they borrowed from the 
canonists or civilians’.322 Only with later Chancellors do we begin to see an identifiable set of 
rules, which slowly became known to the public through the publication of reports on 
procedure, being administered.323 Prior to the mid-sixteenth century decisions made by Equity 
Courts were recorded only haphazardly; in the case of Star Chamber the decrees and order 
books have been lost entirely.324 It is, therefore, to the procedure of Equity that we must look; 
as we saw in Chapter Three, that procedure was persuasion by reasoned argument and specific 
types of proofs. It is to the content those arguments and proofs that we should turn in order to 
understand equitable justice and how litigants, including the Crown, engaged with it. 
 Whilst Courts of Equity were courts of justice, they were not viewed in the strictest sense 
as courts of law. They could not modify the substance of the common law, nor could they 
reverse a judgement given in a common law court; whilst Equity was to be assimilated by the 
common law and become part of our substantive law, this was not yet so in the sixteenth 
century. The discrimination, by sixteenth-century common lawyers, of the common law from 
other forms of justice is the root of the problem that now pervades legal history. In the common 
law tradition Equity was seen to be in the political, rather than the legal, sphere; common law 
practitioners jealously resisted any encroachment.325 Legal historians, whilst correctly 
identifying the distinction early modern lawyers made between common law and Equity, have 
largely followed the same line. This is a mistake. Such an interpretation is itself a legal fiction 
because it is clear that the common law was not the only form of justice being administered. 
Common law lawyers distinguished the common law from other forms of justice because they 
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wanted to defend it from what they perceived as threats. That is, they resisted what they saw 
as the influence of Roman law and, by extension, interference by the catholic powers of Europe 
in the legal safeguards provided by English law. Courts of Equity operated by compelling 
compliance with their decrees. If, for instance, plaintiff (X) obtained a judgement at common 
law and the defendant in that case (Y) brought suit in Star Chamber and asked for equitable 
relief. If the court found in favour of Y, the Star Chamber would have nothing to say on the 
judgement given at common law. It would simply compel X not to enforce the judgement 
obtained at common law.326 This is why contemporaries such as Christopher St German argued 
that ‘Equity pertained wherever the literal application of the [common] law would frustrate the 
object the legislator had in mind or else where it would run contrary to the dictates of natural 
law’.327 Equity was always supplementary to common law, it was not a self-sufficient system 
in and of itself, at every point it presupposed the existence of common law. This distinction 
has not been particularly well handled in the scholarship to date.328 A more sensitive treatment 
will allow us to investigate the relationship between Equity and common law much in much 
more detail. It will also demonstrate that it makes no sense to disaggregate law and politics in 
this period.   
Star Chamber was peculiar in that, with its superior criminal jurisdiction based upon the 
royal prerogative, it was the only court that had the power to create new offences. This made 
it a popular jurisdiction for litigants, including the Crown, who sought punitive damages for 
perceived wrongs; its use by the Crown in this way is partly why Star Chamber is often 
described in the scholarship as the judicial arm of the privy council.329 Many of the offences it 
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created were actions that were familiar in local courts but which were not as yet pleas of the 
crown. The legal innovation of Star Chamber was that, like local courts, it treated wrongs as 
injuries to be compensated as well as offences to be punished. It was, for instance, the first 
royal court to undertake punishment for fraud when it was not previously a plea for the 
crown.330 The litigation examined in this chapter, which pertains to Edward Coke’s Star 
Chamber prosecution in 1587 of some of the inhabitants of Gimingham, will demonstrate how 
new legal principles could be developed through active litigation.331 
 
I: Approaches to Legal Development and the State in Existing Scholarship 
Legal development in early modern England is inextricably linked with the formation of the 
early modern English state.332 There is an unusually distinguished literature surrounding the 
state and its formation; a historiographical war continues to rage in the scholarship around how 
to approach a discussion of the State. There is, however, a distinction that needs to be drawn 
at this point, between the state, government and civil society. They are not synonyms, despite 
all three being conflated in the scholarship.333 The tendency in social history in particular to 
use the term ‘the State’ as a shorthand for government is particularly misleading because social 
history has not, generally speaking, been concerned with civil society in its wider philosophical 
sense. In the philosophical literature, historically, the term ‘the State’ has been used specifically 
in contrast with ‘government’.334 This is, for instance, deeply important in seventeenth-century 
political discourse where theorists such as Hobbes sought to argue that the State was immortal, 
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in contrast to governments which live and die.335 When we, as historians, investigate the early 
modern state we should picture it holistically, as the totality of civil society. Government, in 
all its forms, is but an aspect of civil society. Three methodological approaches to the State 
stand out as being particularly influential in the scholarship.336 In this section we will discuss 
each of them in turn, before proceeding to examine them in relation to some litigation in the 
next section.  
The first approach, which I will call the philosophical approach, is the one taken by 
historians of political thought. Studies in conducted in this vein tend to examine philosophical 
works of political theory. These treatises, which continue to inform so much of our political 
discourse, approach civil society in relation to the problems posed in the politics of that society. 
Thus, in the early modern world, Machiavelli discussed the virtues of republican government 
after the fall of the Florentine Republic to the Medici in the early-sixteenth century; Hobbes’s 
Leviathan is an irenic work produced in conditions of seventeenth-century revolution; 
Rousseau’s Social Contract discussed the nature of eighteenth-century civil society in a 
changing commercial context. Such treatises have conceptualised political authority vertically; 
they are concerned with the theoretical basis of political power.  
The canonical texts of early modern political thought have generally conceived of political 
power in one of two ways.337 The first analysis is that political authority descends, in varying 
degrees from God or the sovereign through the aristocracy and gentry through to the most 
humble sort. This is the argument made by advocates of the divine right of kings and theorists 
of absolute monarchy.338 This notion of the civil society clearly underpinned the Tudor 
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monarchy, but it found its most forceful apologists in the defence of the Stuart monarchy in the 
1640s. On the other side of the coin, the alternative conception was that power ascended 
through society from the people. This is the view eloquently expressed by John Milton in his 
Ready and Easy Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth (1660) at the Restoration of the Stuart 
monarchy.339 This philosophical approach, concerned with the theoretical roots of political 
power and authority enjoyed a hegemony in historical scholarship until the mid-twentieth 
century; it remains widely discussed in the history of political thought.340 
The second approach, which I will call the empirical approach, shattered the geography of 
mid-twentieth century historiography in 1953 when Geoffrey Elton published his Tudor 
Revolution in Government.341 In this paradigmatic work, Elton made two major contributions 
to the scholarship. The first was a double-edged  methodological assault upon the practice of 
professional historians. Elton broke with the early twentieth century Whig aspiration to locate 
the constitutional origins of modernity, which presupposed the philosophical approach we have 
just discussed. He insisted, instead, that the past should be studied ‘in its own right, for its own 
sake’.342 At the same time, he rejected ‘a philosophic concern with such problems as the reality 
of historical knowledge or the nature of historical thought only hinders the practice of 
history’.343 Elton thus advocated an approach that amounted to a strict adherence to historical 
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empiricism.344 His second, perhaps more important, contribution was a corollary of this 
stringent empiricism. When combined with a narrow focus on financial accounts, court cases, 
and statutes, which were ‘far and away the most important’ sources of evidence, this empirical 
hermeneutic produced a picture of society that levelled the historiographical landscape.345  
History, for Elton, was the explanation of events and the deducing of consequences that 
may follow. A vertiginous investigation into the roots of political power was, in Elton’s 
analysis, to confuse the proper explanatory task of explicating events with the explanation of 
things that simply are.346 Thus, he located the foundations of the early modern state in the 
creation of a centralised bureaucracy during the Henrician administration of Thomas 
Cromwell. Whether or not they agreed with Elton’s identification of a critical moment in the 
1530s, historians largely adopted the premise of Elton’s approach; late-twentieth century 
scholarship on the state is overwhelmingly based on an empirical reading of sources drawn 
almost entirely from institutions. This created a dichotomy in the scholarship between ‘central’ 
and ‘local’ institutions and, consequently, between ‘central’ and ‘local’ government. This 
empirical approach to sources has underpinned, to varying degrees, numerous historiographical 
traditions, from political history as exemplified by Elton, to Revisionism in the 1970s and 
1980s,347 and even the New Social History of the 1980s and 1990s.348 Whilst an emphasis on 
bureaucratic institutions is no longer seen as a credible way to approach questions of state 
formation, not least because it has been shown to be just as problematically teleological as the 
 
foundational to the new disciplines of social and intellectual history. Cf. Christopher Hill, 'Marxism and History', 
The Modern Quarterly, 3 (1948), pp. 52-64; Christopher Hill, 'The Materialist Conception of History', University, 
1 (3: 1951), pp. 110-4; Richard W. Southern, The Making of the Middle Ages (London: Hutchison, 1953). 
344 For a critical appraisal of Elton’s methodology see Skinner, 'The Practice of History and the Cult of the 
Fact', pp. 8-26. 
345 Elton, The Practice of History, p. 101. 
346 Skinner, 'The Practice of History and the Cult of the Fact', pp. 8-26. 
347 J. S. Morrill, Revolt in the Provinces: The People of England and the Tragedies of War 1630-1648 
(London: Longman, 1976). 
348 Whilst the New Social History is known for its use of anthropological and sociological approaches, in the 
1980s and 1990s it used the vocabulary of ‘centre/locality’ heavily and much of the early work in that school is 




Whiggism Elton sought to repudiate, the unhelpful division between centre and locality has 
endured as a misleading shorthand in the scholarship.349 
The third approach we will examine is the one we see in some of the more recent social 
history on the early modern state. This scholarship has attempted to move beyond investigating 
the theoretical and administrative roots of the State. Steve Hindle has, for instance, 
demonstrated that state formation was a process that took place in tandem with developing 
social structures; for Hindle, the State is centred around local governors and officeholders who 
mediated and implemented royal policy and bureaucracy in localities.350 Much of the recent 
social history in this vein has owed much to the sociological work of Marx, Weber and 
Gramsci.351 It has emphasised the participatory nature of the early modern state, demonstrating 
how notions of officeholding, reciprocity and credit created a more inclusive State than is often 
depicted in older scholarship.352 This is, however, to shift the emphasis of the analysis away 
from the location of political power within civil society to the type of political power. That is 
to say, it is a shift away from analysing whether political power and authority ultimately resided 
in the monarchy, commons, or administrative bureaucracy, towards an analysis of the forms of 
power that were exercised throughout civil society. The question that consumes this aspect of 
the scholarship is one of legitimacy; not legitimacy in the sense of theoretical or empirical 
justification of political power but, rather, in the sense of belief: under what circumstances did 
contemporaries believe political power to be legitimate.353 
Crucially, social history has demonstrated how contemporary political discourse, and the 
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early modern conception of the State, was contested. This makes the scholarship in social 
history stand out against a backdrop which, due to either its focus on texts either over a long 
chronological space, as in the history of political thought, or its too narrow a spatial context, 
as with the focus on central bureaucracy in traditional political history, struggles to grasp the 
scope contemporary engement with early modern politics and political discourse. Recent 
scholarship in history of political thought, for instance, has failed to acknowledge the contested 
nature of key political concepts: the term commonwealth, which was deployed by Jack Cade 
as early as 1450, was deployed in the sixteenth century in a treatise extolling the virtues of 
monarchical government, by Sir Thomas Smith, and by rebels against monarchical government 
in Kent, Sussex and Norfolk during the commotion of 1549.354 Meanwhile, it possible to read 
Mike Braddick’s seminal study without ever encountering the idiosyncratic ideologies and 
practices of the people who inhabited local office because, for Braddick, the State functioned 
through its dissemination of hegemonic ideas.355  
What the scholarship lacks is a history of contemporary theories of state which takes into 
account not only variations over time and space but also over social class. We need a history 
of political discourse which can account for all the participants in that discourse; which 
recognises the many interventions made by ordinary people instead of just the few 
interventions made by the intellectual and social elite. Such a history is beyond the capacity of 
this thesis, but in what remains we will examine how it might be achieved in future research.356 
This chapter will demonstrate how a focus on litigation and the consequent development of 
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English law can illuminate that wider engagement with political discourse by ordinary people 
in their everyday lives; how their conceptions of key political concepts inflected their lives and 
shaped the ways in which they organised their world; how, when they deployed those ideas in 
litigation, ruling ideas were shaped through the conflict contrasting ideologies, all of which 
exerted a formative influence on the development of early modern English law, politics and, 
consequently, civil society. 
 
II: Intellectual Contexts - Coke v Bateman 
In 1597 the Queen’s Attorney General, Sir Edward Coke, brought a suit in Star Chamber 
against several inhabitants on the manor of Gimingham. The suit alleged that, among other 
things, the defendants had unlawfully entered into several parcels of land around the manor 
and converted them into pasture for their own profit. In doing so Coke claimed they had pulled 
down several cottages which stood on the lands in question and displaced the deserving poor.357 
The defendants in this case argued that they were lawfully seised of the lands in question and 
that putting their lands to better use allowed them to provide for the poor more adequately.358  
The pleadings in this case are particularly rich and highlight the tension between royal 
government and local inhabitants. This tension has been of perennial interest to historians, who 
have sought to excavate the relationship between the State and its citizens by examining the 
points of contact between national and local institutions.359 In this section we will concentrate 
first on the arguments advanced by Edward Coke, in order recover how officeholders at the 
heart of government interpreted the law and how their interpretations reflected royal policy. 
This will illustrate how equity courts were often the jurisdictions most suited to legal 
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innovation. In doing so we will suggest that the existing scholarship on equity jurisdictions, 
and on Star Chamber in particular, over emphasises their use as a weapon of royal ministers.360 
Detailed attention will then be paid to ways in which the defendants responded to the exercise 
of political power in their answers. This will illuminate the other side of the coin: how people 
outside the trappings of high office interpreted the law, and how such interpretations reflected  
the attitudes of ordinary people to the everyday exercise of political power, which are indicative 
of different currents in contemporary political thought beside those of the ruling elite. In short, 
by examining the intellectual content of these texts, we excavate more than the history of 
institutions and social relations: we can illustrate the climate of past politics. The history of law 
is, in large part, wrapped up in the social, cultural and political discourses that surround it 
because ‘law was an arm of politics and politics was one of its arms,’ it was a battleground on 
‘which alternate notions of law were fought out’.361 By focusing on the actions performed in 
litigation we will get a greater sense of the ruling ideas that underwrote the structures of the 
early modern State as well as conceptions of the State that are socially grounded. 
Edward Coke’s information in Star Chamber in 1597, against the inhabitants of 
Gimingham, began with the standard formula we examined in Chapter Two. It was addressed 
to ‘the Queen’s most excellent majesty’ and it introduced the speaker, ‘Edward Coke esquire 
your highness attorney general’.362 It then, in a concerned and supplicating tone, proceeded to 
offer a brief description of the issues identified and provides a narration of the facts as Coke 
identified them. This opening was common to most bills of complaint before the Star Chamber 
and it has been rightly identified in the scholarship as a legal formula. Despite its generic 
appearance, this form of beginning was in fact a highly technical and rhetorical exercise that 
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performed a set of specific functions.363 The forensic structure should, therefore, be kept in 
mind, as it throws into relief the performative nature of the text, while this chapter will 
primarily focus on the later parts of the texts in which arguments are advanced.  
Coke used the vocabulary of classical humanism to argue that a balanced commonwealth 
resulted from the greater and the poorer members fulfilling their roles in society.364 In 
Ciceronian vein, he emphasised the participatory nature of the English state. The first 
substantive section began with a description of the state of the commonwealth telling how ‘a 
very great and substantial part of this realm consists of houses of habitation and husbandry’ 
wherein many poor people dwell.365 It described how many ‘wealthy and great families’ 
including ‘your highness as well’ have provided for the ‘bodies and goods’ of the poor.366 The 
poor inhabitants of these houses of husbandry and habitation are described as ‘good members 
of that realm not having any other trade or course of life but by taken to farm some lands 
without tenants’.367 There they maintained ‘houses for the dwelling and abiding of them 
peoples and their families’.368 By converting these tenantless lands to ‘husbandry and tillage’ 
there was ‘great abundance and plenty of corn and grain … whereof famine dearth and 
starvation hath been avoided and also the people of this your highness realm being exceedingly 
enriched thanks be to god’.369 The poor are thus described in positive terms, living in balance 
with the wealthier members of society. In these circumstances they are ‘generally set out to 
work and employed to profitable labour by the said principal farmers and tenants’.370 Thereby 
‘idleness unlawful games and infinite other’ instances of undesirable behaviour have been 
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prevented.371 The body politic was seen to be in good health when the poor were maintained 
on the waste: they were able to feed themselves while the propertied members of society 
provided employment as wage labourers on their estates, which contributed to the maintenance 
of the social order by setting the idle to work. This was, as Thomas Smith argued, the place of 
the ‘fourth sort or class’.372 
 Coke developed this argument along distinctly Tacitean lines. The immediate context for 
this case was, according to Coke, the failure of the defendants to maintain this equilibrium. 
This mirrored a wider debate within later sixteenth century humanist political thought between 
the more sceptical ideas of Tacitus, which emphasised a descent into vice and ambition over 
the Ciceronian ideals of wisdom and virtue when participating in politics.373 Immediately after 
his description of the commonwealth, Coke argued that several wealthier inhabitants had 
displaced the poor in order to enlarge their own estates.374 He described the defendants as 
‘being without god goodness and your majesties peaceable and politique governance’.375 Coke 
argued they thought ‘only of themselves to attain greater wealth and substance within the 
several communities in which they inhabit’.376 Within those communities they had ‘of late 
years not only decayed or suffered to decay divers and many houses of habitation and 
husbandry having of ancient time until of late divers arable land and other grounds thereunto 
belonging’.377 The defendants were also said to ‘have of late years taken from other like houses 
the same land or ground or the greatest part thereof into their own hands’.378 They were then 
faced with a choice to ‘either suffer the same [their seizure of lands] to stand void or else place 
some poor people in the same wherein they live’ in poverty, ‘without anything to sustain 
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themselves and their families or work’.379 It was for these ‘offences and misdemeanours divers 
and sundry years last past’ that Coke prosecuted the defendants in Star Chamber.380 The [legal] 
problem Coke faced was that those offences and misdemeanours did not yet exist in common 
law. 
The defendants, on the other hand, drew upon vocabulary more reminiscent of ancient 
constitutionalism than classical humanism.381 They disputed the facts of the case as they were 
recounted by Coke and argued that they had acted in full accordance with the laws of the land. 
Robert Bateman traced his claim to the title of the lands back twenty-nine years, where at the 
beginning of Elizabeth’s reign his father in law, Nicholas Warye, ‘was owner of divers houses 
lying and adjoining together in Southreppes’.382 Attached to these houses Bateman estimated 
that there were ‘nine or ten acres of land or ground thereabouts’.383 He conceded that, long 
before these houses and lands came into his possession, around ‘fifty years last past’ they may 
have been ‘termed or taken to be several cottages’.384 But ‘whether the same were at any time 
three cottages for habitation or not’ he could not say, other than ‘the said Nicholas Warye did 
in his life time about thirty-five years now last past make of the said houses or supposed 
cottages one messuage or one dwelling house for habitation and husbandry and did so use and 
enjoy the same during the term of his natural life’.385 Warye bequeathed the lands and houses 
to the defendant’s wife, Agnes Bateman, in the first or second year of Elizabeth’s reign and the 
Bateman claimed he had continued to enjoy them in the same state since her death. Indeed, he 
had ‘not only maintained and kept the same’ in good condition but he had also ‘bettered [them] 
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said house and lands as one entire house of habitation and husbandry’ because that is all he had 
known it to be ‘by the space of forty years past’. Coke had, according to Robert Bateman, got 
it completely wrong.  
He had got it so wrong that Bateman offered yet further arguments to the contrary. Again, 
they were all premised on legal right, rather than civic duty. Bateman claimed he held another 
cottage on a piece of land on the adjoining manor of Bruisyard, also near Southreppes. He held 
this land ‘by copy of court roll’ and ‘occupied and used it for the maintenance of himself, his 
wife, children and family,’ as well as a ‘very poor woman of the age of four score years or 
thereabouts to have her dwelling in the said cottage’ along with the ‘most part of her food and 
fuel there with for the yearly rent of eight half shillings’.386 This was particularly generous 
because ‘this defendant might as he think yearly let for the rent of twenty-five shillings’.387 But 
he had ‘rather suffered the said poor woman to dwell in the said cottage’ because it had not 
been a house of husbandry before and the ‘poor woman hath for the most part had her dwelling 
there in the said cottage by the space of fifty years now past’.388 If he should be forced to put 
her out, however, ‘the town and inhabitants of Southreppes should at their charge be 
constrained to find some other dwelling’ for her.389 Bateman claimed that he would forced to 
do this unless he ‘be permitted to occupy the lands before mentioned’ in order to maintain 
himself and his family.390 What we see in this defendant’s answer, then, is a vehement rejection 
of both the facts as they were presented by Coke, and of the essential premise of Coke’s 
information. Bateman argued that he should be permitted to continue to occupy the lands in 
question primarily because he had demonstrated his legal right to them. That this would allow 











This was not an unusual defence. Another defendant in this case, Robert Langward, argued 
along similar lines to Bateman. Langward’s answer was more formal than Robert Bateman’s; 
it was shot through with the vocabulary of the common law. Langward argued that he ‘had 
been lawfully seised of one capital messuage or tenement in Thorpe Market,’ along with ‘one 
small tenement adjoining with three score and ten acres or thereabouts of arable land and 
pasture which without the remembrance of any man hath been used and occupied with the same 
capital messuage and also of one small cottage with a yard’.391 Langward had inherited these 
properties from his father, William Langward, and when he died they ‘did descend unto the 
said defendant as son and right heir unto the said William Langward, whereby the said 
defendant did enter into the said premises for his necessary use and dwelling’.392 According to 
Langward, there were some small buildings dotted around his lands, but those small cottages 
wherein he kept ‘hay straw and other fodder for cattle in the time of winter and hard weather 
… [none of which] is nor at any time was to the knowledge of this defendant a house of 
habitation or husbandry’.393 Langward went further and, like Bateman, asserted that he was in 
fact providing for the poor in the community. He claimed that he ‘doth suffer one William 
Slappe sometime this defendant’s tenant to dwell in part of the said tenement and the houses 
and buildings situated upon all the said premises now being in good and sufficient [condition] 
having been from time to time repaired maintained and kept without wasting or decaying any 
of them.394 This had, according to Langward, allowed him to convert more of his land to tillage 
and, in so doing, employ some sixteen persons; whom, because of the income derived from the 
land in question, he could afford to continue to let dwell in a cottage that had, from time out of 
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mind, been used for the dwelling of poor persons.395 For Langward, as for Bateman, there was 
no question of title; he argued that the law allowed him to dispose of his lands as he wished, 
while the improvements he made allowed him maintain himself and fulfil his obligations in the 
community.  
This case raises some profound questions for the scholarship and historiography. Social 
historians have, for a long time now, used cases such as this to investigate the institutions of 
the State in relation to government broadly conceived. That is, how the apparatus of 
government operated in a wide variety of national and local contexts. But, more significantly, 
cases like this have fundamental implications for any historian concerned with legal culture.396 
This case demonstrates that the judiciary was a key avenue through which social and political 
agendas were prosecuted. It demonstrates how those in high office viewed the role of the State. 
Coke and Bateman each present contrasting views of civil society. This in itself is significant 
and demonstrates the vibrancy and breadth of early modern political discourse. More 
substantially, however, the pleadings in this case demonstrate contemporary conceptions of the 
early modern state in action; how they inflected everyday life; how substantial officeholders 
like Coke and more ordinary subjects like Bateman drew upon contemporary intellectual 
discourse to justify and defend their behaviour in their everyday life. People in early modern 
England could conceptualise and deploy different notions of the State and civil society in a 
wide variety of contexts outside of academic discourse and abstract works of political theory. 
The stakes were real in sixteenth century litigation; what this demonstrates is that 
contemporaries debated the epistemic premises of political power when they challenged the 
exercise of political power in a wide variety of contexts. That is to say, debates over the nature 
of civil society took place in litigation across the country. Whilst this is not to suggest quite as 
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broad a definition of politics as is found in the anthropological work of Adrian Leftwich and 
the associated scholarship.397 It is to suggest that ordinary people in early modern England were 
much more involved in politics and political discourse in a traditional sense than is often 
allowed for in the scholarship. 
The litigation between Coke and Bateman also forces us to question some of the prevailing 
assumptions surrounding the intellectual tools available to lawyers and litigants in the 
advancement of their agendas. It is, for instance, not of small significance that Edward Coke is 
here shown to have deployed the vocabulary of classical humanism in 1597, when he is 
primarily known in the scholarship as a jealous defender of the common law and the greatest 
exponent of ancient constitutionalism in the following decade.398 This distinction, while 
important, is often misunderstood in the scholarship. Classical humanism and ancient 
constitutionalism were modes of discourse, they were ideologies with political vocabularies; 
they were a means by which people could grasp and conceptualise society.399 What is often 
elided in the scholarship, however, is that they were both strands of Humanism. There has been 
little appreciation of the fact that common lawyers were steeped in the humanist tradition and 
that they used those tools in their defence of customary antiquity. Ancient constitutionalism 
was ‘a peculiarly English brand of legal humanism’ and its proponents, even as ‘they began 
undermining it, were humanists of a very special sort’.400  
Two things follow from this. On the one hand, it is important to explicitly recognise that 
the distinction between classical humanists and ancient constitutionalists is a distinction to be 
made within Humanism. This is crucial to understanding court records and it directly relates to 
one of the central concerns of this thesis. That is, to examine the influence of humanist rhetoric 
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on English law and legal culture. The second point that follows is perhaps more significant for 
the scholarship more generally, if not for this thesis specifically, in that when we discuss 
Humanism, the appropriate contrast should not be with vocabularies such as ancient 
constitutionalism, absolutism, contractarianism, or republicanism. Rather, the distinction to be 
drawn is between Humanist and Scholastic thought.401 The fundamental question is still what 
Coke, Bateman and Langward were doing with these vocabularies, but it is crucial to remember 
that they were both humanist vocabularies. Using customary arguments did not preclude 
Bateman from using classical forms in a different discourse later. Nor did Coke’s use of 
classical tropes in this information commit him to a defence of humanism in its entirety. Legal 
instruments were highly specific interventions in contemporary intellectual debates over the 
nature of civil society; the attempt to recover their specificity will occupy us for the remainder 
of this thesis, because those details are what enable us to understand not just what happened 
when early modern men and women litigated, but what was going on.402 Coke’s argument, in 
short, that it was wrong to seize lands upon which the poor rely for their livelihood and that 
such a wrong should be punishable under law, even if the law did not prohibit it verbatim, was 
an attempt to establish a precedent in Equity on which other jurisdictions, including common 
law jurisdictions, may have drawn.403 This is to affect the substantive content of the law.  
This certainly illustrates how the Star Chamber could be used by the privy council to enact 
royal policies. But this does not mean we should relegate the jurisdiction itself, in the sixteenth 
century, to an instrument of government.404 Crucially, such an emphasis elides the contested 
nature of royal policy and, therein, the struggle within contemporary political discourse around 
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the early modern state. Coke may have attempted to enforce royal policy on provision for the 
poor through Star Chamber, and thus asserted an authoritarian notion of the State upon the 
inhabitants of Gimingham. But the key point to remember is that the inhabitants challenged 
this attempt in court. They deployed counter arguments and, through rhetorical structure, 
forensically argued that, far from being avaricious opportunists, they were attempting to 
provide for the poor on their own terms. What is more, in pursuing their line of argument the 
inhabitants of Gimingham articulated an alternative view of civil society; which, contrary to 
Coke’s innovation in attempting to force provision for the poor upon the inhabitants, was 
conservative in emphasising the liberties and rights of lawful title. It is this contestation of key 
political concepts and assumptions through litigation which illustrates the varied and vibrant 
politics of subaltern life in early modern England. 
 
III: The Development of Jurisdictions 
Jurisdictions were key to the development of English law; they were also of fundamental 
importance in considering where to litigate.405 It is, therefore, necessary at this point to examine 
the significance of equity jurisdictions, and in particular that of Star Chamber, in the 
development of English law. The genesis of criminal law was in those wrongs which were 
matters for royal justice, in pleas of the crown. In the twelfth century Glanvill distinguished 
criminal and civil pleas. Civil pleas were the old real and personal actions; criminal pleas 
concerned wrongs.406 English jurisprudence, however, and the common law in particular, 
developed extremely slowly. Throughout the sixteenth century, criminal law was still in its 
infancy. There were no direct means under common law by which the Crown could prosecute 
its wealthier subjects for failing to provide for the poorer ones.407 Pleas of the crown were 
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originally matters in which the Crown had an interest, as opposed to common pleas.408 This is 
why the Court of Common Pleas held no criminal jurisdiction, yet the Court of Kings Bench 
did. Pleas of the Crown took two forms: felonies, which were capital offences where property 
was forfeited to the Crown upon conviction, and trespasses against the King’s peace for which 
neither life nor property was forfeit, but which carried some other penalty. These trespasses, 
which were prosecuted on behalf of the Crown, were known as misdemeanours, in order to 
avoid confusion with civil actions of trespass.409 The twin pillars upon which criminal pleas of 
the crown were based were the principles of vie et armis and contra pacim regis.410 Coke could 
not prosecute Robert Bateman’s case under the common law because the Crown could not have 
a theoretical interest in it: the defendants neither broke the royal peace nor used force of arms. 
There was no plea the defendants could answer.  
Other jurisdictions were more versatile.411 What Coke needed in his 1597 litigation against 
Robert Bateman was the ability to argue that something that did not fall under the strict letter 
of the law could nevertheless be shown to fall under it. Equity pleadings, as we have seen, 
allowed Coke to demonstrate this because they were structured according to a specifically 
Ciceronian theory of rhetorical invention. Two particularly influential contemporary rhetorical 
and legal authorities even draw explicit connections between theories of forensic rhetoric and 
pleading before equity courts. The first, Thomas Elyot, who, it will be remembered, was a clerk 
in Star Chamber during the 1530s, wrote that 
 
there seem to be in the said pleadings certain parts of an oration, that is to say for Narrations, Partitions, 
Confirmations and Confutations, named of some Reprehensions, they have Declarations, Barres, Replications 
and Rejoinders, only they lack pleasant form of beginning, called in latin Exordium, nor it make there of no 
great mater they that haue studied rhetoric shall perceive what I mean. Also in arguing their cases, in my 
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opinion, they very little do lack of the whole art; for therein they do diligently observe the rules of 
Confirmation and Confutation, wherein rests proof and disproof, having almost all the places whereof they 
shall fetch their reasons, called of Orators loci communes, which I omit to name, fearing to be too long in this 
matter.412  
The second authority, Thomas Wilson, Master of the court of Requests, argued in his Arte of 
Rhetorique that litigants should 
 
first express our minde in plaine words, and not seek these ropey terms, which betray rather a fool, then 
command a wise man: and again if we orderly observe circumstances and tell one thing after an other … 
neither should we suffer our tongue to, run before our wit, but with much awareness, set forth our matter, and 
speak our mind ever more with judgement. We shall make our sayings appear likely, if we speak directly as 
the cause require, if we show the purpose of all the devise, and frame our intention according as we shall think 
them most willing to allow it, that have the hearing of it.413 
Eloquence, according to the humanist rhetorical tradition, depended above all else on a clear 
and logical structure of argument, rather than on the ornamentation of that argument. The 
ability to argue a point of view, rather than to plead to the facts, is where equity derives its 
immense significance; for it was in the equity jurisdiction of the Elizabethan Star Chamber, for 
instance, that the ‘vague and under-developed statutory offences of trespass and fraud were 
extended into wide-ranging and substantive crimes’.414 Furthermore, whilst ‘conventional 
wisdom tells us that most of Star Chamber’s innovation was absorbed into common law after 
its abolition. In fact, it happened in parallel because the judges and councillors who sat in Star 
Chamber were, more often than not, practicing common law judges and attorneys. What was 
done in one place was extended to another. Star Chamber was just the best place for 
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innovation’.415 This thesis has been centrally concerned with what made Star Chamber the best 
place for innovation. That is, the classical premises of equity itself; based as it is on contextual 
arguments from both sides of a case through the formally rhetorical structure of its pleadings 
and instruments.  
The influence of Roman law upon the common law is primarily discussed in terms of the 
substantive content of the law.416 That is, in terms of rules or maxims borrowed from the law. 
The scholarship has little to say on the procedures of equity and how they may have 
existentially influenced the substantive content of english law. The argument made throughout 
this thesis is that by borrowing procedure from Roman jurisprudence lawyers necessarily 
altered the common law because the common law and Roman law are predicated on completely 
different bases. That is, in simplest terms, the common law procedure was predicated on a 
formal logic of pleading, with its own artificial logic and reason which necessarily ignored 
context; while, in Roman law, reason was universal and thus necessarily took the contextual 
detail of each case into account. 
This is nowhere more evident than in the development of Star Chamber’s criminal 
jurisdiction. Star Chamber has received some attention in the scholarship in terms of its 
development from the fifteenth century as the King’s Council developing a judicial capacity 
out of its executive capacity, and in the development of the court itself in the early sixteenth-
century.417 Some work has also been conducted on Star Chamber from the closing years of the 
sixteenth century up to its abolition in 1641, in the crisis of the Stuart monarchy and English 
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Revolution.418 Remarkably little work has been done on the Elizabethan Star Chamber.419 Our 
understanding of the court under Elizabeth is generally based on extrapolating the differences 
between Star Chamber in the early sixteenth century and what it was to become under the 
Stuarts. The only work to attempt a large scale quantitive analysis of Star Chamber litigation 
in the later sixteenth century is to be found in an unpublished thesis by Elfreda Skelton.420 
Written nearly a century ago, it also needs to be contextualised and be understood in the 
historiographical context out of which it arose.421 That is to say, while it is an invaluable source 
of empirical data due to the amount of archival work undertaken, it essentially buys into Lewis 
Namier’s thesis that political ideas bear no causal relation to political actions.422 This, coupled 
with an extremely narrow definition of politics, led to conclusion that ‘the court was not being 
used, as in later times, as a tyrannical means of extorting money, and confounding subjects that 
dared question the royal will, but that the court of Star Chamber was in fact the very obvious 
but still just instrument of paternal despotism.’423 This hypothesis, which echoes throughout 
some of the more recent social history that has made use of Star Chamber litigation, obscures 
the development of the court and the effects that development precipitated in English law 
because it does not consider how litigants went about preferring a case in star chamber, or why 
they may have chosen to do so.424  
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The development of Star Chamber’s criminal jurisdiction, out of what was ostensibly a 
civil one, is one of the fundamental moves that is made by the Elizabethan legal profession. It 
is in examining the means by which this development was achieved that we can come to 
understand the influence of rhetoric on English law more widely, for the way in which the law 
was practiced had a substantive impact on the law itself. The equity jurisdiction and ex parte 
nature of English Bill procedure in Star Chamber meant that the focus of pleading shifted from 
a dialectical exercise into a rhetorical one.425 It is this shift from dialectic to rhetoric, from 
apodeictic proof to reasoned persuasion, which facilitated the explosive development of 
English criminal law in the Elizabethan Star Chamber. 
This movement from apodeictic proof to reasoned persuasion had far reaching 
consequences. The question behind litigation ceased to be ‘has person X committed the crime 
of Y; if yes the punishment is Z.’ Instead, the question shifted to one of legitimacy: ‘is X a 
legitimate response to Y?’. This was the nature of Equity in that it provided redress for litigants 
who could not find justice at common law. Once the question turned to what was legitimate, 
however, the whole enterprise of litigation shifted and the point became not whether something 
was legal or illegal, but rather could something be legitimately described as legal. This is, for 
instance, what we see the litigation we have just examined between Edward Coke and Robert 
Bateman. This is the absolutely fundamental move made in the Elizabethan Star Chamber and 
in English jurisprudence more generally at the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the 
seventeenth centuries. Furthermore, this is how Star Chamber’s jurisdiction widened from the 
narrow statutory basis for crimes such as forgery and fraud to what was seen as an almost 
limitless and arbitrary reach by the time of its abolition in 1641. The coalescence of Roman 
forms of judicial argument designed to persuade a judge to accept the legitimacy of a particular 
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interpretation, rather than ‘proving’ an issue to be true or false as in common law, with the 
common law reverence for precedent and custom as a legitimate form of proof, facilitated the 
rapid expansion of criminal law. As successive rulings built upon one another, central 
jurisdictions expanded with every judgement; they rarely, if ever, contracted.426 
One can grasp the scale of how English law developed in Star Chamber by examining 
changes in the type of litigation brought before the court. John Guy has argued that 821 cases 
can be accurately dated as having been brought to Star Chamber during Wolsey’s 
chancellorship (1515-1529).427 Of these 821, however, it was only possible to discern the 
subject of 473.428 Similarly, Elfreda Skelton, in her thesis on the Elizabethan Star Chamber, 
found and identified the subject of seventy-three cases preferred in Star Chamber in the first 
year of Elizabeth’s reign, while identifying and dating a further 713 to the forty-forth year of 
the reign.429 Broadly speaking, the subject of the cases Guy and Skelton excavated can be 
placed into four categories: (1) cases pertaining to title, (2) cases pertaining to offences which 
include the use of physical force, (3) cases which concern some form of fraudulent behaviour 
and finally, (4) cases concerning corruption of officers of the Crown.430 The table below 










Title 194 7 9 
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Force 98 40 313 
Fraud 109 21 313 
Corruption 72 5 78 
Total 473431 73432 713433 
 
These figures have been used to illustrate a number of legal developments in the sixteenth 
century.434 In the first instance they illustrate the movement of Star Chamber from a civil and 
a criminal jurisdiction to a primarily criminal one. This has been the focus of work conducted 
by Thomas Barnes and John Guy.435 The movement from a civil to a criminal jurisdiction can 
be seen in the decline over the course of the sixteenth century in the number of cases preferred 
in Star Chamber concerning title, and a corresponding rise in litigation involving an allegation 
of force.436 That is, a decrease in litigation wherein the question to be adjudicated was the 
lawful possession of  property, and an increase in litigation where the question concerned the 
legality of an action which may constitute a breach of the peace. In the early sixteenth century, 
when the Star Chamber held a mixed jurisdiction, cases concerning title made up 41%. By the 
beginning of Elizabeth’s reign twenty-nine years later, however, they made up only 9% and, 
by the end of her reign, forty-three years later they made up only 1% of all cases heard before 
Star Chamber that year.  
The second, and perhaps more significant, point these figures have been used illustrate is 
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the growth in the volume of litigation throughout the sixteenth century.437 This has been well 
documented in the historiography and there have been studies on the growth of the legal 
professions,438 on the Inns of Court,439 on the growth of business in particular courts,440 and on 
the gender of litigants.441 In their preoccupation with the increase in the volume of litigation 
and its effects on the legal profession, particular courts, and the gender balance of litigants, 
however, these studies have often paid less attention to the effects this increase in volume may 
have had on the substantive content of English law. While it has not gone unremarked in the 
scholarship that these figures illustrate a dramatic increase in a specific types of offences 
prosecuted before Star Chamber. The significance of this increase has been consistently 
downplayed. It is, for instance, often noted that the allegations of riot in Star Chamber were 
more of less fictitious. John Guy devotes an entire chapter to explicating the ‘real’ issues 
litigated before Star Chamber and concludes that ‘two thirds of the suits … which complained 
of riotous and violent demeanour were in reality about unquiet titles’.442 Thomas Barnes 
similarly concluded that the majority of Star Chamber litigation was merely ‘civil ends in 
criminal rament’.443 This dismissive sentiment echoes through some of the more recent studies 
to have made use of Star Chamber records.444 Too often this is the extent of the attention given 
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to the type of offences prosecuted before Star Chamber. Having recognised that most people 
were interested in litigating over property historians have been content to assume that is the 
extent of what may have been going on in litigation. That story, however, surely does not take 
us very far. If most people were interested in litigating over title to property, an existentially 
civil claim, but were able to do this through an ostensibly criminal jurisdiction, the area of 
interest to the historian is surely the circumstances in which this was made possible. This has, 
however, received little attention in the scholarship. It is to a specific analysis of these 
circumstances, and what they illustrate, to which we now turn. 
 
IV: Riot, Rebellion, and the Ordinary Litigant - Anguishe v Nicholas 
Ordinary people across England also attempted to influence the law through the arguments 
they pleaded before the courts. Granted, in the following case, Emme Anguishe did not attempt 
to reform the poor laws of England when she brought a suit against several inhabitants of 
Walsingham in 1592, but the means by which she attempted to achieve her desired outcome 
were strikingly similar to those employed by Coke in his litigation against Bateman. Herein 
lies the extraordinary value of the Star Chamber, for arguments of this sort were commonplace. 
In 1592 Anguishe alleged several of her neighbours had broken into a field on the edge of a 
wood belonging to her and ransacked all the wood, minerals, and livestock therein.445 In their 
answer the defendants replied that the land in question did not belong to Anguishe and that 
they possessed certain rights to the wood and minerals on it. They also argued ‘the said 
complaint exhibited is, for the most part, very uncertain untrue and insufficient in the law’.446 
It is tempting to take this as a simple denial, a matter of course in any court case; indeed, it is 
commonplace in almost all of the answers examined while conducting research for this 
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thesis.447 But this would be to miss that they were actually correct insofar as the common law 
had little to say on the matter. Minor disputes over use-rights and land were generally matters 
that would be decided in local jurisdictions: Manorial Courts and Courts Baron.448 What made 
the case attractive to Star Chamber was that Anguishe argued the accused had ‘in most riotous 
and outrageous manner, and armed and arrayed with bowes, pikes, knives, long poles, piked 
staves, pitchforks and divers other such like weapons … in most riotous manner, drove out of 
the said wood of right belonging your said subject’.449 She argued that their actions were 
committed by force of arms, vie et armis, and as Star Chamber was, by this point in the century, 
primarily a criminal jurisdiction, it took the case.450  
Star Chamber litigation is often treated with a level of suspicion in the scholarship. It has 
been argued, to the point where it is perhaps even uncritically assumed nowadays, that an 
allegation of riot was essentially par for the course in Star Chamber litigation. It was, we are 
told, device to remove a suit into ‘the domain of royal jurisdiction, and beyond the claims of 
the local courts’.451 The hegemony of this belief about Star Chamber litigation in the 
scholarship is such that historians go in search of ‘the real issue’ in a case.452 This is 
problematic on a historical as well as a historiographical level. In the first instance it commits 
the historian to assuming that the text must be saying something other than what it said. For 
instance, by arguing that Emme Anguishe’s suit was not really about riot because what she 
was really complaining about had to do with land. The historian is then forced to go in search 
of the motivation for the litigation rather than to examine the litigation itself. This, then, 
removes the law from the historical enquiry. What the historian then ends up analysing is not 
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what the text may say, but what it does not say. This is, as we saw in Chapter One, a circular 
argument with problematic results.453 
The accusation of riot was one of several legal vehicles by which criminal law developed. 
It has, however, been weakly conceptualised in the scholarship. Its use, whether founded or 
not, gave Star Chamber an interest in cases that it would otherwise have passed over. This, 
coupled with its equitable basis, gave Star Chamber unprecedented legal manoeuvrability.  By 
the first decade of Elizabeth’s reign Star Chamber had given up its civil jurisdiction and refused 
most applications for it to hear matters relating to title.454 However, it could, hear cases of an 
ostensibly civil nature - that is, in Anguishe’s case, a dispute that centres around title to and 
rights in land - if there was a criminal element to the claim.  
Whilst it is certainly interesting and important to note the fictitious nature of allegations of 
riot in sixteenth-century Star Chamber litigation, it is misleading to suggest we should treat 
such litigation as essentially ‘civil ends in criminal raiment’.455 To do so is to elide the nature 
of the litigation. That is to say, we need to remember that legally the issue at hand was the - 
the contitutio or quaestio - around which the allegation turned. In other words, legally, the 
scope of the enquiry centred around the allegation of riot; we should, then, pay more attention 
to the development of the legal principles around allegations of riot and spend less time trying 
to read between the lines of a case to “get at” the issues in which we think litigants were really 
interested. If our goal is to understand the role of the law in early modern society and to grasp 
how it developed, we need to approach it on its own terms. That is to say we need to approach 
it with its own artificial logic in mind and treat allegations of riot as logically factual, even if 
we know them to be fictitious. This may seem counter-intuitive but it is extremely important 
to grasp we wish to excavate the development of English law. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: POLITICS 
 
This chapter will challenge the prevailing orthodoxies in social and legal history which, 
respectively, treat court records as epiphenomenal with respect to the study of political theory 
and law. Through an examination of the pleadings before the prerogative courts of Duchy 
Chamber and Star Chamber, we have seen how litigants and attorneys constructed narratives 
in order to manipulate the law and engage in legal feuds. In what follows, we will see how 
third-party participants attempted to influence proceedings. We will examine the testimony of 
witnesses deposed to give evidence in cases before these courts, and we will see that they were 
affected by the conflicts raging around them. They constructed their own narratives. Through 
their testimony they intervened in litigation in order to advance their own interests, or the 
interests of their friends, or even the communal interests of the locality as they saw them. In 
examining the views of witnesses alongside those of litigants and attorneys we become 
sensitive to the the nature of civil society. That is, not just the social context that might shape 
the preoccupations of those party to a particular piece of litigation. But also the strategies and 
wagers involved in engaging with the epistemic discourses which surround political action; 
what Sophie Smith has recently described as ‘the politics of political theory’.456 Politics 
consists in civil society. But civil society is more than just a lived experience. It is an 
intellectual experience as well. This chapter will reconcile the social and the intellectual facets 
of politics. In doing so it will demonstrate that politics is more than the sum of power relations. 
 
Power and Politics 
The life of Peter Read, who sub-leased the manor of Gimingham through Edward Fisher from 
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1549 until his death in 1568, is a colourful one, wrought with fraud, theft, bribery, and 
extortion.457 In 1566-7 he was a plaintiff before the Star Chamber where he prosecuted his 
tenants for forgery. He was at the same time a defendant in Common Pleas, where his tenants 
were prosecuting him for theft and extortion. At the time of his death in 1568, he was involved 
in no fewer than three separate legal cases in three different courts.458 While he held the lease 
of the manor of Gimingham he was, for all intents and purposes, lord of the manor and he 
exercised seigneurial power over its inhabitants.459 He was intimately involved in every aspect 
of life on the manor, everyone who lived there would have known him, and most would have 
interacted with him through the annual collection of rents. His position as lessee also required 
inhabitants to seek his permission before various activities such as enclosing land, hunting 
game, or collecting resources from around the manor. When we think of Gimingham and its 
inhabitants in the 1560s we should think of a relatively small community of inhabitants, 
clustered around a larger landholder - the lessee - who possessed certain legal powers over 
them. Peter Read’s attempts to exercise those powers over the manor often brought him into 
conflict with its other inhabitants, and these conflicts form the immediate contexts for the 
litigation examined here. The instruments of litigation - pleadings, interrogatories and 
depositions - are more than textual records of litigation. They had specific juridical 
functions.460 In this chapter we will use them to excavate more of the political context of 
litigation which took place in late-Elizabethan Gimingham.  
By the mid-sixteenth century one of the primary ways through which people exercised and, 
consequently, experienced political power was through litigation. Developments in early 
modern society opened up the central courts and put them within reach of people for whom 
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they had previously seemed a distant and unreachable form of justice.461 Spurred on by the 
lucrative revenue generated through fees and perquisites, the courts and the legal professions 
actively sought and encouraged people to litigate in their jurisdictions rather than traditional 
manorial courts. For the first time, large numbers of people below the status of gentry were 
able to seek redress at common law and in the prerogative courts, rather than being restricted 
to local courts.462 This offered them access to more impartial justice, central courts were staffed 
by professional lawyers and judges in Westminster and were unlikely to be intimately familiar 
with the particulars of individual cases prior to a suit being brought. Manorial courts, by 
contrast, were made up of individuals from the locality out of which the suit arose and were 
much more likely to be partisan.463 Putting the central courts within reach of ordinary people 
had a number of effects, many of which have been discussed at length in the scholarship, but 
the most significant for the present argument was that it triggered a precipitous rise in business 
for the central courts.464 The cumulative effect of these developments was a diffusion of agency 
through the social hierarchy, by giving the lower orders access to national jurisdictions in 
which they could assert themselves. Peter Read’s attempts to exercise political power in 
Gimingham and the subsequent reactions of inhabitants are set against the backdrop of these 
broader developments in early modern society. Over the course of the sixteenth century, then, 
power was increasingly mediated through an active engagement with the law. 
The relationships between lords and their tenants were primarily relationships of power. 
They were marked, in various ways, by domination and dependence in respect of property 
rights. They were, however, in a perpetual state of existential flux, because they were 
constantly being redefined. This, in turn, is why power relations have been described as 
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inherently political in the scholarship, for ‘politics occurs with any attempt to extend, reassert 
or challenge the distribution of power’.465 In the Anglo-Saxon period these relationships were 
known institutionally as a Soke, which, put simply, was the congregation of smaller landowners 
around a larger landowner who provided protection in exchange for services. They were the 
product of practical necessity more than anything else. After the Conquest, and throughout the 
medieval period with the development of the manorial system, they evolved into species of a 
legal and administrative genus, which gave rise to different types of tenure.466 Throughout the 
thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and well into the sixteenth century, property 
rights so predominated English society that they could dictate almost anything from ownership 
of land and enfranchisement, to the regulation of the daily tasks required to subsist, or even 
freedom of movement in instances of villeinage.467 They were, in short, the bonds which held 
society together: they were the foundation upon which trade and market relations rested; they 
also formed the bedrock of civil society by being the determining factor of the franchise.468 To 
understand the nuances of these relationships is to get at the heart of what was at stake when 
they broke down.469  
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The texts in which the conflicts between Peter Read and his tenants are described depict 
the breakdown of these relationships. Such relationships between lords and tenants in 
sixteenth-century England were dynamic, but they were also porous. They had limits. The 
discrepancy between Read’s assertion of seigneurial power and the ways in which his tenants 
responded help us to identify those limits. It indicates a break between the way lordship was 
perceived and the way in which it was being experienced. This is not necessarily surprising; in 
a century on the cusp of modernity there were many competing visions of the social order, of 
politics.470 What is surprising, however, is historians’ relative lack of exploration of this terrain 
in recent years. These texts allow us to recover how people organised their experience and 
talked about it to each other; how they understood the complex web of relations they were 
locked into with their social betters, inferiors, and neighbours. To trace this web is to draw the 
map of politics and society in Gimingham in the 1560s.  
 
Legitimate Power 
In 1565 Peter Read initiated a suit in Star Chamber against several of his tenants. In his bill of 
complaint Read claimed that one of the inhabitants of the manor had forged a writ in order to 
remove a suit from the manorial court at Gimingham to Common Pleas at Westminster.471 The 
crux of the matter was that Read was less likely to receive a favourable verdict in Common 
Pleas, a court over which he held no sway, than he was in the manorial court over which he 
could exercise considerable influence. The litigation before Star Chamber is, therefore, multi-
faceted in that it performed two distinct functions. On the one hand, it attempted to influence 
the case in Common Pleas: if a verdict was rendered in Star Chamber before the case at 
Common Law reached its conclusion, the outcome of the Star Chamber case could be 
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submitted as evidence in support of Read’s action at Common Law.472 Cross-litigating in 
multiple courts in an attempt to influence the outcome of other cases was a common tactic in 
sixteenth-century litigation, especially for those with greater resources than their opponents.473 
On the other hand, however, it was in and of itself a targeted assault upon the tenants, and it 
typifies a number of ways in which power in Gimingham was contested.  
A close reading of the bill of complaint before Star Chamber highlights the stratagems 
deployed in this power struggle. Before he mentioned anything about forgery, Read recounted 
the original conflict with his tenants: that ‘about whitsunday last past [Read’s servants] 
distrained certain cattle of one Robert Howse’ for damage the tenant had allegedly caused to 
part of the demense.474 Howse had allegedly responded to the seizure of his cattle by making 
reply in the manorial court and Read ‘was compelled to answer, and thereunto pleaded […] 
that he lawfully may’ distrain Howse’s cattle.475 According to Read, the matter then ‘proceeded 
orderly until it was ready to receive a verdict at trial’.476 Only after setting the scene does he 
come to the central allegation of this particular case: that ‘Thomas Grame and Humphrey 
Britton being common attorneys in the said county […] believing that the matter was like to 
pass against them […] knowing that a writ of amicus certiorari would both stay the said trial 
in the said court of Gimingham and remove the suit out of the same […] contrived, forged, and 
secretly made a counterfeit warrant in the name of the sheriff of your majesties country of 
Norfolk’.477 In forging this writ and removing the case to Common Pleas, Read argued that 
Britton was maliciously attempting to subvert the customs of the manor by scheming to prevent 
Robert Howse from being compelled to pay for the damage he had caused; and that he was, in 
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real terms, depriving Read of income he was lawfully entitled to and which he had the authority 
to collect.478 
There are two distinct interventions here that highlight the extent to which political thought 
and political action permeated early modern society. The initial conflict between Read and his 
tenant generated the original suit in the manorial court and the subsequent action before 
Common Pleas. That was a conflict over the exercise of power in Gimingham specifically. It 
was an attempt to maintain social order. The case before Star Chamber, however, was premised 
not on the maintenance of social order, but the destabilisation of it. The initial case, which 
ended up before Common Pleas, if read alone, conceals the level of agency ordinary people in 
Gimingham possessed. Read’s complaint to Star Chamber, however, makes clear that he did 
not perceive the conflict in terms of a disagreement over the extent of his seigneurial powers 
in Gimingham.  
He presented it as a much more serious challenge to the basis of his authority to seize his 
tenant’s property in the first place. Read escalated the conflict by elevating the struggle out of 
the specific circumstances of the initial disagreement, and out of common law jurisdiction, into 
the realm of political theory. The matter Read wanted adjudicated before the prerogative court 
was not whether he could exercise seigneurial power in this way.479 He had in fact already 
exercised it. It was instead concerned with whether or not he should be able to; whether he had 
the authority to do it. That is to say, the question to be adjudicated before Star Chamber was 
the extent to which Read’s actions were legitimate. Read may have hoped that the judges in 
Star Chamber, sensitive to attempts to disturb the the social order, would find in his favour and 
strengthen his administrative grip on the manor. A favourable verdict would trickle down and 
be admissible as evidence in the action before Common Pleas. But, his tenants could also 
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manipulate this discourse and cast Read as the disturbing force upsetting the social order. Both 
cases were part of the same political struggle, but they each made distinct interventions in that 
struggle. The action in Common Pleas is indicative of a seigneurial disagreement in 
Gimingham; the case before Star Chamber demonstrates, however, that politics was more than 
just a lived experience, it was also premised on an intellectual experience. 
Perhaps one of the best examples of this is a metaphor that can be found in almost every 
instrument of litigation, and which echoes throughout renaissance political discourse. That is, 
the visualisation of a commonwealth or civil society as ‘a politique body,’ with the sovereign 
functioning as the head and the people as the body.480 This was a common feature of legal texts 
and political treatises and is, for instance, the theoretical basis that underpins Read’s claim. 
Before delving too deeply into the language of the complaint in greater detail it is worth 
unpacking this recurrent trope and how it has traditionally been handled in the scholarship. One 
of its enduring strengths is that it could be used as a prism through which one could refract 
society into its constituent parts. As in John Norden’s early-seventeenth century survey of 
English manors, which he referred to as ‘little commonwealths.’481 Or even more precisely in 
Thomas Smith’s mid-sixteenth century account of English society, wherein he dissolved it into 
what he saw as its smallest parts - the family -  to show in what it consisted, in order to then to 
give a causal account of how it came about and to what ends it was ordained.482 The crux of 
the matter, the controversy surrounding Read’s litigation, for instance, is that the body politic 
was said to be in good health if and only if power was exercised in the interests of the 
commonwealth. If power was exercised against the interests of the people the whole 
constitution of the body politic was thrown out of balance and disorder would ensue.483 
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Essentially, this metaphor was invoked when there was disagreement over the means by which 
authority was exercised and the ends for which it was meant to be exercised. Given this 
ubiquity in contemporary legal and political texts, it is safe to say that the practical and the 
epistemic premises of power were in continual contestation in our period.  
 
Patriarchal Authority 
Authority in early modern England is often taken to be patriarchal. In the scholarship, broadly 
speaking, patriarchal authority has generally been examined in the context of the family and 
defined along the lines of ‘a cluster of related and unrelated dependents living under the 
authority of a household head who was usually, although not always, an adult male.’484 England 
was ‘a patriarchal society in that authority was vested in adult males generally and male 
household heads specifically.’485 This is certainly true but, due to the lack of attention historians 
have paid to the nature of authority in early modern England more generally, this has been the 
primary focus for most of the recent work on the concept itself. That story, however, does not 
get us very far. Social historians have thus far failed to give a convincing account of the process 
by which early modern lawyers and politicians were able to dissolve the civitas into its 
constituent parts and locate it throughout society, thereby devolving a measure of power to 
each constituent part and situating operational authority in its head. There is, in other words, 
something missing from the current scholarship on the social history of politics. 
Patriarchal authority is the term given to power exercised by one person over a multitude 
of dependents by virtue of their position in a social hierarchy. The family is, naturally, the 
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smallest unit of analysis in this equation. It is not, however, the sum itself. In order to solve it 
we must find the value of units greater than that of the family. We need, that is, to look upward 
through, not across and over, society from the vantage point of the family. We should therefore 
extend our analysis beyond simply familial relations to include manorial tenants.486 The 
inhabitants of Gimingham were a cluster of people who were dependent upon Read, not in 
respect of personal freedom - as in a wife or child being subject to her husband or father - but 
in respect of property rights: Read held the manorial lease from which the tenants ultimately 
derived their copyholds, leaseholds and attendant rights. The patriarchal figure in the family 
literally possessed their dependants: women became the property of their husband upon 
marriage; the notion that a person was subject to the authority of another because they were a 
copyholder or a tenant at will was equally important in common law. Moreover, Read 
ultimately held his lease from the Queen and, therefore, derived his authority from the 
Crown.487 The manor was, like the family, a constituent part of the civitas.  
The salient point that is brought out in the forensic arguments of litigation is that ordinary 
people were active participants in this dynamic. They understood, on their own terms, what it 
meant to be subject to authority; how power was meant to be exercised in order to keep the 
body politic in good health. Authority is distinct from power in that we do not speak of 
authority in the absence of power. If a person simply lacks the power to do something we do 
not speak of them not having authority. Conceptually, then, in a positive sense authority is the 
right to exercise power in a given context with impunity because it has been sanctioned by the 
agent or agency from which the power is derived. If we put this point the other way around we 
bring out its significance for the present argument: the experience of authority is the experience 
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of being obliged to behave in a certain way. It is the experience of political obligation. The 
relationships between lords and tenants were, just as much as familial relations, lived 
experiences and intellectual affairs of domination and dependence with respect to property 
rights; they were the essence of civil society and of politics. They were, in other words, the 
local expression of civil society.488 In order for the commonwealth to be maintained so too did 
the little commonwealths, e pluribus unum. 
Read’s complaint offers us a rich insight into his perception of one such relationship. It 
presents a particular view of life in Gimingham, of the nature of politics and obligation, and of 
how legitimate power should consequently be exercised. As lessee, Read held a degree of 
authority over the manor and had access to significantly more resources than most people in 
Gimingham. By sending his servants to distrain his tenant’s cattle, Read asserted his authority 
over a subordinate tenant. From this we can infer how he perceived his position and seigneurial 
powers; from his assertion and justification of it, first in the manorial court, then in Common 
Pleas, and then again in this Star Chamber complaint, we can infer that his perception was to 
some extent normative. Indeed, Read claimed that the majority of the manor would agree with 
him. The defendants in the original suit were the exception; and when they came to realise ‘that 
the matter was like to pass against them’ in the manorial court, ‘contrived, forged, and secretly 
made a counterfeit warrant’ to remove the suit to Westminster.489 Humphrey Britton, the 
defendant in the Star Chamber litigation, however, evidently did not agree with Read. Britton 
does not seem to have been directly involved in the original conflict between Read and his 
tenant, but his answer offers a radically divergent account of the events described by Read, and 
thereby throws into sharp relief how authority was contested in Gimingham in the 1560s.  
Relationships based on domination and dependence were existentially competitive.490 
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Britton’s vitriolic repudiation of Read’s complaint underlines the fervour with which people 
jockeyed for position and sought to gain the upper hand. Britton, it will be remembered from 
Chapter Four, completely rejected Read’s narrative of events and began his answer by 
forcefully stating that the complaint and ‘the matter therein contained are the forged imagines 
of a certain private matter and troublesome disposition of the said complainant for that the said 
defendant hath issue by good warrant served divers persons upon the said complainant’.491 His 
answer offered a radically different account of the original dispute between Read and Howse, 
the events immediately preceding Read’s allegation of forgery; it also offered a polemical 
account of how seigneurial authority was being exercised in Gimingham in the 1560s. The 
persuasive force of Britton’s answer lay in that he did not completely jettison the idea of 
patriarchal authority Read had sought to exude, he qualified it.492 Where Read appealed to the 
judges in Star Chamber to confirm that he should have the power to distrain his tenants’ 
property because this allowed him to maintain the social order. Britton, by contrast, argued that 
‘he hath offended no court of law but rather that he did necessarily’ answer and refute ‘the evil 
practice of this complainant’. The courts, not lords, maintained the social order.493  
This distinction emptied Read’s argument of its content and reversed its meaning. Whereas 
Read’s complaint emphasised obedience as the essential criteria for the maintenance of the 
commonwealth, Britton emphasised the lawful exercise of power as the essential criteria. 
Read’s exercise of seigneurial power was the destabilising force on the manor. He claimed that 
Read ‘and certain of his servants […] pursued certain causes such as to the great disquiet of 
divers quiet persons dwelling near him’.494 An educated common law attorney, he went on to 
give an example of the sorts of actions Read perpetrated in order to stir up these ‘divers quiet 
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persons dwelling near him’. He alleged, for instance, that Read ignored the ‘advantages of 
exception’ with regard to enclosure for his own benefit. Essentially, he claimed that Read had 
enclosed land that should have been protected from enclosure.495 The litigation against himself 
in Star Chamber, Britton argued, was another example of the corruption and abuses perpetrated 
by Read; it was part of a concerted campaign of oppression against the tenants of Gimingham, 
designed to confirm their subordination and silence their lawful objections. Britton attempted 
to remove the case to Common Pleas in order to check these seigneurial abuses and restore the 
social order in Gimingham. He had been successful not through the forgery of a writ, but rather 
through the legal naivety of Read and his client ‘John Browen, understeward of the said court 
manorial,’ who ‘in the said bill of complaint entered an issue thereof very erroneously and 
unskillfully and by the special practice of the said complainant as this defendant suppose who 
doth so rule the said under steward in his said office that he will for his pleasure deal very 
indirectly without any regard for the justice thereof’.496  
This is the story which, when juxtaposed with the narrative in Read’s complaint, gives us 
the traditional picture of social relations in rural communities in the later-sixteenth century: 
endemic conflict between landlord and tenant over seigneurial power and property rights, in 
which, more often than not, landlords attempted to extract capital from tenants who resisted 
what they viewed as encroachments on their rights and liberties.497 Seigneurial authority in 
Gimingham, was literally and epistemically synthesised through the collision of competing 
judicial narratives. Britton’s answer, just as much as Read’s complaint, gives us insight into 
the nature of how individuals perceived, experienced, and tried to exercise power in 
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Gimingham. Both texts, and both narratives, offer competing views of not just what life was 
like but of how life in Gimingham ought to be. Whilst this means we should not take them at 
face value, they remain one of the most fruitful sources available to historians precisely because 
they are so polemical in their descriptions.498 These texts, and this case in particular, show us 
how interconnected and interdependent different perceptions of authority were with the 
exercise of power in a given circumstance. The latter is evident, in this case, through Read’s 
seizure of his tenant’s cattle and their subsequent reply in the manorial court; the former is 
evident through the rhetorical confirmations both Britton and Read offer in support of their 
narratives.  
Read’s accusation of forgery required him to substantiate his claims. As we saw in Chapter 
Four, he provided non-artificial proofs by giving a detailed timeline of events, moving point 
by point from how it was ‘impossible to have a writ so quickly from London,’ and ‘the said 
Britton’ was so indisposed ‘to abuse your majesties laws’ that he ‘secretly contrived and forged 
a warrant’ which should ‘remove the matter from your majesties court of Gimingham unto 
your highness court of Common Pleas […] therefore by the issue of the said forged warrant, it 
was commanded to the said bailiffs that the same should be executed with effect’.499 Britton, 
in his answer, claimed that other matters had been dealt with so unjustly in the manorial court 
that ‘the fear and dread of such like bid me […] to expedite out of the Queen’s majesties court 
of Chancery a writ of amicus ad certiorari for removing of the said suit out of the said court 
wherein there was always like to follow very disordered proceeding […] as by the instances of 
these and other misdealing most many’.500 Furthermore, Britton claimed that there could be no 
act of forgery ex hypothesi because he and Thomas Grame ‘by composition and agreement 
with the said undersheriff [were] licensed’ to make such warrants that ‘were to be executed 
 
498 Stretton, 'Social Historians and the Records of Litigation', pp. 15-34. 
499 TNA, STAC7/5/4, complaint of Peter Read 




within a certain limit of the Duchy within which the said Court of Gimingham was holden and 
for that purpose [the Sheriff] did always leave divers and sundry blanks sealed with his seal of 
office to the intent that by force of such writ were to be executed’.501 These two narratives 
demonstrate the litigious inflection of sixteenth-century society and the judicial strategies by 
which people sought to manage their lives and engage with the world around them; with regard 
to what one literally could or could not do, the devil was, theoretically, buried in the detail.502  
 
Intellectual Contexts 
These texts also demonstrate an intellectual struggle over the nature of civil society broadly 
conceived. Such contestation need not imply an analytical engagement in politics along the 
lines of More’s Utopia (1516),503 Machiavelli’s The Prince (1532),504 or Calvin’s Institutes 
(1536).505 Neither Peter Read nor Humphrey Britton were likely to have been particularly 
familiar with the political literature of the period. Their understanding of civil society was 
grounded in their experience of society, in the everyday comings and goings of life in 
Gimingham; in what they and their neighbours could do and what they could not. It was a lived 
experience in that Read and Britton fought over whether Read could distrain his tenants 
property; over the enclosure of common land; over the customs that governed everyday life in 
Gimingham. It was also an intellectual experience, however, in that they both argued over the 
reasons why Read should or could distrain property; they argued over the conditions upon 
which enclosures could or should be made; they even argued over which jurisdiction it was 
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appropriate to decide these questions in.  
Whilst investigating the middling and lower sorts of people on their own terms has become 
one of the central concerns of social history, posterity is still enormously condescending.506 
The scholarship has diversified in that, broadly speaking, we no longer accept a focus on elites 
and the apparatus of government they operated as an adequate account of politics.507 But, 
somewhat paradoxically, individual studies have narrowed their focus and become less holistic 
in vision and scope.508 Themes of analysis have displaced periodisation as the distinguishing 
feature of the scholarship. Within social history, for instance, there are studies of ‘popular’ 
politics, culture and society, which use the vast majority of their source material concerning 
the lower orders to look through society from the perspective of ordinary people.509 In the same 
school, there are also studies of politics that, using similar sources, tackle larger processes of 
social and political change by focusing on the state.510 Similarly, within intellectual history, 
there are studies of politics that focus on the expression of ideas in a given moment in order to 
recover the ideological makeup of a particular section of society.511 While other studies focus 
on political theory more abstractly in order to identify the limits of the intellectual props 
available to political actors.512 Myopic analyses, then, have been replaced by hyperopic ones.  
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These analyses have been enormously enriching on their own terms. But, we must take 
stock of the slower and often more profound changes in the ways in which people thought.513 
Attempts to locate among the lower orders some of the ideological roots of broader political 
and social developments have thusfar been unconvincing.514 A persuasive account of political 
processes that is also social should understand politics holistically; not in terms of a false 
dichotomy of ‘popular’ and ‘high’ politics; nor in terms of social history versus political or 
intellectual history.515 Whilst there is a connection between the lived and the intellectual 
experience of politics, it would be wrong to assert the priority of one over the other.516 Ideas 
might ultimately be derived from lived experiences, but they are not reflections of the societies 
out of which they arise. Nor are they necessarily determined by material contexts.517 It is not 
possible, for instance, to identify a person’s beliefs by scrutinising their class background or 
income. The ideas that made up the intellectual experience of politics in Gimingham were the 
product of a series of choices individuals made in given circumstances. They were, in short, 
both a form and product of deliberate social action. 
To correctly identify those actions is to solve the equation of politics in sixteenth-century 
Gimingham. The utterances people made when litigating before the courts performed multiple 
actions simultaneously.518 They were launched into a volatile political contest - in this case, 
the dispute between Read and his tenant, and now this defendant - and drew upon a distinct 
range of normative vocabulary in order to legitimate their behaviour. Read’s seizure of his 
tenant’s cattle, his subsequent defence of it in the manorial court, and the way in which he 
prefaced his case against Britton with the context of the seizure of cattle, suggest a view of 
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seigneurialism and lordship that embodied a more traditionally feudal understanding of 
landlord-tenant relations. One which, in part due to the rapid coeval development of proto-
capitalist market forces and innovations in the common law, struck a chord that did not chime 
with the way in which poorer inhabitants had come to understand civil society.519  
Once we put the language of Read’s complaint side by side with Britton’s answer, the 
conflict over the extent of seigneurial power in Gimingham, and over the nature of civil society 
more broadly, becomes clearer. Britton did not begin his defence by refuting the charge of 
felony forgery. Instead, he vehemently attacked Read as an unjust and corrupt seigneurial lord. 
He described Read as a tyrannical landlord, who exercised seigneurial power not for the good 
of the people, but rather in his own interests. He claimed that, due to his unscrupulous nature, 
merely dealing with him filled his tenants with ‘fear and dread.’520 Even without being 
juxtaposed with the language of Read’s complaint, this suggests that the tenants of Gimingham 
did not perceive the landlord-tenant relationship to be one in which lords were free to distrain 
their property without recourse to the common law.  
This was a multidimensional conflict, fought across the manor as well as in the minds of 
its inhabitants. When he claimed that the tenants had shown ‘contempt for the laws and customs 
of her majesties realm,’ and called upon the judges in Star Chamber to ‘grant your majesties 
gracious writ of subpeona to be directed to the said Thomas Grame and Humphrey Britton 
commanding them’ to appear before the court, Read performed two distinct but closely related 
actions. First and foremost, he characterised their behaviour as criminal; but in doing that he 
also locked front and centre a particular view of civil society in which they were subject to his 
authority. The emphasis on the tenants’ ‘contempt for the laws and customs of her majesties 
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realm,’ and ‘commanding them to appear before the court’ underscores this.521  
In describing the tenants as contemptuous, Read suggested malice and cast the tenants as 
ideologically opposed to the social order vis-a-vis seigneurialism; which, on this formulation, 
he was taken to embody. The use of rhetorical figures and tropes of speech amplified the 
argument and elevated what might appear as a relatively minor local conflict to the realm of 
political theory. They were the artificial forms of confirmation we examined in a legal context 
in previous chapters in relation to the development of English jurisprudence. When we examine 
them in this light what we see is how, in addition to having a juridical dimension, they also had 
a political one. They were the ideological hooks that tied the specificities of a case, that is the 
step by step account of who did what when, which to us might seem idiosyncratic or parochial, 
to a range of normative motivations that justified the litigants’ actions politically; which we 
can identify in the printed political literature of the period. Among the weapons available to 
the weak the pen may have been the mightiest sword after all: the figures and tropes of speech 
are what the rhetoricians claimed would stir the emotions of judges in such a way as to move 
them around to their side of a case.522 They illuminate politics as an intellectual exercise and 
experience in tandem with a lived material experience.523 
Politics is, then, the experience of a complex web of relationships. At the very least it 
encompasses the social relationships between individuals, the semantic relationships within 
and between complex concepts and ideas, and the relationships that govern the dynamics of 
thought and action in any given context.524 We should, therefore, think of it as being made up 
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of a number of distinct but connected actions. What I have tried to excavate with this case is 
how ordinary people perceived this and, through a mixture of intuition, advice, and judgement, 
navigated these relationships. This case demonstrates that Peter Read and Humphrey Britton 
were able to draw upon and intervene in a broad contemporary discourse surrounding civil 
society, with specific reference to its application in Gimingham. It identifies in ordinary people 
much more political agency than is usually acknowledged in the scholarship. It asks the 
scholarship to expand its definition of politics beyond the exercise of power, but it still locates 
politics within agency and thereby maintains its analytical precision. The rhetorical 
confirmation of a judicial narrative, which is often overlooked in the scholarship, links theory 
with practice in that it draws upon theory in order to legitimate practice. This makes legal 
pleadings political actions in and of themselves. They were specific interventions in 
contemporary discourse surrounding authority and civil society, which were intended to 
legitimate social actions within the locality of Gimingham. These texts show us how national 
political discourse inflected the lives of people from across the social spectrum, and how 
ordinary people engaged with and intervened in that discourse through the shared language of 
the law. Taken together, then, politics is the process by which civil society is literally and 
epistemically brought into being. In other words, Politics is artifice. Civil society is not God-




Throughout the early modern period, one of the most common of ways to influence politics 
was to manipulate the discourse of popular memory.525 In what follows we will examine two 
cases from Gimingham, one from 1572 and the other from 1615. The case from 1572 pertains 
 




to an enclosure dispute; the 1615 litigation concerns the boundaries of land around Gimingham 
Hall, the manor house once occupied by Peter Read. Both cases therefore had questions of land 
at their core. I will take each case in turn, beginning with the litigation in 1572 and moving 
forward chronologically to the case in 1615. In this section, however, we will be primarily 
concerned with the interrogatories administered to, and depositions given by, witnesses in these 
cases. Litigation was, in more ways than one, a communal affair.  
In 1572, four years after her husband’s death, Anne Read, then widow farmer of the manor 
of Gimingham, was engaged in an enclosure dispute on the manor. She, like her late husband, 
seems to have taken a relatively hands-on approach to lordship in the years leading up to her 
own death in 1577, nine years after the death of her husband. Between 1568 and 1577 she was 
involved in no fewer than five suits before the Duchy Chamber, where she accused tenants of 
poaching and enclosing land around the manor, or where they alleged she had deprived them 
of their tenurial rights with regard to the same. This is to say nothing of the case in Star 
Chamber she inherited and continued to pursue upon the death of her husband.526 In 1572 Read 
claimed before the Duchy Chamber that her tenants had unlawfully enclosed part of the 
foldcourse. She argued that they needed licence to enclose land around the manor; licence she 
had refused to give. The defendants, Stephen Powle, Thomas Nuttall, Nicholas Allen - all 
familiar names by now - argued that not only did they not require any licence to enclose land, 
but that the foldcourse Read claimed had been enclosed was situated on the other side of the 
manor; far from the land allegedly enclosed.527  
Within this case, then, we see another conflict between landlord and tenant over the nature 
of authority and civil society in Gimingham. Unlike the litigation examined in the previous 
section, however, this case centred around whether the tenants had the authority to enclose land 
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on the manor. It was not, on the face of it, concerned with the exercise of seigneurial power 
but, as we will see, preventing action was just as much an exercise of seigneurial power as 
compelling it by force.528 Where the case examined in the previous section was concerned with 
the positive exercise of seigneurial power by a lord, this case was in some ways the inverse: it 
was concerned with the exercise of power by tenants. Both cases were, however, substantively 
a contest over political obligation. In what follows we will examine how individuals adjacent 
to the litigants themselves influenced politics and political discourse through an active 
participation in the legal process. 
As we have seen, power relations in the late-sixteenth century were still largely determined 
by property rights. When the defendants described the geographical and topographical features 
of the manor in 1572, they did so because they were the physical markers that divided up the 
landscape. Land was held by different forms of tenure; the use-rights attached to land were 
dependent upon the type of tenure by which it was held. Witnesses were asked to recall the 
topography of Gimingham in order to establish the attendant rights attached to different parts 
of the manor. The ways in which people chose to remember these details in their depositions 
before the court, then, had the potential to affect the outcome of a case. They were, therefore, 
discrete interventions in the political contest constituted in the case, and indicative of how 
political engagement through litigation was not limited to the litigants on either side. From the 
depositions we can sketch, in greater detail, the legal and political landscape.  
The partisan nature of the depositions need not surprise us. In response to a question posed 
by Read asking whether tenants could enclose land around the manor, one old witness deposed 
that about twenty-five or twenty-six ‘years past he was Under Steward of Gimingham to Sir 
Edward Wyndham Knight, deputy to the Earl of Surry, then being High Steward of the Duchy’. 
The witness remembered how Thomas Gryme, a farmer on the manor, petitioned the Steward 
 




to be permitted to enclose part of the foldcourse for his own use. To which Wyndham replied 
‘that he would not grant any licence to the tenant to make enclosures within the liberty of 
foldcourse of Gimingham’. The witness went on to add that ‘further, as he remember, that all 
the time he was Under Steward no tenant did enclose within Gimingham’.529 Another witness, 
in response to the same interrogatory, deposed that ‘he doth know upon sight of the record and 
hath heard that it is not lawful nor stand the enclosure of any ground within the manor of 
Gimingham’.530 While yet another witness testified that ‘of his own knowledge he can say 
nothing, but at whereof court holden for the manor of Gimingham he hath heard the Steward 
of the said court upon his charge to the tenants there to inquire for any enclosures made within 
the said liberty of foldcourse, to the incidence thereof without the licence of the Queen’s 
officers or farmers’.531  
On an elementary level, what these depositions show are witnesses confirming Anne 
Read’s version of events: that enclosures required seigneurial licence. What they also 
encapsulate, however, and what is often acknowledged but little explored, is the complexity of 
social relationships on a manor. Whilst this might be a legal case primarily between two 
interested parties, it was not confidential; nor was it conducted in a void. People often had a 
significant interest in the litigation happening around them. Why did these witnesses testify as 
they did? Why did they remember these things and not others? What, broadly conceived, did 
they get out of testifying? In other words, what was really going in this case? A comprehensive 
account of the motivations behind each utterance in each deposition is beyond the scope of this 
thesis but, in order to underscore the potential richness of the image these texts can offer us in 
relation to what historians have thus-far primarily used them to illustrate, the point need only 
be made that it is possible to think with them in this way.  
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The value of thinking in this way with these texts is brought out clearly when we contrast 
the testimony of witnesses for the plaintiff with those of witnesses for the defendants. When 
asked about the validity of foldcourse rights in Gimingham, one witness for the defendants 
deposed that ’he did never know the farmer or farmers of the manor of Gimingham […] to 
pasture or feed their sheep within the liberty and boundaries of South Reppes, North Reppes 
or any other towns thereunto adjoining but only within part of the townships of Gimingham, 
Mundesley and Trunch, which in the north east part of Gimingham fold, Mundesley in the west 
part, and in the north part of Trunch in the time of Thomas Gryme and Peter Read then farmers 
there’. The deponent went on to say that both Read and Gryme kept around four or five hundred 
sheep ‘and that non of the said farmers did use at any time to pasture their sheep in the time of 
shack in any of the enclosures of any of the inhabitants within the said towns which hath been 
enclosed within his own remembrance, and this he knoweth to be true for he was born within 
the said town of Gimingham and hath dwelt all his life time there’.532 The same witness, when 
asked whether the inhabitants of Gimingham could enclose their lands, deposed that ‘the 
tenants and inhabitants dwelling and inhabiting within the townships of North Reppes, South 
Reppes, and other towns thereunto adjoining the lordship and soken of Gimingham, have at 
their will and liberty from time to time during all his remembrance, used to enclose as well 
their copyholds as freeholds lying and being within the aforesaid towns, without any let or 
denial of any of the Queen’s majesties farmers, until that Peter Read late farmer denied them 
so to do’.533  
What we see in these depositions, again on an elementary level, is how the defendants 
solicited testimony in order to refute Read’s narrative and legitimate their enclosures. On this 
account, the legitimacy of enclosures around Gimingham rested not on the grant of licence, but 
 





in the customs of the manor as they were contained in the memory of its inhabitants. When 
examined alongside the earlier depositions this testimony exposes the tension surrounding 
enclosures on the manor specifically, and concerning seigneurial authority more generally. In 
recalling the topographical features of Gimingham as they did, these witnesses refuted the 
plaintiff’s narrative and suggested that Read’s late husband had subverted the customs of the 
manor by denying them their customary right to enclose their own lands. Depositions, however, 
like the related pleadings, allow us a glimpse not of how the world was but of how people 
wanted it to be. It is, therefore, ancillary to the present investigation whether or not the tenants 
in fact needed permission to enclose their land. What is of primary concern is how the litigants 
appealed to the memories of deponents in the questions they posed, and what the witnesses 
were doing in recounting those memories in their depositions. This was not a passive exchange 
of ideas. In recalling specific details and omitting others, in choosing to confirm the plaintiff 
or the defendants’ version of events, witnesses made two distinct interventions in two closely 
connected discourses. They intervened in the political contest embodied in the litigation by 
situating it in a discourse they could relate to: a discourse of custom, memory, and 
experience.534  
 
Memory in early modern England is often seen as essentially utilitarian. It was ubiquitous 
and inescapable in the mentalities of early modern people for the simple reason that it covered 
all manner of sins; it could be called upon to legitimate almost any distribution of power.535 
This is certainly borne out by the 1572 litigation. The litigation between Anne Read and 
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Giminham’s tenants was a substantive disagreement over the distribution of power in 
Gimingham.  As with Peter Read’s Star Chamber litigation, the conflict in 1572 was not over 
freedom of action per se, but rather a conflict over property rights; the prevailing distribution 
of which did affect the freedom of action of inhabitants. Read, and the defendants, appealed to 
the memory of witnesses in an attempt to assert and challenge the distribution of power in 
Gimingham.  
This suggests a number of things about power relations in Gimingham over the course of 
the sixteenth century generally, and about seigneurialism and lordship as political institutions 
more specifically. At the beginning of the sixteenth century the privatisation of the medieval 
open field system of agriculture, which began with Statute of Merton in 1235, was in full swing. 
Whilst the roots of the social tension engendered by this gradual process of enclosure have 
their origins at least as far back as the fourteenth century, by the mid-sixteenth century tensions 
were beginning to boil over.536 Contemporary criticism of enclosure had two distinct aspects 
to it.537 On the one hand, there was a political criticism in terms of enclosing common land and 
thereby depriving communities of access to shared resources and land on which inhabitants 
could pasture their sheep and cattle. This criticism is perhaps the original criticism of enclosure 
and it is traditionally suggested that we should think of this as going hand in hand with the 
changing social relations that engendered by the gradual decline of feudalism and the 
emergence of more capitalist conceptions of property.538 On the other hand, the criticism that 
arose later in the sixteenth century was more specifically concerned with depopulating 
enclosures. This line of attack developed out of the repeated periods of dearth and the weak 
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economic climate that characterised the latter half of the century. This analytical paradigm has 
defined much of the scholarship surrounding enclosure in that the historians that have generally 
been concerned with enclosure have tended to approach them either in terms of popular 
reactions against encroachment on common land, or as popular reactions against depopulating 
enclosures.539 It has even been suggested that ‘enclosure (when all the sophistications are 
allowed for) was a plain enough case of class robbery.’540 The 1572 litigation, however, 
presents a different view of popular perception around enclosure. The inhabitants of 
Gimingham were here defending the practice by virtue of their common rights. Set against the 
backdrop of fiscal seigneurialism made manifest by a rising population, rampant inflation and 
repeated dearth over the course of the century, this conflict brings out a number of tensions in 
early modern society. 
Fiscal seigneurialism, that is the process by which lords attempted to squeeze capital and 
services out of their tenants in response to the deteriorating economic climate, is itself 
pejorative. It is indicative of the endemic tension between lords and tenants across England, 
brought on by inflation and a rising population over the course of the century. Lords faced the 
problem of having a fixed income from copyhold rents and entry fines in a century with high 
levels of inflation for protracted periods. Which, in real terms, meant a personal economic 
deficit. Consequently, in order to maintain their income in real terms they exploited every legal 
avenue open to them.541 Tenants, meanwhile, faced the more appealing prospect of paying the 
same amount of rent as was customary and perhaps even having more disposable income if 
they produced more than they needed to subsist. Tenants, then, jealously defended their 
newfound wealth and the liberties it brought, while lords sought to maintain themselves and 
their position in society. Considered against this backdrop, Anne Read’s litigation in 1572 is 
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part of that endemic struggle; as in the previous section, litigation demonstrates how seigneurial 
relationships broke down and intellectually prised apart.  
Historians generally paint the broader strokes of this struggle as the gradual decline of 
feudalism and the exponential growth of capitalism.542 The image I have in mind is more 
pointillist. Legal historians, for instance, have demonstrated that English contract law 
developed rapidly in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, through innovations in the 
common law actions of assumpsit and trespass.543 Both of these forms of action governed how 
people could seek redress before the law with regard to their property, both moveable and 
real.544 As the concept of absolute ownership of property slowly extended from those with 
freehold tenure to those who held copyhold tenures, people required legal remedies for a tenant 
to claim in virtue of their estate. The salient point is that it was theirs and not held of some 
other identifiable agent or agency.545 Legal historians have traced the development of these 
forms of action through the arguments and outcomes of specific cases, because, as we saw in 
Chapter Four, English common law is based upon precedent and developed piecemeal, one 
ruling at a time.546 Some of the best work in social history has drawn upon this scholarship and 
argued that these developments in the common law are indicative of the emergence of a 
capitalist market economy.547 The emergence of capitalist market relations in early modern 
England can, therefore, be seen in the legal culture of sixteenth-century England.548 If 
feudalism withered on the vine of capitalist market relations, what we need is a detailed account 
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of those relations.549  
It would be quite wrong to assume that any of the participants in the litigation we are 
examining were not in possession of a coherent understanding of civil society.550 The forensic 
arguments laid out in the pleadings as well as the interrogatories administered to and the 
depositions given by witnesses, illustrate a rich and occasionally idiosyncratic view of 
contemporary society and culture. Whilst on the one hand, in legal terms, civil litigation such 
as this can be seen as one of the means by which local disagreements over the nature of society 
and culture were resolved, with the “truth” or “facts” of the matter pronounced in the decrees 
and orders of the court. This underdetermines the agency of the ordinary people involved by 
eliding both the political impetus of litigation and the interventions people made through their 
participation in such litigation. The cases we have examined so far in this chapter, against the 
tenants of Gimingham by Peter Read in 1567 and by Anne Read in 1572, are flash points that 
illuminate specific moments of a larger and longer struggle between lords and tenants. It is 
clear that Peter and Anne Read, for instance, used patriarchal ideology to cast themselves in 
the paternal roles of those with authority to care for and maintain the social order amongst 
otherwise childlike and petty tenants: people who the gentry and yeomanry traditionally viewed 
as too base and low to have a more positive role in civil society; ‘the fourth sort or classe’ who 
Thomas Smith claimed ‘have no voice nor authority in our common wealth, and no account is 
made of them but only to be ruled’.551 How this section of society engaged with that 
characterisation, however, has been explored in much less detail. 
Viewing instruments of litigation as social actions, as interventions in legal and political 
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discourse, allows us to traverse this terrain. Witnesses deposed during legal cases were drawn 
from a variety of backgrounds within a local community, including the ‘fourth sort or classe’. 
Therefore, by treating depositions as interventions in a legal case that was itself part of a wider 
political intervention, we can excavate how people who were thought to be excluded from 
politics actively participated in it. When William Arnold deposed that he remembered ‘Stephen 
Powle did kill coneys within the manor of Gimingham and had licence of Peter Read being 
farmer thereof so to do paying a yearly fee for the same, [otherwise] the said Stephen did 
infringe the libertie of warren there552,’he actively engaged in the immediate legal context of 
the case vis a vis the provision of evidence in support of Anne Read’s complaint. He also made 
a intervention into the political context of the case apropos civil society; he claimed that 
seigneurial licence was required to hunt on the manor without infringing the lessee’s rights. 
We must therefore be careful not to read the expression of memory or the act of remembrance 
in early modern litigation as a nostalgic recollection of the past. The past was so readily 
accessible in the minds of ordinary people that it could be drawn upon at will. It was a catalyst 
which, when used to legitimate questionable behaviour, facilitated political participation from 
those who were otherwise excluded from political discourse. Consequently, there are multiple 
levels of meaning to unpack from the numerous illocutionary actions performed within a single 
utterance in a deposition such as this. 
The enclosure litigation of 1572 should, therefore, be broadly understood in performative 
terms. It was a competition over the distribution of power in Gimingham with specific 
reference to the right to enclose property around the manor; it was inherently political because 
property rights formed the basis of civil society. Litigants drew upon the past when making 
their arguments, and witnesses recalled the customs of the manor in support of both sides of 
the case. Recent scholarship on early modern social relations has demonstrated the legal weight 
 




of custom, and located it within popular consciousness and memory.553 It has shown that 
memory was discursive in and of itself; that it was a locus for a wide range of conflicts.554 
People remembered things differently; different people remembered different things for 
different reasons. The historian now needs to ask why people remembered things differently; 
what people were doing in choosing to recount something in a particular way. What we need, 
then, is to identify how people understood memory and attempted to influence it. The ways in 
which witnesses in 1615 remembered the history of Gimingham Hall, Peter Read’s manor 
house, provide a unique insight into this. 
In 1615, the Attorney General of the Duchy of Lancaster, Sir Edward Mosley, brought a 
suit against several inhabitants of the manor of Gimingham in the Duchy Chamber and, among 
other things, alleged that they had allowed the demense to decay while inhabiting and farming 
the land around it. The land, the Attorney claimed, belonged to the lessee of the manor and had 
done since the middle of the previous century when Peter Reade had enclosed it. By 1615, 
however, Reade was long dead and subsequent lessees John Ransom and Anthony Death (d. 
1608) had lacked Reade’s seigneurial ambition. Gimingham Hall, the grand manor house 
where Reade had dwelt, was described in a survey commissioned by the Duchy as a ‘great hall 
with houses situated to the south and west thereof,’ comprised of great hall and a little hall, as 
well as a ‘gatehouse or stewards lodging’ with a ‘courtyard, orchard, gardens and entry leading 
from the said gatehouse’.555 By 1615 it was a ruin, its roof collapsed and its orchards and 
gardens overgrown with foliage. The wider context of this case was essentially that subsequent 
lessees had allowed the demense to fall into decay because they could not afford to pay for the 
upkeep of Gimingham Hall, so enlarged by Peter Read. With the decay of the demense, the 
tenants had moved in and begun using the land around the manor. The Attorney had, in 
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litigation elsewhere, unsuccessfully attempted to force the lessees to retroactively pay for the 
repair and maintenance of the Hall. By bringing suit against several inhabitants of the manor 
he may have hoped to suggest liability for the Hall if they were farming on the same parcel of 
land on which it was situated. If the tenants claimed the right to farm the land around the Hall 
they would, then, be responsible for maintaining it. 
A set of interrogatories on behalf of the Attorney began by asking witnesses ‘whether or 
not they know the great hall in Gimingham […] called by the name of Gimingham Hall and 
the houses adjoining’ and whether they did ‘knowe Peter Reade Esquire, John Ransom, 
Anthony Death Esquire, all late of Gymyngham’ were ever resident within the great hall. Two 
of the witnesses, Edmund Gryme and Thomas Wafye, deposed that they knew the successive 
lessees and that ‘the said Mister Reade did dwell in the place mentioned in the said 
interrogatory’. Witnesses were then asked ‘is there not a wall or partition between the said 
great hall and the […] houses aforesaid at the south end […] and also a partition wall between 
the said hall and the houses of the west side’? Having asked a question to which he presumably 
already knew the answer, the Attorney further posed ‘how long the same walls or partitions to 
be there and whoe hath repayred and kept the same during [their] knowledge thereof’? One 
witness testified that the lessee Peter Read had erected walls separating the houses adjoining 
the hall from the land around them. In recounting this before the court, however, he recalled 
that there was also an ‘ancient ditch have been heretofore cast downe […] In the time of Mr 
Reade for the Beutifieng or enlarging of his garden […] for the fitting the groundes to his 
pleasing,’ and it was this ‘ancient ditch’ which ‘hath bene accounted, reputed and taken […] 
to be the ancient boundarie’ of the land upon which they were farming, not the remnants of 
Read’s walls or partitions.556  
In the eyes of this old witness, then, the tenants did have the right to use the lands in 
 




question because they were not part of the same parcel of land as Gimingham Hall. Peter Read’s 
expansion of the Hall was illegitimate. Customarily, lands adjoining the manor house had been 
much smaller. Tenants could, therefore, make use of the lands up to the point of the ancient 
ditch this witness remembered because that ditch, not Read’s walls, distinguished the land 
attached to the Hall from the lands around it. The physical markers of Read’s lordship over the 
manor had decayed in the time since his death, and the memory of his seigneurial authority had 
withered along with them. By 1615, in the absence strong lordship, the communal memory - 
and, consequently the legitimacy - of the changes Read had made to the manor had been 
overwritten by the more convenient memory of the way things had been in the more distant 
past557 The inhabitants of Gimingham used the past to undermine the Attorney’s argument and 
reassert their position on the manor.  
Just by examining a few of the interrogatories and depositions we can see that it touches 
on issues of seigneurial authority over time in how Read expanded the hall in the 1550s and 
the conflict over how the inhabitants began farming around the manor in the early seventeenth 
century. It also touches on the physicality of Gimingham, the topography of the manor in a 
material sense. The 1615 litigation was brought by the Attorney General of the Duchy of 
Lancaster because the Duchy ultimately owned the manor and, despite leasing it out to different 
lessees over the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, after a survey of the manor 
early in the reign of James I it was found to be in a state of decay. Subsequent lessees after 
Read had failed to maintain the manor house, Gimingham Hall, and it had fallen into a state of 
disrepair while the land around it was repurposed by other tenants. By bringing suit against the 
tenants the Attorney tried to stem the tide of decay and force the tenants to pay for the repair 
of Gimingham Hall. What we see in these depositions is an attempt by the Attorney to 
demarcate the boundaries of the hall and the surrounding land and establish who was 
 




responsible for its upkeep. While the tenants on the other hand argued that Gimingham Hall 
had been enlarged by previous lessees unlawfully and that they should not be liable to pay for 
its upkeep, as traditionally the boundaries of the land had looked rather different. 
 These depositions let us see how people remembered the past. How the discourse of 
memory was not for most people written down in documents but carved into the land. How 
people’s rights, liberties and obligations were not solely conceptualised through documents 
such as leases, or attached to court rulings, but they were also attached to the physical attributes 
of the landscape; rather, people used the material markers of what they saw as their rights, 
liberties and obligations to influence what was written in the records. Ordinary people viewed 
the land as a patchwork of customary entitlements, with each individual field or pasture 
differing slightly and telling a different story. We can see this in the 1615 depositions where 
the witnesses talk about the ancient boundary of the land, and we can also see it in the 1572 
depositions where the witnesses recall historical instances of enclosure around the manor. 
Memory is defined by what people choose to remember and what they forget.558 It is a 
dialectical discourse. The physical markers of Gimingham and the customary entitlements they 
denoted were how subalterns embedded contemporary discourses into the land. By carving the 
memory of customary entitlements into the landscape people embedded the prevailing 
distribution of power into the land and gave themselves a vocabulary with which to express 
their understanding of society in material terms. This allowed them to engage in discourses 
which they may have lacked the technical vocabulary to debate in an academic sense, but which 
they nevertheless understood on their own terms.559  
 
Historical memory inflected the very nature of civil society. Peter Read remembered the 
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practice of enclosure differently to the other tenants; Anne Read remembered the foldcourse 
differently to the other inhabitants. These sorts of memories were shaped by individual 
experience. What we also see with a run of depositions like we get in 1572, with multiple 
witnesses being asked the same set of interrogatories, is the collective nature of memory. How 
groups of people, in this case the tenants of Gimingham, remembered the customary status of 
pieces of land differently to the lessee. A multitude of remembrances came together to make 
one memory. The point is starkly illustrated in 1615 when we see how the inhabitants of 
Gimingham recalled the ancient boundary of the land being an ancient ditch instead of Peter 
Read’s more recent walled expansion of Gimingham Hall. Litigation like this is indicative of 
a contest over people’s memories as well as a contest over the memory of the people.560 There 
are, therefore, multiple levels of discursive engagement taking place in the recollection of 
events before a court.  
At its heart this analysis presumes a deliberate intentionality in remembering and 
forgetting. This is indicative of an active participation in contemporary discourses, debates, 
and legal processes, all of which are inherently political in nature. One of the most interesting 
ways to think about memory, especially if we accept the premise that it is essentially a 
utilitarian concept, is as a form of social action; both in terms of how it was constructed and 
how it was utilised. What we see in the testimony of witnesses in 1572 and 1615 is the range 
of ways people in sixteenth and seventeenth century Gimingham understood the world around 
them. That is, we see competing visions of politics and civil society in how people attempted 
to assert, challenge, and maintain the prevailing distribution of power.  
 






I began this thesis with three principal aims. The first was to simply interrogate the form and 
structure of legal records pertaining to the equity courts of Duchy Chamber and Star Chamber. 
The second was to use those texts to illustrate a more general historical theme, namely the 
effects of classical forms of rhetoric on English law and politics. My third principal aim was 
exemplify a particular way of interpreting historical texts by approaching pleadings and 
depositions before courts of equity, which have generally been considered the exclusive 
province of social historians, with the tools of intellectual history. In what follows we will draw 
together the analyses conducted through previous chapters by examining these general aims in 




The investigations conducted in Chapters Two and Three, into the form and structure of the 
pleadings before the Duchy Chamber and Star Chamber, served two closely connected 
purposes. The first was historiographical; the second, historical.  
We began by examining some of the orthodoxies in social and legal history. The first is 
one we find in legal history. That is to say, the central notion that English law has historically 
been somewhat insular; removed from the jurisprudential developments in continental Europe. 
This is a view of English law, rooted in the immemorial common law, which has been 
perpetuated by English lawyers for centuries. The notion that English law has existed since 
before the memory of man; that English common law is the common custom of the realm, 
legitimated by its continuous use since ancient times before the Norman Conquest. This was 




seventeenth century with Sir Edward Coke and his colleagues.561 The second is the notion, 
voiced by Chris Brooks, that most ‘British historians would probably maintain that whilst legal 
records are a useful source of evidence, “the law” itself is not a very worthwhile or rewarding 
subject of investigation’.562 This has thesis sought to contest the first assumption and to 
demonstrate that the second was the result of historians asking the wrong questions of legal 
records. 
Chapters Two and Three demonstrated how some key legal records, the pleadings before 
the equity courts of the Duchy of Lancaster’s Court of Duchy Chamber and the Star Chamber 
were structured according to a Ciceronian theory of forensic rhetoric. We examined rhetorical 
theory, in its classical origins in the key texts of Cicero’s De inventione and De oratore, 
Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria, and the anonymous Rhetorica ad herennium. We saw how an 
essentially Ciceronian theory of invention was to be found in sixteenth century rhetorical 
treatises, its chief advocates being Leonard Cox (1495-1550) with his The Art of crafte of 
Rhetoryke, first published in 1532; Richard Rainolde (1530-1606) with his The Foundacion of 
Rhetorike (1563); and most importantly Thomas Wilson (1524-1581) with his The Arte of 
Rhetorique, first published in 1553. These texts give explicit advice on how one should argue 
before a court of law and were in wide circulation in sixteenth-century England.  
Chapters Two and Three demonstrated that, if one examines pleadings before the equity 
courts along side the rhetorical literature, it is possible to see they follow the structure set out 
by the rhetoricians. We even saw how the connection between rhetoric and pleading was 
explicitly acknowledged by the rhetoricians, two of whom, Thomas Elyot and Thomas Wilson, 
held office in equity jurisdictions; Elyot as a clerk in Star Chamber and Wilson as a Master of 
the Court of Requests. The connection between what is essentially a classical theory of forensic 
 
561 Pocock, Ancient Constitution. 




rhetoric and pleading before English courts, which have emphasised their historical insularity 
from classical influences, flies in the face of the notion that English law was insular and devoid 
of any Roman influence. It was argued that this insularity was the product of sixteenth century 
common law discourse; the deployment of arguments based upon english historical ideas, of 
concepts such as custom and memory, is causally linked to latent assumptions within that 
discourse. They are the product of English history itself and contingently limited the way in 
which lawyers thought; they have, in turn, limited the ways in which scholars have approached 
English law. In other words, scholars have not given sufficient critical attention to the influence 
of humanism on English law and legal culture because so much of the legal literature has 
emphasised the insularity and independence of English law. 
The point of demonstrating that pleadings before the Duchy Chamber and Star Chamber 
were constructed according to rhetorical theory was to suggest that we should question some 
of the assumptions held in the scholarship. To illuminate the need to think about these texts in 
a different light. That is to say we need to stop thinking of the pleadings in equity jurisdictions 
as formulaic texts symptomatic of technical legal procedure. Their rhetorical underpinnings 
suggest they were intended to be intelligible and persuasive in a much wider context. We 
should, then, start thinking of these texts as rhetorical exercises; as written examples of judicial 
speech. If we treat pleadings as speech we can begin to ask a different set of questions. Namely, 
what is the value of a rhetorical oration in judicial speech? The value is, following the 
rhetoricians, found in the persuasive force associated with eloquent speech. Eloquence, 
however, was not, as we are so often told, the ornamentation of language with the figures and 
tropes of rhetorical speech. Both the classical and early modern rhetorical authorities saw 
eloquence as being embodied in structure. That is, in the invention of appropriate arguments 
and their deployment in a logically concise manner which emphasised reasoned persuasion 




pleadings before equity courts, then, the form and structure they took, was determined not by 
the technicalities of law but by the precepts of rhetoric. 
Once we see the rhetorical dimension of these texts, rather than just legal formulae serving 
a juridical function, we begin to see their multivalence. This brings us to the historical 
significance of the form and structure Chapters Two and Three have been concerned to 
demonstrate and explicate. Chapter Three demonstrated how, by contextualising all of the 
instruments in a particular piece of litigation, the whole process of equity litigation can be seen 
as a rhetorical exercise. That is to say, when we contextualise the plaintiff’s complaint or 
information alongside their rejoinder and the interrogatories and depositions drawn up for their 
witnesses, we perceive the forensic argument holistically; we see the narration of the facts in 
the pleadings and we see how the litigants attempted to use artificial proofs to confirm their 
argument through the replication and rejoinders, we then see how the interrogatories 
depositions were designed to utilise non-artificial proofs to confirm the artificial proofs 
deployed in the pleadings. What this amounts to is a completely different legal tradition than 
that of the common law jurisdictions but which nevertheless operated in tandem with the 
common law.  
The historiographical point Chapters Two and Three were concerned to explicate was that 
English law was neither insular nor devoid of Roman influence. Equity was premised on an 
existentially Roman understanding of jurisprudence. English lawyers, educated through a 
humanist curriculum in the grammar schools and the universities and Inns of Court, were 
saturated in an essentially classical theory of forensic rhetoric. This theory lay out a set of 
precepts which lawyers were to follow when producing a legal argument. Scholars, while 
noting the influence of the humanist curriculum on legal education have, it was argued in 
Chapters Two and Three, made a mistake in their analysis. They have tended to reverse the 




figures and tropes at the expense of the more general advice advocated at the beginning of the 
rhetorical textbooks.563 The salient point to grasp about rhetoric, which both the classical and 
early modern rhetoricians want their readers to grasp, is that rhetoric is not just ‘a care for 
words, but a deep concern for the subject’.564 That is to say, the specific words, the syntax, the 
figures and tropes of speech - dispositio and elecutio - are not as important as understanding 
which arguments are appropriate for that particular moment. If we search for words without 
first thinking about subject matter, Quintilian argues, ‘we shall merely do violence to what we 
have found out’, rather than enhancing our speech.565 The historical point these chapters have 
been concerned to make, which is closely connected to the historiographical in that it requires 
us to first jettison the notion of legal exceptionalism and insularity in order to recognise the 
classical form and structure of these texts, is that the very nature of arguing both sides of the 
case necessitates a substantive effect upon the content of English law. This recognition of 
classical, and essentially Roman, styles of argument in English legal culture is what is missing 
from the scholarship and without this recognition we are liable to misunderstand the 
development of English law in the sixteenth century. It is, therefore, a central contention of this 
thesis that ‘the law’ itself is a worthwhile and rewarding field of enquiry. We just need to 
illuminate it with a different set of questions. 
 
II 
The second main aim of this thesis has been to illustrate the value in thinking about English 
law and legal culture with this classical context in mind. The first point we considered in 
Chapters Two and Three was that we should think of these texts as written examples of judicial 
speech; in doing so we should explicate them as we might any speech-act. Approaching 
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pleadings and depositions in this way highlights their performativity and forces us to ask a 
different set of questions of the texts. Namely, what were lawyers and litigants doing in these 
texts. In short, Chapter Four argued that the forensic arguments we see in litigation, and in 
particular those made before Star Chamber, were intentionally designed to directly affect the 
content of English law. This is in direct tension with the conventional wisdom in the 
scholarship, which, since Maitland, holds that ‘English law is not where we look for humanism 
or the spirit of the Renaissance’.566 It also flies in the face of much more recent scholarship, 
which suggests that pleadings and depositions are poor sources for historians interested in the 
substantive content of the law.567 
In Chapters Two and Three we saw how in modern scholarship surrounding rhetoric there 
is a tendency to reverse this emphasis and concentrate on the more specific rhetorical figures 
and tropes at the expense of the more general advice advocated at the beginning of the 
rhetorical textbooks.568 Chapter Four demonstrated the significance of the forensic foundation 
of equity litigation for the development of English law. We saw how Equity gave lawyers and 
litigants the flexibility to argue their case; thus attempt to demonstrate how matters which did 
not fall within the scope of the law verbatim might nevertheless be seen to be within its scope. 
This is the analysis we saw through the lens of the Coke v Bateman litigation in Star Chamber, 
wherein Coke attempted to show how provision for the poor did fall under the scope of the law 
even before the Elizabethan Poor Law was introduced. We saw how the criminal law developed 
in Star Chamber in response to the forensic arguments deployed there. At its heart the 
development of English criminal law through the equitable jurisdiction of Star Chamber 
reflected the inadequacy of common law jurisdictions to account for contextual variations. As 
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Maitland argued long ago, a ‘system of law which will never compel, which will never even 
allow, the defendant to give evidence, a system which sense every question of fact to a jury, is 
not competent to deal adequately with fiduciary relationships.’569  
One of the fundamental points this thesis has been concerned to make is that scholars have 
struggled to grasp the role equitable litigation played in the development of English law. We 
‘ought not to think of common law and equity as two rival systems; Equity was not a self 
sufficient system, at every point it presupposed the existence of common law’.570 The root of 
all errors has, however, been for scholars to suppose that because Equity could not alter 
judgements at common law that Equity was in some way inferior. This is a mistake. Equity at 
all times presupposed the common law and we should think of its decrees and and orders as, 
for all intents and purposes, modifying the common law rather than correcting it. 
Equity would never say of X in relation to common law “no, that is not so you have 
made a mistake, your rule is absurd, an obsolete one”. It would instead say “yes, of 
course that is so, but it is not the whole truth. You say that A is the owner of the land; 
no one doubts that is so, but I must add that his is bound by one of those obligations 
know as trusts”.571 
The judgements given at Equity thus do affect the substantive content of the common law. 
Moreover, this thesis has sought to emphasise how this process took place over the course of 
the sixteenth century. We see this through the development of Star Chamber’s criminal 
jurisdiction and the extension of misdemeanours with a narrow statutory basis into wide 
ranging crimes. Thus, the notion that Star Chamber was in some way ancillary to the equitable 
jurisdiction of the Chancery and of ‘little importance for fundamental legal change’ is deeply 
misleading.572 Equitable jurisdictions, and Star Chamber in particular, began to have a 
substantive effect on the common law as soon as it began to administer an established set of 
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rules and procedures. We begin to see this in the later-sixteenth century; well before the 
abolition of the court in 1641, when it is commonly held that much of the legal innovation in 
Star Chamber’s criminal jurisdiction was adopted in bulk by the common law courts.573 The 
judges that sat in Star Chamber invariably also sat in the common law jurisdictions and Equity 
steadily bled into the common law with each successive judgement. Again, the fundamental 
point to remember here is that it was the rhetorical premise of Equity which allowed lawyers 
and litigants to argue their position rather than simply pleading to the facts of a case. This, in 
turn, allowed them to describe events as riotous or fraudulent, for instance, when the common 
law would perhaps not have initially recognised them as such. 
In Chapter Four we saw how humanist discourse inflected more than the form and structure 
of the pleadings. We saw how lawyers and litigants drew upon the vocabularies of Cicero and 
Tacitus, as well as ancient constitutionalism, in the substantive content of their arguments. We 
saw them attempt to legitimate their behaviour by deploying contrasting visions of civil society. 
The litigation between Sir Edward Coke and Robert Bateman, for instance, illustrated how a 
government minister used an authoritarian notion of civil society to attempt to enforce royal 
policy through the prerogative courts; we saw how the inhabitants of Gimingham attempted to 
repudiate that vision of civil society with recourse to their ancient rights and privileges 
enshrined in the common law. This conflict between Coke and the inhabitants of Gimingham 
was used to demonstrate how key political concepts, such as the nature of civil society, were 
contested through litigation; how relatively ordinary rural inhabitants contested the ruling 
ideologies of their governors. We see how the inhabitants of Gimingham understood, for 
instance, politics and the role of the State through a legal lens. 
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This thesis has sought to approach the interpretation of court records, generally seen to be the 
province of social history, with the tools of intellectual history. In doing so it has developed a 
polemical argument which has sought to criticise various aspects of existing scholarship 
surrounding early modern law, politics and society. The aim has not necessarily been to pursue 
all of the arguments advanced here to their logical conclusions. This would be far beyond the 
scope of a doctoral thesis. Rather, it has been to suggest that historiographies should be more 
interdisciplinary. Social historians have, for instance, generally sought to explicate equity court 
records as evidence for the beliefs of people in early modern England. At its core has been the 
notion that the act of historical interpretation should be centrally concerned with the explication 
of actions. It has been argued that, by correctly identifying the linguistic actions within court 
records, we can explicate how ordinary people in early modern England used contemporary 
ideas and ideologies to understand and engage with the world around them on a daily basis.  
Chapter Five developed the analysis we began in Chapter Four and demonstrated how the 
inhabitants of Gimingham contested key political concepts through litigation. We saw how 
people other than lawyers and litigants used opportunities to testify in depositions to contribute 
to contemporary political discourse. We saw, for instance, how the inhabitants of Gimingham 
used the discourse of popular memory to suggest an alternative distribution of power in the 
manor. How authority and power could be written into the landscape and deployed to challenge 
the prevailing distribution of power in the manor. Chapter Five thus demonstrated what power 
could mean in a given context; what it meant to people in a particular context; how it inflected 
their understanding and engagement with their world. Power is, in one form or another, always 
everywhere. It is, therefore, not suited to historical analyses. What we, as historians, need to 
understand is how our understanding of power has changed over time. In order to arrive at such 




affect and effect; that is freedom. 
Civil society, however, is defined not by power but by the freedoms and liberties enjoyed 
by members of that society. The litigation around Gimingham in the later sixteenth century 
shows how civil society functioned on the ground in rural Norfolk. What we see in litigation 
around Gimingham is, following Wood, how inhabitants attempted to extent, reassert and 
challenge the prevailing distribution of power but, crucially, this done in relation to their rights, 
liberties and freedom within the Manor of Gimingham. In other words, the point to recognise 
is not that power was contested through litigation. This is surely self evident. It is, rather, how 
power was shaped by ideas and ideologies of liberty and freedom. How power in early modern 
England was mediated through the law.  
What this boils down to is a simple but deceptively complex question: what is politics? 
Perhaps the most polemical point this thesis has suggested is that Patrick Collinson’s ‘new 
political history, which is social history with the politics put back in, or an account of political 
processes which is also social’574 has yet to be realised. Social historians have argued that 
politics was diffused through early modern society and that power is its defining attribute. This 
is based largely on twentieth century anthropological investigations of power.575 By contrast, 
this thesis suggests that what is to count as politics is historically specific. A notion of politics 
based upon the anthropological conception found in recent social history would not have been 
recognisable in the time to which they have applied it.576 Such a notion is far too broad and, 
rather, reflects what is to count as political in modern society. In light of this, social historians 
should consider what it is they purport to study. That is to say, are we studying our politics 
historically, or are we considering the history of politics. History ‘comes to life when we draw 
together the insights of social historians and historians of political thought’.577 Thus, 
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576 Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought. 




approaching the texts with which we have been concerned throughout this thesis with the tools 
of intellectual history illustrates how ordinary people deployed ideas and ideologies in 
litigation to define power and the limits of politics in their society; and thus constitute 
contemporary civil society.  
In early modern England people conceptualised politics in terms of their rights, liberties 
and freedoms under the law. This thesis has sought to show that it is to how people used ideas 
and ideologies in everyday life that we should turn. A history of political process which is also 
social necessarily entails an account of how the majority of people in early modern England 
contested the nature of civil society. That is to say, it entails an account of that ‘most popular 
of indoor sports’: litigation.578 This thesis has sought to demonstrate how the inhabitants 
Gimingham understood and engaged with key political concepts concerning power, authority, 
the state and the liberties and freedoms they enjoyed in early modern civil society. In so doing 
it has argued that the distinction between law and politics, as between political theory and 
political practice, is but a stubborn illusion. 
 
ed., The Politics of the Excluded, c. 1500-1850 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 153-94. 
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